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Abstract

This dissertation consists of three essays examining the relation between corporate governance and firm
performance. The theme of this study is that the widely documented long-term underperformance in
equity carve-outs can be partly explained by weak corporate governance.
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 explores the effect of shareholder-rights protection on the
performance of a sample of firms that initiated a carve-out during the period 1983-2004. Using the
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) entrenchment index,
as proxies for the quality of shareholder-rights protection, I provide evidence that firms with better
shareholder rights protection outperform those with weaker rights protection. Results indicate that the
weaker the rights protection, the greater the degree of underperformance. Overall, the results are robust to
measures of firm performance and to model specification.
The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between firm performance and board
structure. In particular, I study how board size, board independence, and CEO duality influence firm
performance. I find that board size for non-financial firms is negatively related to firm performance but
positively associated with performance for financial firms. Board independence is positively related to
firm performance and CEO duality is negatively associated with performance for both financial and nonfinancial firms. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance. The conflicting
evidence on board size, between financials and non-financials, seems to suggest that the scope and
complexity of a firm‟s operations drives board size.
The third essay presented in Chapter 4 investigates corporate ownership and firm performance. I focus on
insider ownership, outside blockholder ownership, and ownership concentration. Results show that
insider ownership is negatively related to firm performance even at low levels of insider ownership levels.
It is plausible that the combination of parent ownership and management ownership in the subsidiary
exacerbate the entrenchment effect thus overwhelming the incentive alignment effects that theory posits. I
document a positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. And finally, I
show that the level of ownership concentration increases (decreases) in anticipation of positive (negative)
changes in firm performance.

JEL Classifications: G32, G34, G38, K22
Keywords: Carve-outs; GIM-Index; Entrenchment-index; Divisive restructurings; Anti-takeover
Provisions; Corporate Boards; External Directors; Board Size; Board-insiders; Board Independence;
Ownership Structure; Insider-Ownership; Managerial-Ownership; Blockholders.
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Chapter 1
1.

Introduction
This dissertation examines the relation between corporate governance and firm

performance. The theme of the study is that the widely documented poor performance of equity
carve-outs, following the announcement, can be partly explained by weak corporate governance.
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 explores the effect of shareholder-rights protection on the
performance of a sample of firms that announcement a carve-out during the period 1983-2004.
Using the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004)
entrenchment index, as proxies for the quality of shareholder-rights protection, I provide
evidence that firms with stronger shareholder-rights protection outperform those with weaker
rights protection. Results show that the weaker the rights protection, the greater the degree of
underperformance. This evidence is robust to various measures of firm performance and to
model specification.
The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between board structure
and firm performance. In particular, I explore the potential influence of board size, board
independence, and CEO duality on firm performance and whether the cross-sectional variations
in these attributes across the sample can explain inter-firm performance disparity. I find that
board size for non-financial firms is negatively related to firm performance but positively
associated with performance for financial firms. Board independence is positively related to firm
performance and CEO duality is negatively associated with performance for both financial and
non-financial firms. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance and to
model specification. The conflicting evidence on board size between financial and non-financial
firms suggests that board size may be largely driven by the scope and complexity of a firm‟s
operations and should not be prescribed across firms.
The third essay presented in Chapter 4 investigates the relation between corporate
ownership and firm performance. I explore to what extent insider ownership, outside blockholder ownership and ownership concentration moderate the relation between ownership
structure and firm performance in equity carve-outs. I find that contrary to extant evidence
positing a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low levels of
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ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is rejected in the
case of equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider ownership in the
subsidiary seem to exacerbate the entrenchment effects and to overwhelm the incentive
alignment effects at very low levels of insider ownership. I present evidence in support of the
positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The presence of
outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly dominant
parent firm. And lastly, I show that in the case of equity carve-outs, the level of ownership
concentration seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes in firm
performance. Overall, these findings seem to suggest that dominant parent firms, at least in the
case of equity carve-outs, exacerbate rather than mitigate the agency problem. As a matter of
governance policy in the case of equity carve-outs, alternative control mechanisms may be
necessary to moderate the behavior of dominant parent firms.
2.

Motivation and Contributions

2.1

Motivation
Beginning with Adam Smith (1776) in the Wealth of Nations, and much later in a seminal

exposition on the demerits of the corporate form by Berle and Means (1932), the idea of
divorcing corporate ownership from corporate control and its implications for firm value has
preoccupied financial economists. Berle and Means (1932) went as far as suggesting that the
corporate form was an untenable form of organization. Despite this criticism, control and
ownership of the modern public firm are still separated. Specialization, one of the basic tenets of
free markets, suggests that atomistic owners with relatively small stakes in the firm may have
neither the incentive nor the skills to run the firm. Consequently, shareholders (principals) are
better off hiring professional managers (agents) to whom they delegate decision rights to pursue
the objective of maximizing share value. Although in this organizational form the modern firm
has proved to be a very efficient means for raising and deploying capital, this efficiency does not
come without cost. When corporate ownership and control are separated agency conflicts
invariably arise. The interests of the managers, acting as agents, may not necessarily be in
alignment at all times with those of shareholders (principals) on whose behalf they are acting.
These principal-agent conflicts are what constitute the fundamental problem that belies the
notion of corporate governance.
2

Corporate governance can be defined as a complex system of mechanisms intended to
overcome the conflict of interests inherent in the corporate form. The inability of the firm to
establish an effective system of corporate governance therefore poses significant risk to outside
investors and is detrimental to the survival of the firm itself. This critical importance of corporate
governance has spawned an extensive literature. Some studies explore whether various
governance mechanisms are optimally chosen to maximize shareholder wealth, others investigate
whether governance mechanisms are chosen independent of each other or jointly to resolve
conflicts of interest, and the rest examine the independent or joint influence of governance
mechanisms on firm performance. In spite of these research efforts the existing evidence is still
mixed and largely inconclusive for various reasons that I discuss below. The three essays reexamine the relation between corporate governance and firm performance by attempting to
mitigate the major econometric problems that plague previous studies.

First, previous corporate governance studies have generally been hampered by a number
of econometric issues. Chief among these are: the endogeneity problem, poor measurement of
variables, omitted explanatory variables, selection bias, and lack of data. The main objective of
this dissertation is to re-examine the relation between corporate governance and firm
performance using methodological approaches that control for these problems. The goal is to run
alternative estimation methods and successively increase their complexity with a view to
discerning the effect on coefficients. The idea here is that if any statistically significant changes
in the coefficients can be observed, then it is plausible that the choice of econometric models in
earlier studies may partly explain the largely mixed evidence. To the extent that the choice of
estimation models in this study is more reliable than simple OLS approaches implemented in the
majority of earlier studies, I present new evidence that sheds light on whether and how corporate
governance influences firm performance.

Second, the persistence of governance structures across time is well documented and
often cited as one of the factors that weaken findings in previous studies. This auto-correlation
renders empirical tests on the association between corporate governance and firm performance
weak and unreliable. I argue that some of the conflicting evidence that exists may be due to this
problem. To mitigate this persistence problem, I exploit the experimental setting presented by the
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structural break in governance following the announcement of a carve-out transaction. Further
investigation in this set up is likely to shed more light on the evolution of governance structures
and whether these changes have any impact on firm performance.

Finally, although an extensive IPO literature exists that addresses market reaction and
post firm performance [Eckbo, et al. (2000), Brav, et al. (2000), and Ritter and Welch (2002)],
issues involving equity carve-outs are not directly addressed. Equity carve-outs are
fundamentally different from traditional IPOs and spinoffs. The strong ties that continue to bind
carve-out subsidiaries to their parent are non-existent in other IPO transactions. In addition,
following most carve-outs the subsidiary gets new management with separate compensation and
incentive structures. I argue that parent firms, with the approval of their boards, exercise
significant discretion in this restructuring. It is reasonable to hypothesize that some of the
performance issues raised following carve-out announcements can be partly attributable to
agency conflicts between the parent firm and minority shareholders in the subsidiary.
Considering that some of these costs are borne by the new minority shareholders, it raises the
issue of minority shareholder-rights protection in equity carve-outs, which I investigate in the
first essay. Further investigation of equity carve-outs is also likely to shed light on the merits and
demerits of having a corporate blockholder with majority control. And to what extent other
forms of ownership such as institutional ownership and the presence of external blockholders can
moderate these potential agency problems. I attempt to answer these questions in the third essay.

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that a gap still exists in our understanding of how
corporate governance in general, and the specific mechanisms in particular, influence firm
performance. Denis (2001), in a survey “The Last 25-years of Corporate Governance Research‟,
highlights our limited understanding of the influence of governance on firm performance and
delineates areas for future research. She posits that our understanding of corporate governance
requires further work in the following areas: (1) why various corporate governance mechanisms
should be expected to mitigate the agency problem, (2) how these mechanisms interact with each
other and with other important characteristics of the firm, (3) a need to develop theoretical inner
workings of governance mechanisms such as the board. More importantly, she asserts that
existing governance literature fails to establish an unambiguous link between the quality of
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governance and firm performance. My dissertation attempts to fill this gap by focusing on three
governance mechanisms: the quality of shareholder-rights protection, board structure, and
corporate ownership.

2.2

Contributions
The three essays in this dissertation fit within the corporate restructuring strand on one

hand, and corporate governance literature on the other. These essays make three important
contributions to extant literature. First, in light of the severe econometric issues that confound
earlier corporate governance studies, I present evidence supported by improved empirical
techniques, in particular the instrumental variables approach (IV) and the generalized method of
moments (GMM). Second, as discussed earlier the persistence of governance structures makes it
harder to empirically discern changes in governance and the impact those changes may have on
firm performance. In this study, I mitigate this issue by exploiting the experimental setting
presented by the structural break in the governance structures of restructuring firms. This
strategy also allows me to take an evolutionary approach to analyzing changes in corporate
governance and their impact on firm performance. I present evidence that changes in
shareholder-rights protection, board structure, and ownership structure have an impact on firm
performance. Third, there is a dearth of evidence on the effects of blockholder ownership when
the blockholder is a corporation. In the case of equity carve-outs, the parent firm happens to be
the largest blockholder. I argue that the parent firm being also the largest blockholder puts it in
too powerful a position that the interests of the fringe minority may be compromised. Consistent
with this argument but contrary to extant evidence, results show a statistically significant
negative relation between the level of control retained by the parent and the performance of the
subsidiary following the announcement.
3.

Background

3.1

The Agency Problem
The notion of corporate governance is a consequence of the fundamental agency problem

created by the potential set of conflicts of interest amongst various stakeholders of the firm
including managers (agents), shareholders (principals), directors, debt-holders, employees, and
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suppliers. Most studies focus on three main conflicts of interest: manager-shareholder conflicts,
shareholder-bondholder conflicts, and director-shareholder conflicts. In the following section I
describe the main agency conflicts and discuss potential problems that are likely to arise in the
absence of effective governance.

Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders arise when managers, acting as
agents on behalf of shareholders (principals), engage in activities that are detrimental to
shareholders and inconsistent with the goals of shareholder value maximization. Four potential
sources of conflict exist: managers‟ desire to remain in power even though it would be optimal to
replace them, managers‟ choice of effort, managers being too risk averse, and the free cash flow
problem. Conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders are important considering that
corporate governance is highly reliant on a system of checks and balances. The shareholders
(principals) who hire managers (agents) to run their firms cannot reasonably monitor them on a
day-to-day basis. Instead, shareholders appoint a board of directors to which they delegate the
responsibility of monitoring the managers to ensure that shareholders‟ interests are well served.
A board that is independent of senior management is more likely to discharge this responsibility
more effectively and objectively. Conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders arise
when the former come to identify with managers‟ interests rather than shareholders‟. In these
circumstances, a board beholden to senior management will tend to exacerbate the managershareholder conflicts afore-mentioned. The issue of board independence and firm performance is
the subject of my second essay.

3.2

Governance Mechanisms
Given the potential agency costs that separation of corporate ownership and control is

likely to impose on shareholders, a system of mechanisms has evolved over time to help mitigate
some of these costs. This system of mechanisms is what constitutes what is commonly referred
to as corporate governance. Governance mechanisms can be broadly categorized as internal or
external. Internal mechanisms are those checks and balances within the firm itself that are
designed to align the interests of various stakeholders. Examples of internal mechanisms include:
the board, managerial compensation and succession, capital structure, and ownership structure.
Corporate boards, as one of the key internal stakeholder-interest alignment mechanisms in the
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governance of the modern public firm, have attracted the interest of researchers for a long time.
The board of directors is an instrument designed to ensure that the resources of the firm are used
in the best long-term interest of the shareholders. To effectively perform that function board
members must be independent, resourceful, and have the experience to judge the actions of
senior management. Some of the big questions about boards that empirical research has
attempted to answer include: (1) What factors affect the composition of boards; (2) Whether and
how board characteristics, such as proportion of external-to-insider directors and board size
affect firm performance; and lastly (3) How effectively corporate boards accomplish their
intended role as an interest alignment mechanism. Managerial compensation and succession is
another internal mechanism intended to align the interests of managers and those of shareholders
and is one of the top responsibilities assigned to the board of directors. Two important questions
that empirical research has grappled with for some time are the level of managerial compensation
and its sensitivity to performance. The issues at hand are whether managers are fairly
compensated or over-compensated. And perhaps more importantly, since compensation contracts
are designed to align manager-shareholder interests, to what extent is compensation sensitive to
firm performance?

External mechanisms include the market for corporate control, the judicial system, and
product markets. In the event that a firm fails to institute an effective internal governance system,
significant agency costs will be imposed on its shareholders. These costs will in turn be reflected
in the firm‟s relative underperformance or low market valuation. Market participants outside the
firm are likely perceive that as an opportunity to acquire the underperforming firm, replace bad
management and create additional value for their shareholders by improving the operations and
governance system. The judicial system plays an important role in disciplining managers and
controlling the opportunistic behavior of other stakeholders. Systems of laws and regulations that
govern a firm in a given jurisdiction have a significant impact on what managers and other
stakeholders in a corporation can do and what they cannot do. Competitiveness in the product
markets is another external disciplinary mechanism that aligns the interests of shareholders and
management. Managers have a vested interest in the survival of the firm because their continued
tenure depends on it. Ensuring that the firm they are managing not only survives but thrives in
the product market necessitates that managers deploy the firm‟s resources efficiently and
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productively. Even through the self-preservation motive may seem self-interested, shareholders
are ultimately the beneficiaries of these actions when firm value increases. All these mechanisms
are complementary in nature and none individually, is sufficient to mitigate the severity of
potential agency conflicts. In this study, I focus on internal mechanisms and examine the
influence of shareholder-rights protection, board structure, and corporate ownership on firm
performance.
4.

The Econometrics of Governance Studies
The main objective of corporate governance is to mitigate agency conflicts amongst

stakeholders of a corporation and to ensure that the firm‟s resources are deployed in a manner
that is consistent with shareholder value maximization. Empirical studies in corporate
governance seek to understand the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms and their
potential impact on firm value. In most of these studies some proxies of firm performance, say,
return on assets (ROA) or Tobin‟s Q, is projected onto a set of explanatory variables that
represent a set of governance mechanisms. It is noteworthy that the empirical evidence on
corporate governance is largely a mixed bag and far from conclusive. The conflicting evidence
can partly be attributed to a number of econometric problems. In this section, I present the major
problems and describe various approaches that I implement in this study to mitigate them.

The first and perhaps most troublesome is the endogeneity problem. This problem
manifests itself either as spurious correlation between the dependent and the explanatory
variables or as reverse causality in regression models. In the first instance, spurious correlation
confounds empirical results when no economic causal relation truly exists between the dependent
and the independent variable but some unobserved variable is related to both the dependent
variable and the independent variable. Empirically, we would observe a significant relation in
our regression model between the dependent and independent variables, which however, is
spurious and not causal. On the other hand, reverse causality taints regression results when we
find a significant relation between the dependent and independent variables but there is no clarity
on the direction of causality. Empirical results are likely to be biased and inconsistent without
testing and effectively controlling for the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables.
Moreover, it is plausible that the unobserved heterogeneity across sample firms could potentially
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explain the differences observed in firm performance if systematic cross-sectional differences
amongst firms somehow influence performance.

The omitted explanatory variable is the second problem that hampers empirical
interpretation in corporate governance studies. In addition, lack of data and misspecified
functional forms are known to exacerbate this problem. The omitted variable problem is difficult
to resolve because it is not obvious which variables are missing or how many. Various
approaches have been suggested. One approach is incorporate into the regression model an
indicator variable for whether an explanatory variable is observed. Another approach is to
stratify the model based on the range of values for an explanatory variable, with a separate
stratum for those with missing explanatory variables. And lastly, inclusion of quadratic terms
and the use of piece-wise regressions have also been shown to partially mitigate the problem.

Third, empirical governance studies are saddled with the issue of sample selection-bias.
The majority of samples used in governance studies consist of firms that are large, publicly
traded, more profitable, and better governed. These are firms that are most likely to be covered
by major data vendors. It is arguable that firm characteristics typical of such samples induce a
certain level of bias in firm behavior, stewardship, and governance structures that in turn may
bias the findings in extant literature. My final sample of equity carve-outs consists of a broad
selection of firms ranging from small to very large corporations [Table 2].

Fourth, serial persistence of governance structures across time is extensively documented
in various studies such as Bhagat and Black (2001), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Yermack
(1996), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Madura and Nixon (2002). This empirical
regularity tends to weaken the explanatory power of most econometric models implemented to
ascertain the relation between governance and firm performance. In this study, I attempt to
overcome this problem by exploiting the structural break in the governance system of firms
which undergo restructurings, in particular equity carve-outs.

These empirical problems notwithstanding, a majority of previous governance studies
take a simple OLS approach of projecting some measure of firm performance onto a set of
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governance variables. The attempt to relate a complex set of inter-relationships via a simple
linear model is likely to generate false evidence of causality in some instances where none exists
or to negate causality when in fact it exists. More recent studies have implemented the
simultaneous equations approach (SEM). The SEM approach ideally captures the notion of
optimal joint-determination of governance mechanisms when it is appropriately identified.
However, in the case of governance studies, this approach suffers from severe identification
problems. Bhagat, et al. (The Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies, 2005), assert that
“…identification requires a combination of exclusion restrictions, assumptions about the
distribution of the error terms, and strong restrictions on the functional form” which in their
opinion is still an unresolved problem. Consequently, the evidence presented using the
simultaneous equations method is also unsurprisingly mixed and in some cases contradictory.

Finally, variable measurement and definitional issues arise when attempting to reconcile
extant evidence. It is true that corporate governance variables can only be measured imperfectly,
however the issue is further complicated when variables are defined in different ways. Take for
example, ownership, which is defined as „ownership by the board‟; „insider ownership‟; „CEO
ownership‟; „block-holder ownership‟; or „institutional ownership‟ in various studies.
Measurement problems also arise when choosing proxies for firm performance. Return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin‟s Q have been widely used with equally contradictory
results. Clearly these disparities in variable definition and measurement obscure the
interpretation of findings and frustrate any attempts at reconciling findings from disparate
studies. Is sum, all the above issues individually and in combination have contributed to our
limited understanding of whether and how corporate governance influences firm performance
and to the largely mixed evidence.

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The first essay presented in chapter 2
investigates the effect of shareholder-rights protection on firm performance. The second essay
examining the relation between board structure and firm performance is presented in chapter 3.
And lastly, chapter 4 presents the third essay analyzing the evolution of ownership structure in
equity carve-outs and the impact that these changes have on firm performance.
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Chapter 2
Shareholder-Rights Protection and Firm Performance: Evidence from
Equity Carve-Outs

Abstract

Using improved estimation methods and exploiting the experimental setting presented by the
structural breaks in a firm‟s governance structure through equity carve-outs, I investigate the association
between the quality of shareholder-rights protection and firm performance for the period 1983-2004.
Consistent with extant evidence, I find that in the short-run markets react positively to carve-out
announcements, however, in the longer run equity carve-outs underperform the control group. I document
negative monthly excess returns of -0.23% (-0.07%) for the 36-month (60-month) value-weighted index
and -0.17% (-0.03%) for the 36-month (60-month) for the equally-weighted index of sample firms.
Within the carve-out sample, results indicate that firms with weaker rights protection underperform those
with stronger protections. Increased transparency has been advanced as one of the motives for equity
carve-outs. Within this subset, subsidiary firms with weaker shareholder-rights protection again
underperform those with stronger protections. These results are consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and

Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004), and are robust to various measures of firm
performance and to both proxies for the quality of shareholder- rights protection [GIM-index and the
entrenchment index]. Overall, this evidence lends further credence to the notion that protecting
shareholder-rights impacts firm performance, even in countries with strong judicial protections like the
US.

JEL Classifications: G34, K22
Keywords: Carve-outs; GIM-Index; Entrenchment-Index; Divisive Restructurings; Anti-takeover
Provisions.
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1.

Introduction
It well known that agency conflicts, resulting from the separation of corporate ownership

and control, significantly imperil shareholder interests if a firm fails to establish a sound and
effective system of corporate governance. As a result, various governance mechanisms have
evolved over time to ensure the primacy of shareholder interests in the public corporate form. An
extensive academic literature debates the efficacy of these mechanisms. Existing evidence,
though inconclusive, suggests that when well intentioned and reasonably implemented these
mechanisms in combination significantly mitigate the agency problem. Invariably, it begs the
question: Does effective corporate governance result in improved firm performance? To date the
evidence that conclusively suggests a direct link between corporate governance and firm
performance is very scanty, at best. I re-examine the association between governance and firm
performance by implementing improved estimation techniques with the goal of mitigating some
of the econometric issues that have plagued earlier studies. In this essay I focus on whether and
how the quality of shareholder rights protection impacts firm performance.

Governance mechanisms, even when in place, can still be subverted by management. A
typical example is when management changes the by-laws or enacts provisions that erode or
limit the rights of shareholders. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), henceforth GIM, construct
an index that ranks firms based on the quality of shareholder-rights protection using a set of 24
provisions. They show that firms with stronger rights protections earn abnormal returns of
approximately 8.5% per year higher than those with weaker protections. In addition, such firms
have higher market values, higher profits, and greater sales. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004)
on the other hand, construct a narrower index - the „entrenchment index‟, using a set of six
provisions [four „constitutional‟ and two „anti-takeover‟] that are deemed to be more restrictive
of shareholder-rights. These provisions include staggered boards; limits to amend the charter;
super-majority voting provisions; golden parachutes; and poison pills. They show that increases
in the index are monotonically related to reductions in firm value as measured by Tobin‟s Q.

Following GIM (2003) and Bebchuk, et al. (2004), I test the hypothesis that long-term
under-performance in equity carve-outs is partly explained by weak shareholder-rights
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protection. I find that strong shareholder-rights protection is associated with better firm
performance. In particular, carve-out firms that exhibit stronger shareholder-rights protection
exhibit moderate long-term underperformance while those with weaker shareholder-rights
protection performed significantly worse than the control group. This study fits within both the
corporate restructurings literature and the corporate governance strand linking governance to
firm performance. I present new evidence linking the long-term underperformance observed in
equity carve-outs to weak shareholder-rights protection. More generally, I present evidence
linking corporate governance to firm performance. These results are consistent with findings by
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) GIM (2003) and
lend further credence to the notion that even in countries with strong investor legal protections
such as the US, shareholder-rights protection remains important.

The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section 2 I review the literature and
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection process. Empirical
tests and findings are presented in section 4. Robustness tests are discussed in section 5 and
section 6 concludes.

2.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

In this section I review relevant theories on equity carve-outs and shareholder rights
protection and their main predictions on firm performance to develop testable hypotheses. Then I
discuss extant empirical evidence both in support and negation of the main predictions.

2.1

Theory on Equity Carve-outs

Various motives have been advanced for carve-out transactions and by extension to
explain the widely documented positive market reaction following the announcement [Schipper
and Smith (1986), Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Boone
(2001), and Anand Vijh (2002)]. Initiating a carve-out is presumed to be a strategic move on the
part of the parent firm to correct some past mistakes, take advantage of a new business
environment, or to mitigate an information asymmetry problem. Evidence shows that the market

13

expects any one of these motives to generate gains for the initiating firm. The positive reaction is
reflected in the initial average (median) return of 4.9% (2.1%) documented by Schipper and
Smith (1986) for equity carve-outs compared to the average negative return of -2 to -3% when
parent firms issue seasonal equity (Smith 1986 a, b). Theories in support of restructuring gains
fall in two broad categories: the divestiture gains hypothesis and the information asymmetry
hypothesis.

The divestiture gains theory postulates that when firms initiate a carve-out they are likely
to realize gains from a number of sources including: the refinancing strategy, incentive alignment
and corporate re-focusing strategy. The refinancing hypothesis suggests that raising equity
capital is the primary reason for carve-outs. A capital constrained firm chooses to unbundle a
business unit in order to alleviate its liquidity constraints. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms
that initiate carve-outs exhibit higher leverage ratios, lower interest coverage ratios, and lower
profit ratios than matched firms [Allen & McConnell (1998)]. The refinancing hypothesis
predicts that both the parent and the subsidiary will show performance improvements resulting
from less financial distress. The re-focusing hypothesis posits that value is created when
previously over- diversified firms use carve-outs to re-focus their operations [Comment and
Jarrell (1995), and Boone (2001)]. Moreover, corporate focus, it is argued, leads to more
efficient contracting between managers and shareholders by enabling stock-based compensation
that is more sensitive to firm performance than would be possible within a conglomerate. And
lastly, the incentive alignment hypothesis posits that value is created in the subsidiary when
managerial incentives in the unbundled unit are better aligned with those of shareholders in the
subsidiary.

The information asymmetry hypothesis is couched in the spirit of signaling models in
Myers and Majluf (1984). Parent firms perceiving an undervaluation of some of their business
segments choose to unbundle these units so as to enhance their transparency and thus unlock
hidden value. The overall prediction is that carve-out subsidiaries that are less related to the
parent will elicit a stronger positive market reaction and to outperform subsidiary firms that are
more closely related to the parent.
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2.2

Theory on Shareholder Rights Protection

Motivated by agency theory, the strength of shareholder rights protection is deemed to
moderate the negative consequences of separating corporate ownership and control. Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct the GIM-index to test the impact of shareholder rights
protection on firm performance. The index is comprised of 24 governance characteristics
identified by the Institutional Investors Research Center (IRRC) to proxy for the quality of
governance. They show that firms with stronger shareholder protections earn abnormal returns of
approximately 8.5%. The stronger performance, they argue, is explained by lower agency costs
resulting from a closer alignment of manager-shareholder interests. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2004) on the other hand, construct a narrower index - the „entrenchment index‟, using a set of
six provisions [four „constitutional‟ and two „anti-takeover‟] that are deemed to be more
restrictive of shareholder-rights. These provisions include staggered boards; limits to amend the
charter; super-majority voting provisions; golden parachutes; and poison pills. The higher the
index the weaker is shareholder rights protection. They show that increases in the index are
monotonically related to reductions in firm value as measured by Tobin‟s Q. A number of
explanations are advanced. First, weak shareholder-rights protection may inhibit the removal of
incompetent managers or board members thus prolonging mediocre performance. Second, given
the entrenchment of current managers there will be limited scrutiny by the board, the market for
corporate control, and much less by the rest of the shareholders. This lack of scrutiny invariably
induces behaviors such as shirking, empire building, and perquisite consumption that increase a
manager‟s private benefits on one hand but destroy shareholder value on the other. Therefore
managers intent on continued enjoyment of private benefits are likely to shield themselves from
disciplinary mechanisms by instituting charter amendments and bye-laws that restrict
shareholder oversight. Overall, the prediction is that firm performance is positively related to the
strength of shareholder right protection.

2.3

Hypotheses Development

In the context of a domineering corporate blockholder and a minority fringe, the notion of
shareholder protection becomes highly imperative. The divestiture gains and incentive alignment
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theories on equity carve-outs suggest that we should expect improved firm performance
following the announcement of the transaction. Although empirical evidence shows positive
market reaction upon announcement of equity carve-outs, in the longer-term carve-outs in
general underperform matched firms. To test for the impact of shareholder rights protection on
firm performance, I relate the quality of shareholder rights protection (measured by the GIMindex and the entrenchment index) to the performance of a sample of firms that initiated carveout transactions during the period 1993-2004. I conjecture that carve-out firms with stronger
shareholder protection will outperform those with weaker shareholder rights protection.

H1:

Long-term carve-out performance is positively related to the quality of
shareholder-rights protection.

The corporate re-focus and information asymmetry theories, on the other hand, posit that
value is created when previously over-diversified firms use carve-outs either to re-focus their
operations [Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Boone (2001)]. In addition, corporate re-focus
leads to more efficient contracting between managers and shareholders by enabling stock-based
compensation that is more sensitive to firm performance than is possible within a conglomerate.
Carve-out subsidiaries that are more closely related to the parent are predicted to earn larger
abnormal returns upon announcement and to outperform those that are less related to the parent.
To test the corporate refocus/information asymmetry hypotheses, I include a dummy variable
(SIC) in the model specification coded as „1‟ if the subsidiary firm does not belong to the same
2-digit SIC code as the parent or „0‟ otherwise. I argue that subsidiaries that are less related to
the parent are the ones likely to benefit the most from the reduction in information asymmetry. If
the quality of shareholder rights protection significantly influences post-carve-out performance,
then subsidiaries with stronger rights protection are likely to outperform those with weaker rights
protection. Consequently the prediction on the SIC dummy variable should be positive and
statistically significant.

H2:

Carve-out subsidiaries that are less related to the parent firm and have stronger
shareholder-rights protection will outperform subsidiaries that are less related to
the parent and have weaker shareholder- rights protection.
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2.4

Empirical Evidence

2.4.1 Market Reaction to Equity Carve-outs

Extensive empirical evidence has been documented in support of the idea that markets
react positively to the announcement of equity carve-outs. Schipper and Smith (1986) examine a
sample of 76 carve-outs from 1963 to 1984 and show excess returns averaging 1.83%. Anand
Vijh (2002) using a sample of 336 carve-outs from 1980 to 1997 document excess returns of
approximately 4.92% in the case where the pre-carve out subsidiary‟s assets are greater than the
non-subsidiary‟s and excess returns of approximately 1.19% in the case of transactions where the
pre-carve out asset levels are lower than the non-subsidiary‟s. Allen and McConnell (1998)
using a sample of 188 carve-outs for the time period 1978-1993, examine the effect that the use
of proceeds has on post carve-out performance. They find that announcement period gains for
firms that use proceeds to pay debt are higher than those of firms that retain the proceeds.
Mulherin and Boone (2000) study a sample of 125 carve-outs for the time period 1990-1990 and
document shareholder gains which they attribute to divestiture synergies. These results seem
more compelling when compared to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), a closely related
transaction. For example, Masulis and Korwar (1986) find excess returns for SEOs to be -3.25%
on average. Myers and Majluf (1984) attribute the negative reaction in the case of SEOs to
information asymmetry. They posit that managers with superior private information only issue
seasoned stock when their shares are favorably valued. Hence, rational investors aware of the
inherent moral hazard appropriately discount the firms‟ shares upon an SEO announcement.
Considering that equity carve-outs are very similar to SEOs, this discrepancy in market reaction
is still not well understood. Byers & Lee (working paper) find that a change in top management
prior to carve-out announcement is significant in explaining the favorable market reaction.
Equity carve-outs involving incumbent management seem to elicit a similar reaction from the
market as SEOs. They conjecture that the market views the capital raising efforts of new
managers as a positive business strategy and less so if done by incumbent management.
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2.4.2 Divestiture Gains

In spite of this extensive literature on potential gains from equity carve-outs, empirical
evidence on long-term performance of carve-outs remains largely unfavorable. Madura and
Nixon (2002) document a positive relation between the level of financial distress prior to carveout announcement and the unfavorable long-term performance. Their cross-sectional results
show that previously distressed parents and their subsidiaries significantly underperform
previously non-distressed firms. Inter-temporal comparisons between these two carve-out types
show cumulative buy-and-hold returns for parents ranging from -7.19% to -19.97% in the first
year; -12.9% to -61.91% in the second year; and -39.6% to -153.61% in the third year relative to
matched firms. For the subsidiaries, cumulative buy-and-hold returns range from -17.59% to 26.89% in the first year; -49.45% to -101.73% in the second year; and –62.41% to -192.13% in
the third year. Mulherin and Boone (2000) study 125 equity carve-outs during the period 1990 –
1999 and conclude that the positive wealth effects are due to synergistic gains. Allen (1998) also
examines the long-run stock performance of a set of equity carve-outs at Thermal Electron and
concludes that the positive effects are due to divestiture gains. GIM (2005) among others,
contend that the event-study approach cannot adequately identify the impact of changes in
governance on firm value in the possible presence of other contemporaneous corporate events.
GIM in their study avoid this problem by taking a long horizon approach to examining the effect
of governance changes on firm value.

2.4.3 Information Asymmetry

The re-focusing and information asymmetry hypotheses suggest that managers engage in
restructurings in order to mitigate an under-valuation problem. Business units within diversified
firms are more likely to be fraught with severe information asymmetry leading to an
undervaluation problem [Nanda (1991)]. Managers of such firms seek to unlock this hidden
value by divesting the units into independently trading entities. The divestiture, for instance,
necessitates a different set of books for the subsidiary and a separate set of analyst coverage.
Both of these developments are likely to enhance the subsidiary‟s transparency and gradually
lead to the convergence of market value to fundamental value. Consistent with this view, the
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information asymmetry hypothesis predicts a gradual increase in the subsidiary‟s market value
upon announcement. For example, Burch and Nanda (2003) posit that diversification discounts
partly reflect a value loss due to the diversified nature of the firm itself rather than selection bias
or measurement error. Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002) show that asset restructuring
through spin-offs leads to efficient redeployment of the assets and improvements in investment
efficiency. Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) present evidence that there is less information
asymmetry and increased transparency following spinoffs. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam
(1999) empirically test the information hypothesis on a set of spin off firms. Consistent with the
predictions of the hypothesis, they find that firms which engage in spin-offs are less transparent
than their industry and size matched peers. Moreover, upon announcement of the spin-off such
firms experience significant reduction in their information asymmetry. The authors also present
evidence of a positive relation between gains around the spin-off and the severity of information
asymmetry. Lastly, they show that firms with higher growth opportunities and those seeking
external financing have a higher propensity to engage in spin-offs, suggesting that the mitigation
of the transparency problem is in anticipation of accessing capital markets. Dale, Mehrotra, and
Sivakumar (1997) test the prediction that cross industry spin-offs generate more value than
within industry spin-offs. They find strong evidence that spin-offs of firms that belong to
different 2-didgit SIC codes create significantly more value than own-industry spin-offs. Vijh
(1999) presents evidence on equity carve-outs suggesting that long-term returns for carve-outs
increase with the number of business segments of the pre-carve-out firm, which lends credence
to both the re-focusing and information asymmetry hypotheses.

2.4.4 Shareholder-Rights Protection and Firm Performance

La Porta, Lopez-de-Salinas, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) survey 27 developed countries
on the basis of the quality of minority shareholder protections and present evidence that firms
identified with better protections have greater market valuations. Klapper and Love (2003) on the
other hand, examine firms from 14 emerging economies and present evidence suggesting a
positive relation between the quality of shareholder-rights protection and both market valuations
and firm performance. They posit that shareholder-rights protections seem to matter more in
countries with weaker overall legal protections than those with stronger legal protections. Leuz,
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Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) explore the relation between quality of shareholder–rights protection
and earnings quality and show evidence that firms with weaker shareholder-rights protections
have lower quality earnings. They posit that earnings management is likely to increase in
environments where shareholders rights are relatively more restricted.

3.

Sample Selection and Data

3.1

Sample Selection
The sample is compiled from the Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) United States IPO

data and cross checked with Lexis-Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, the Wall Street Journal Index
and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. The initial sample comprises 421 firms (regulated
and unregulated) that announced a carve-out transaction during the time period 1983 - 2004. For
inclusion in the sample, a firm must be traded on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and have
coverage by CRSP and Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT. In addition, the firm must have
coverage in at least one of the volumes published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC). Rights protection data for firms not covered by IRRC are collected from SEC filings in
Edgar and/or the Fiche-Q files. Firms that constitute the final sample are then tracked
individually from the date of announcement to the end of the sample period or when the firm
ceases to exist, whichever comes first.

The sample period is selected to generate a sufficiently large sample but also allow
sufficient time (at least 3 years prior to and following the announcement date) for operating
performance data analysis. After the initial screening and deletion of firms with missing data
points, the final sample includes 101 firms (both regulated and unregulated) that engaged in a
carve-out transaction during the time period 1983-2004 and meet all the above selection criteria.
To control for the regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of financial firms (SIC 6000), I
include a binary variable coded „1‟ if the firm is financial or „0‟ otherwise, in all regressions. For
robustness, I construct two sub-samples. The first sub-sample includes 48 non-financial firms
(industrials and utilities) and the second sub-sample includes 53 financial firms. Shareholderrights protection data from the IRRC is published in seven volumes: 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998,
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1999, 2002, and 2004. Each volume consists of roughly 1,400-1,800 firms, inclusive of all S&P
500 firms. IRRC publications are issued every three years, so following Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003), missing data for the interceding years are filled with the most recent annual
survey data. According to Core, et al. (2006) although this approach introduces autocorrelation
in the data series they contend that the resulting measurement noise will be minimal given the
general stability of the GIM-index across time.

Table 1 presents the sample distribution and size. Panel A shows the number of firms
dropped and the reasons for their exclusion. Of the original sample of 421 firms, 144 firms were
dropped

either

because

they

were

unlisted

or

listed

on

exchanges

other

than

AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE. 105 firms were not covered by either CRSP or COMPUSTAT, and
61 firms had missing data points. Panel B shows the distribution of transaction announcements
by year. The number of transactions announced per year ranges from 0 for 2003 to 12 for 1986
and 1993. Lastly, Panel C presents the distribution of transactions by industry (2-digit SIC for
industrials, utilities, and financials). Financials had the highest number of transactions with 58
announcements. Manufacturing had 25, other services had 12, wholesale/retail had 7, there were
5 transactions for mining, lastly transportation, communications, and utilities reported 4 for a
final sample of 111 firms.

3.2

Description of Variables

3.2.1 Proxies for Firm Performance

Table 4, presents descriptions of dependent and independent variables and how they are
constructed. Dependent variables (firm performance), include Tobin‟s Q, return on assets
(ROA), and return on equity (ROE). I use Tobin‟s Q, measured as the ratio of the firm‟s market
value divided by the book value of its assets as a market based performance measure. Each
firm‟s Tobin‟s Q is adjusted by subtracting the industry median. To ascertain the significance of
the right skew in the distribution of firm value, I use log values of Tobin‟s Q as a robustness test.
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity are accounting based measures of firm
performance. Both variables are adjusted by subtracting the industry median return on assets
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(ROA) and median return on equity (ROE), respectively. ROA (ROE) is constructed by dividing
the firm‟s EBIT by the firm‟s average assets (equity). Dependent variables for the quality of the
firm‟s shareholder rights protection include the GIM-index [Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)]
and the Entrenchment-index [Bebchuk and Cohen‟s (2005)]. Each of the performance measures
has its merits and weaknesses. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that ROA, although as an
accounting measure it avoids the influences of the psychology of investors it is backward
looking. Moreover, it is significantly influenced by changes in accounting policies and
managerial discretion on how certain accounting items are treated. Return on equity on the other
hand, has less desirable distribution properties than the return on assets. Moreover, ROE may be
affected by leverage, extraordinary items, and other discretionary items [Barber and Lyon
(1996)]. Lastly, although Tobin‟s Q has the advantage of being forward looking, it is highly
dependent on investor psychology and expectations. In addition, the numerator in Q includes
estimates of intangible assets whereas the denominator excludes them. This feature is likely to
distort comparisons between firms that do not similarly rely on intangible assets. For robustness I
use all three measures.

3.2.2 Proxies for Shareholder-Rights Protection

I test the effect of shareholder rights on firm performance, using the GIM-index and the
entrenchment index as proxies for the quality of shareholder rights protection. Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003) construct the GIM-index using a set of 24 restrictions followed by the
Institutional Investors Research Center (IRRC) that proxy for the quality of governance. The
GIM-index represents the number of rights restrictions on a firm‟s books. A high index implies
more rights restrictions and consequently weaker shareholder rights protection, lower
governance quality, and higher agency costs. GIM characterize firms with an index falling in the
highest decile as „dictatorships‟ and those with an index falling in the lowest decile as
„democracies‟. The sample GIM-index has a minimum (maximum) of 5 (16) provisions with a
mean (median) of 8.2 (8.4) and a standard deviation of 2.69. I characterize firms that have a
GIM-index equal to or greater than 8 as having weak shareholder rights protection and those
whose index is lower than 8 as having strong shareholder rights protection. Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2004) on the other hand, construct a narrower index - the „entrenchment index‟- using a
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set of six provisions [four „constitutional‟ and two „anti-takeover‟] that are deemed more
restrictive of shareholder-rights. These provisions include staggered boards; limits to amend bylaws or charter; super-majority voting provisions; golden parachutes; and poison pills. The
sample entrenchment index has a minimum (maximum) of 1 (6) provisions with a mean
(median) of 3.9 (3.8) and a standard deviation of 1.02. Firms with an entrenchment index equal
to or greater than 4 are deemed „dictatorial‟ and those with an index lower than 4 are deemed
„democracies‟.

3.2.3 Control Variables

Control variables include log of market value of equity (L_MVE), log of total assets
(L_TA), leverage (LEV), an indicator variable „SIC‟ for relatedness between the subsidiary and
the parent, and a binary variable „FIN‟ for financial firms (SIC 6000). Log of market value of
equity (L_MVE) and the log of the firm‟s total assets (L_TA), are used to control for firm size.
Leverage (LEV) is used to control for the firm‟s financial risk and is computed as total long-term
debt divided by the firm‟s total assets. For financial firms (SIC 6000), I use price-to-book value
(PBV) as the control variable in place of leverage. For robustness I also include the log of the
firm‟s market capitalization (L_BVE) to control for firm size. If a firm belongs to the financial
industry, the variable „SIC‟ is coded „1‟ or „0‟ otherwise‟. For relatedness between the parent and
the subsidiary, SIC is coded „1‟ if both firms belong to the same 2-digit SIC code, or „0‟
otherwise. For long-run abnormal returns, I use the Fama-French three-factor model [Fama &
French (1993)]. HML represents the monthly return for high book-to-market firms minus the
monthly return for the low book-to-market firms provided by the Kenneth French website [Fama
& French (1993)]. SMB is the monthly return for small capitalized firms minus the monthly
return for the large capitalized firms also provided by the Kenneth French website [Fama &
French (1993)]. Book-to-market value is a ratio of the firm‟s book value of assets divided by the
firm‟s market value. The standard industry classification code (SIC) is used to proxy for the
relatedness between the parent firm and the subsidiary.

Table 5 presents the correlation matrix between the main variables. Results show that the
pairwise correlation between contemporaneous firm performance variables and the main
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explanatory variables is much weaker than that between firm performance and lagged
explanatory variables. Pairwise correlations between industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q and ROE with
lagged GIM-index are both statistically significant at 0.05 and 0.10 levels. Pairwise correlations
between industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q and ROE with the lagged Entrenchment index are both
statistically significant at 0.10 level. As a robustness check and to complement the IV and GMM
analyses, I also run granger-causality tests on all firm performance dependent variables and the
main explanatory variables to ascertain the direction of causation.

3.3

Descriptive Statistics
A summary of the sample descriptive statistics is presented in Table 2.

There is significant variability in firm characteristics for both parent firms and subsidiaries.
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for subsidiary firms with total market value of
equity ranging from a minimum of $3.4 to a maximum of $58,514 with a mean (median) of $985
($197) and a standard deviation of $212. Leverage which is measured as total long-term debt
divided by total assets ranges from 0.12 to 1.04 with a mean (median) of 0.41 (0.52) and a
standard deviation of 0.18. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.21 to a maximum of
0.79 with a mean (median) of 0.39 (0.31) and a standard deviation of 0.22. Tobin‟s Q is
measured as market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets ranges from 1.18 to
1.88 with a mean (median) of 1.44 (1.52). Return on assets is measured as earnings before
interest and tax divided by total assets (EBIT/TA) and the minimum (maximum) for the sample
is -0.03 (0.16) with a mean (median) of 0.09 (0.12) and a standard deviation of 0.11. Return on
equity is measured as net earnings divided by total owners equity (Net Income/Common Stock)
and ranges from a minimum of -0.06 to a maximum of 0.28 with a mean (median) of 0.21 (0.23)
and a standard deviation of 0.18. The GIM-index has a minimum (maximum) of 5 (16)
provisions with a mean (median) of 8.2 (8.4) and a standard deviation of 2.69. The Entrenchment
index has a minimum (maximum) of 1 (6) provisions with a mean (median) of 3.9 (3.8) and a
standard deviation of 1.02.

Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for parent firms whose total market value
of equity ranges from a minimum of $4.2 to a maximum of $82,644 with a mean (median) of
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$2,742 ($728) and a standard deviation of $582. Leverage for parent firms ranges from a
minimum of 0.16 to a maximum of 1.07 with a mean (median) of 0.59 (0.58) and a standard
deviation of 0.20. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.47 to a maximum of 0.88 with a
mean (median) of 0.73 (0.58) and a standard deviation of 0.13. Tobin‟s Q ranges from 1.01 to
1.72 with a mean (median) of 1.56 (1.34) and a standard deviation of 1.28. The range for return
on assets (ROA) for parent firms has a minimum (maximum) of -0.02 (0.13) with a mean
(median) of 0.07 (0.09) and a standard deviation of 0.12. The return on equity (ROE) ranges
from a minimum of -0.08 to a maximum of 0.24, with a mean (median) of 0.14 (0.16), and a
standard deviation of 0.69. The GIM-index has a minimum (maximum) of 5 (16) provisions with
a mean (median) of 10.1 (9.2) and a standard deviation of 2.07. The Entrenchment index has a
minimum (maximum) of 1 (6) provisions with a mean (median) of 4.9 (4.1) and a standard
deviation of 1.18. Although the sample period covered in this study is asynchronous with those
of Schipper and Smith (1986), Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991), Mulherin and Boone
(2000), Boone (2001), and Anand Vijh (2002), sample characteristics presented here are fairly
similar to those in these previous studies.

4. Methodology

In light of the afore-mentioned econometric problems, I argue that simple OLS
approaches used in the many of the previous studies attempting to relate corporate governance to
firm performance generate potentially biased and inconsistent estimates. It is plausible that this
biasness and inconsistency in parameter estimation partly accounts for the largely mixed and
inconclusive evidence. In this study, I use panel data and alternate estimation techniques (fixed
effects, IV, GMM, and granger causality tests), with the goal of mitigating the major
econometric issues inherent in corporate governance studies. The use of panel data also allows
for more robust and dynamic modeling of firm heterogeneity.

First, as a frame of reference, I determine whether my sample is consistent with extant
evidence that demonstrates positive initial market reaction to carve-out announcements. I use the
Fama-French three-factor model to analyze three-year and five-year returns on calendar–time
portfolios of sample firms following the announcement. Fama-French factor returns and related
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data are obtained from Kenneth French‟s data library. The calendar-time method offers a number
of advantages over the cumulative (CAR) and buy-and-hold (BHR) return methods. First, it
minimizes the cross-sectional dependence among sample firms and secondly, the test statistics
generated are more robust if the sample used is non-random. Additionally, the sample used in
this study exhibits some degree of industry clustering with approximately 52% and 23% of the
sample being financial and manufacturing firms, respectively. Lyon et al (1999) posit that the
presence of industry clustering renders controls for size and book-to-market alone statistically
insufficient when implementing the cumulative (CAR) and buy-and-hold (BHR) abnormal return
methods. Thus the empirical rejection levels that are yielded under the two latter methods would
exceed the theoretical rejection levels due to the presence of industry clustering in this sample.
Monthly abnormal returns are calculated using both value-weighted and equal-weighted
methods.

For each calendar month, I calculate the return on a portfolio composed of firms that
were carved out within the last 36-month and 60-month periods. The calendar time return on
these portfolios is used to estimate the following equation:
Rpt – Rft = αi + ßi (Rmt – Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit

(1)

Where Rpt is the simple monthly return on a calendar-time portfolio (equally-weighted and
value-weighted); Rft is the monthly return on three-month treasury bills; Rmt is the return on a
value-weighted market index; SMBt is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios
of small stocks and big stocks; and HMLt is the difference in the returns of high book-to-market
stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The estimate of the intercept, αi provides a test of the null
hypothesis that the mean of the monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero.

As an initial step, I run annual multivariate regressions using all three measures of firm
performance. To test hypothesis H1, I regress a proxy for firm performance [ROA, ROE, and
Tobin‟s Q] on each of the proxies for shareholder rights protection [GIM-index, and the
entrenchment index (ENT-index)]. I include as control variables the log of total assets (L_TA),
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firm profitability (EBIT), and firm leverage (LEV). To capture potential idiosyncrasies of
financial firms, I include a binary variable (FIN) coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial (SIC 6000)
or „0‟ otherwise. To test hypothesis H2, I add a dummy variable (SIC) coded as „1‟ if the
subsidiary and the parent belong to different 2-digit SIC codes or „0‟ otherwise. I estimate the
following model:
Adj_ROAit = α + ß1GIM-indexi,t-1 + ß2L_TA i,t + ß3EBITi,t + ß4LEV i,t + ß5FINi,t + ß6SICi,t + εit (2)

Considering that simple OLS regressions do not capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity
within the sample, I implement the fixed effects model to take full advantage of my panel data as
it allows for more robust and dynamic modeling of firm heterogeneity. Moreover, results from a
Hausman test indicate that the shareholder-rights proxies are endogenous which implies that the
coefficient estimates from OLS would be biased and inconsistent. Hence, as a next step, I
implement instrument variables with shareholder-rights proxies lagged twice as the instruments.

I also implement GMM that does not require as stringent distributional assumptions and
allows for convenient specification of heteroscedastic errors.

Lastly, the main objective of this study is to ascertain whether corporate governance has
an impact on firm performance. In most of the earlier studies the direction of causation between
governance variables and measures of firm performance was left indeterminate. In the presence
of endogeneity, it still remains unclear whether good governance improves firm performance
through closer monitoring or if in fact better performance leads to better governance. To
determine the direction of causation between shareholder-rights protection and firm
performance, I implement the granger causality test (Granger 1969). One of the advantages of
Granger causality tests is that they do not require the use of instrument variables. In addition they
allow for a wider range of changes in the explanatory variables than could be covered, say, in an
event study. One weakness though, is that the presence of structural changes in the data can
severely weaken the validity of the test results. To run Granger causality tests, I implement the
following model:
ROAt = α0 + α1ROAt-1 + α2ROAt-2 + β1GIMt-1 + β2GIMt-2 + εt
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(3)

GIMt = φ0 + φ 1GIMt-1 + φ 2GIMt-2 + β1ROAt-1 + β2ROAt-2 + νt

(4)

In equation (1), the null hypothesis is that the quality of shareholder-rights protection, as proxied
by GIM-index, does not Granger cause firm performance (ROA). Rejection of the null
hypothesis would mean that shareholder-rights protection granger causes firm performance. In
equation (2), the null hypothesis is that firm performance (ROA) does not Granger cause
shareholder rights protection (GIM-index). Rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that
firm performance Granger causes shareholder-rights protection. I use the F-statistic/Waldstatistic to test the following condition, for all equations:
5.

Empirical Results

5.1

Long-run Abnormal Returns

β1 = β2 = 0

The intercept, αi, in the Fama-French three factor model that I estimate provides a test of
the null hypothesis that the mean of the monthly excess return on the carve-out calendar-time
portfolio is zero. Table 6a, Panel A presents Fama-French three factor model results for parent
firms during the 36-month period following the announcement for equally weighted and value
weighted portfolios. The intercept for the equally-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio shows a
-0.28% (-0.47%) excess rate of return per month which is statistically significant with t-statistics
of -3.41 (-2.70), respectively. Panel B shows performance results for parent firms for the 60month period for equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. The intercept for the equalweighted (value-weighted) portfolio shows a 0.39% (-0.77%) per month. The equal-weighted
portfolio has a positive and statistically significant coefficient while the value-weighted portfolio
is negative and statistically significant (1.01 and -2.12, respectively). In both time periods, firm
performance is worse for parent firms using value-weighted portfolios. Table 6(b), Panel A
presents Fama-French three factor model results for subsidiary firms during the 36-month period
following the announcement for equally weighted and value weighted portfolios. The intercept
for the equally-weighted (value-weighted) portfolio shows a -0.17% (-0.23%) excess rate of
return per month both of which are both statistically significant with t-statistics of -4.56 (-1.90),
respectively. Panel B shows performance results for subsidiary firms for the 60-month period for
equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. The intercept for the equally-weighted (value-
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weighted) portfolio shows a -0.03% (-0.07%) per month. Both portfolios show negative returns
and are statistically significant. The coefficients on MKT, SMB, and HML are all statistically
significant. The coefficient on HML for the equally-weighted portfolio, however, changes signs
from a negative sign for the 36-month period to a positive sign for the 60-month calendar period.
Consistent with extant literature the results in general suggest that carve-out firms under-perform
matched firms for both the 36-month and 60-month periods following the announcement.
5.2

Fixed -Effects Regressions
To ascertain which of the fixed effects or random effects model is appropriate, I run a

Hausman test for the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the random effects
estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. If the difference is
significant, then the fixed effects model is preferred. Results show an F-statistic (P_value) of
7.86 (0.0001) suggesting that the fixed effects estimates are more consistent. I therefore
implement the fixed effects model.

Table 7 presents results from a fixed-effects model. In Panel A, Model 1 presents
estimated coefficients by regressing return on assets (ROA) on the GIM-index, parent-subsidiary
relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm size (L_TA), and firm profitability
(EBIT), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on GIM-index is -0.17 and statistically significant
at a 0.01 level. The coefficient on SIC is 0.21 and also statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The
sign for the coefficient on the indicator variable for financial firms is positive (0.12) but
statistically insignificant. Model 2 presents estimated coefficients by regressing return on equity
(ROE) on GIM-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm
size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on GIMindex is -1.08 and is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient on SIC is 1.01 and
statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The binary variable for financial firms is positive, 0.33
and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Model 3 in Panel A, presents estimated coefficients
by regressing Tobin‟s Q (Adj. Q) on the GIM-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and
financials (FIN). I control for firm size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage
(LEV). The coefficient on GIM-index changes sign to positive 0.09, but it is statistically
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insignificant. The coefficient on SIC is 0.09 and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The
binary variable for financial firms is statistically insignificant.

In Panel B, Model 1 presents estimated coefficients by regressing return on assets (ROA)
on the ENT-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm
size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on ENTindex is 0.08 but statistically insignificant. The coefficient on SIC is -0.17 and statistically
significant at a 0.01 level. The binary variable for financial firms is positive 0.31 but statistically
insignificant. Model 2 presents estimated coefficients by regressing return on equity (ROE) on
ENT-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and financials (FIN). I control for firm size
(L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage (LEV). The coefficient on ENT-index
is -1.42 and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient on SIC is 0.98 and statistically
significant at a 0.05 level. The binary variable for financial firms is positive, 0.52 and
statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Model 3 in Panel A, presents estimated coefficients by
regressing Tobin‟s Q (Adj. Q) on the ENT-index, parent-subsidiary relatedness (SIC) and
financials (FIN). I control for firm size (L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio), and leverage
(LEV). The coefficient on ENT-index is -0.18 and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The
coefficient on SIC is 0.16 and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The binary variable for
financial firms is statistically insignificant.

Overall, the fixed effects results support hypotheses H1 and H2, positing a positive
association between firm performance and the quality of shareholder rights protection. The lower
the GIM-index and Entrenchment indices, the better protected are the shareholders and hence we
should expect a negative sign on the proxy coefficients for the quality of shareholder-rights
protection. These results are also consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) who
present evidence that firms with weak shareholder-rights protection exhibit significant stock
market under-performance of approximately 8.5% relative to firms with strong shareholderrights protection and with Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) who show that increases in the
governance index are monotonically related to reductions in firm value (Tobin‟s Q).
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5.3

Hausman Endogeneity Tests

Table 8 presents results from the Hausman endogeneity tests. Panel A provides
coefficient estimates when GIM_Indext-2 is used as an instrument. The coefficient (t-statistic) on
GIM_Residuals is -0.04(-1.74) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 63.96 (78.12) for ROA. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on GIM_Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is 0.01(2.04)
with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 18.44 (24.06). The coefficient (t-statistic) on GIM_Residuals
using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is -0.37(-1.94) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 33.08
(42.43). They are all statistically significant at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.05 levels of significance,
respectively. In all three models the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the GIM_Residuals is
zero is rejected. This implies the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of
using the OLS method. Panel B provides coefficient estimates when ENT_Index t-2 is used as an
instrument. The coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_Residuals is -0.08(-3.22) with an F-statistic
(Wald-2) of 44.37 (68.04) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_Residuals using ROE
as the dependent variable is -0.13(-1.87) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 33.23 (72.05). The
coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is -0.09 (1.44) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 22.67 (46.16). All coefficients are statistically significant at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels of significance, respectively. The null hypothesis that the
coefficient on the ENT_Residuals is zero is again rejected suggesting the presence of
endogeneity. In the presence of endogeneity, the OLS coefficient estimates are likely to be
biased and inconsistent.
5.4

Instrumental Variables Method (IV)

Table 9 presents results from IV regressions. In Panel A, Model 1 presents estimated
coefficients for return on assets (ROA) using GIM_Indext-2 as an instrument. I include a binary
variable for industry relatedness between the parent and the subsidiary (SIC), and an indicator
variable for financial firms (FIN). I control for firm leverage (LEV), firm size L_TA), and firm
profitability (EBIT ratio). The coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is -0.57 (-2.66) and
statistically significant at a 0.01level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.11 (3.19) and
statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.28 (0.22) but
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statistically insignificant. Panel A, Model 2 presents coefficient estimates on GIM_Index using
return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for firm performance. The coefficient (t-statistic) on the
GIM-indext-1 is -0.24 (-1.80) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient (tstatistic) on SIC is 0.03 (1.88) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient (tstatistic) on FIN is 0.34 (1.68) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Panel A, Model 3
presents estimates of coefficients from regressing return on Tobin‟s Q on GIM-index. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is -0.71 (-2.24) and statistically significant at a 0.01
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.40 (1.97) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level.
The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.09 (1.07) but statistically insignificant.

Table 9, Panel B, presents coefficient estimates using the entrenchment index as a proxy
for quality of shareholder-rights protection. Model 1 presents estimated coefficients from
regressing the firm‟s ROA on Entrenchment-index (ENT_indext-1). I control for firm leverage,
firm size, and profitability. The coefficient (t-statistic) on the ENT_indext-1 is -0.83 (-1.97). It is
statistically significant at the 0.01 level and the signs on the coefficients are consistent with the
prediction of hypothesis H1 and the findings by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 1.04 (3.37) and
statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 1.07 (1.12) but
statistically insignificant. Panel B, Model 2 presents coefficient estimates using ROE as the
dependent variables and ENT_indext-2 as an instrument. The coefficients (t-statistics) on the
lagged Entrenchment index, ENT_indext-1, is -0.67 (-2.47) and statistically significant at a 0.01
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.21 (1.91) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level.
The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.81 (1.97) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Panel
B, Model 3 presents coefficient estimates from the regression using Tobin‟s-Q and ENT_indext-2
as an instrument. The coefficients (t-statistics) on the ENT_indext-1 is 0.02 (1.73) and statistically
significant at the 0.05 level but has the opposite sign as that predicted by hypothesis H1. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.57 (2.16) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.34 (0.84) but statistically insignificant.

Overall, the signs on the coefficients and statistical significance from the IV regressions
support the hypothesis that firm performance is influenced by the quality of shareholder-rights
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protection. These findings are consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). In addition, consistent with Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Boone
(2001), the IV results support hypothesis H2 which predicts that subsidiaries that are less related
to the parent based on the 2-digit SIC code, will out-perform those subsidiaries that belong to the
same 2-digit SIC code as the parent.

5.5

Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
Table 10 presents results from GMM regressions. In Panel A, Model 1 presents estimated

coefficients from regressing return on assets (ROA) using GIM_Indext-2 as an instrument. I
include a binary variable (SIC) for industry relatedness between the parent and the subsidiary,
and an indicator variable for financial firms (FIN). I control for firm leverage (LEV), firm size
L_TA), and firm profitability (EBIT ratio). The coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is 0.43 (-2.74) and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficients (t-statistics) on SIC and
FIN are 0.11(1.32) and 0.04 (1.08) respectively but both are statistically insignificant. Panel A,
Model 2 presents coefficient estimates using return on equity (ROE) as the proxy for
performance. The coefficient (t-statistic) on the GIM-indext-1 is -0.22 (-2.67) and statistically
significant at a 0.01 level. The coefficients (t-statistics) on SIC and FIN are 0.46 (1.81) and 0.32
(1.77), respectively. Both are statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Panel A, Model 3 presents
estimates of coefficients using Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for firm performance and GIM-indext-2 as an
instrument. The coefficients (t-statistics) on the GIM-indext-1 and SIC are 0.08 (1.98) and 0.05
(2.04), respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient (tstatistic) on FIN is 0.08 (1.17) but statistically insignificant.

Table 10, Panel B, presents empirical results using the entrenchment index as a proxy for
quality of shareholder-rights protection. Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using ROA to
proxy for firm performance and ENT_indext-2 as an instrument. I control for firm leverage, firm
size, and profitability. The coefficient (t-statistic) on ENT_indext-1 is -0.72 (-2.48) and
statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The signs on the coefficients are negative and support
hypothesis H1. These findings are consistent with the assertions by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.09
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(1.04) but statistically insignificant. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.11 (1.67) and
statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Panel B, Model 2 presents coefficient estimates using
ROE as a proxy for firm performance and ENT_Index t-2 as an instrument. The coefficient (tstatistic) on the ENT_indext-1 is -0.22 (-2.27) and is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.13 (1.69) and statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.52 (1.07) but statistically insignificant. Panel B, Model 3
presents coefficient estimates from the regression of Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for firm performance.
The coefficients (t-statistics) on ENT_indext-1 is 0.08 (-1.84) and statistically significant a 0.05
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on SIC is 0.02 (2.04) and statistically significant at a 0.01
level. The coefficient (t-statistic) on FIN is 0.71 (1.26) and statistically significant at a 0.10
level. Overall, GMM results support hypotheses H1 and H2 and are consistent with Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004); Comment and Jarrell (1995);
and Boone (2001).

5.6

Empirical Results – Subset of Financial Firms (SIC 6000)
IV and GMM test results show a statistically significant coefficient on the indicator

variable, FIN, for financial firms (SIC 6000). To examine whether there are any significant
differences in the relation between shareholder-rights protection and firm performance for
financials, I run separate IV and GMM regressions for only financial firms. Table 11(a) presents
coefficient estimates using GIM_Indext-2 as an instrument. I use ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q as
measures of firm performance in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. All the coefficients on the
GIM-index have negative signs as predicted by hypothesis H1 and H2 are statistically significant
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, with the exception of Tobin‟s Q in the case of GMM. The
results are qualitatively similar to the full sample evidence and are consistent with Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). Table 11(b) presents
coefficient estimates using ENT_Indext-2 as an instrument. I use ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q as
measures for firm performance in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. All the coefficients on the
ENT-indext-1 have negative signs as predicted by hypothesis H1 and H2 and are statistically
significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels. The findings are qualitatively similar to the full
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sample evidence and are consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2004).

In sum the quality of shareholder-rights protection is positively associated with firm
performance and this relationship seems invariant to firm performance measurement and robust
to estimation model choice.

5.7

Granger Causality Tests
Table 12 presents empirical results from bivariate granger causality tests. Model 1 tests

causality between proxies for shareholder-rights protection [GIM-index and ENT_index] and
return on assets (ROA). The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that GIM-index does not
Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 8.420 with a p-value of 0.0000. Hence, the null
hypothesis is rejected implying precedence and information content in past GIM-index values on
firm performance as measured by ROA. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger
cause GIM-index, is 1.203 with a p-value of 0.5480. Failure to reject the null hypothesis negates
the presence of reverse causality in the Granger sense. Similarly, the F-statistic for the null
hypothesis test that the ENT-index does not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 12.621
with a p-value of 0.0000. Rejecting the null hypothesis and implying precedence and information
content in past ENT-index values on ROA. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not
Granger cause ENT-index, is 0.04 with a p-value of 0.2860. Failure to reject the null hypothesis
precludes reverse causality in the Granger sense. The results for tests between the GIM-index
and ROE and those between the ENT-index and ROE are qualitatively similar to those reported
for ROA. Shareholder-rights protection seems to granger cause firm performance but the reverse
is negated. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test GIM-index (ENT-index) does not Granger
cause firm performance as measured by Tobin‟s Q is 1.325 (2.920) with a p-values of 0.0500
(0.0600). The results weakly suggest that shareholder-rights protection Granger causes Tobin‟s
Q. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger cause GIM-index
(ENT-index) are 0.5720 (0.083) with a p-values of 0.2020 (0.7200). The null hypothesis in both
cases is not rejected, suggesting that firm performance does not Granger cause shareholder-rights
protection.
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Overall Granger causality tests indicate that the quality of shareholder-rights protection
has precedent information content for moderating future firm performance. The evidence is
robust to measures of firm performance and to both proxies for shareholder-rights protection.
Consistent with the findings by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2004), these results support hypotheses H1 and H2.

6. Robustness

There is wide cross-sectional variation in the sample characteristics as shown in Table 2.
I test the robustness of my results to the use of alternative variable definitions/measures. First in
place of Tobin‟s Q, I use investment intensity (INV), measured as R&D expenditures divided by
total assets or the ratio of capital expenditures-to-total assets. The results are qualitatively similar
to those reported using Tobin‟s Q. To ascertain whether there are any statistically significant
differences between firms with higher Q values than those with lower Q values, I divide the
sample into three sub-samples. The three sub-samples consist of firms that fall into the top 40%,
firms in the lower 40%, and the rest in the middle 20%. I run the tests on the top 40% and the
bottom 40%. Results obtained in both cases are qualitatively similar to those reported for the full
sample. It is also likely that due to the wide ranges between the minimum and maximum sample
descriptive statistics, outliers could be driving some of the reported results. I test for robustness
by winsorizing the sample data at 1% and 5%.

In both cases the results obtained using

winsorized data are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the full sample. Lastly, I use the
logarithm of Tobin‟s Q instead of levels to ascertain whether the effects based on changes may
differ from the levels effect. Results from log Tobin‟s Q are qualitatively similar to thoise
obtained using levels of Tobin‟s Q.
7.

Conclusion
The main purpose of this essay was to examine whether the quality of shareholder-rights

protection moderates firm performance. By implementing improved estimation methods and
exploiting structural breaks in firms‟ governance systems, I attempt to mitigate inherent
weaknesses in previous governance studies. Using governance indices constructed by Gompers,
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Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) to proxy for the quality of
shareholder-rights protection, I find that strong shareholder-rights protection is associated with
better firm performance. In particular, carve-out firms that exhibit stronger shareholder-rights
protection exhibit moderate underperformance while those with weaker shareholder-rights
protection performed relatively worse than the control group. Specifically, I present new
evidence linking the long-term underperformance observed in equity carve-outs to weak
shareholder-rights protection. More generally, I present evidence linking firm performance to
corporate governance. These results are consistent with findings by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) GIM (2003) and lend further credence to the
idea that even in countries with strong investor legal protections such as the US, shareholderrights protection within the firm remains critical.
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Table 1: Sample Selection & Distribution
Table 1 presents sample distribution and size. Panel A provides a count of the firms comprising the final sample and the number
and reasons for those screened out. For a firm to qualify for inclusion it must be listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges
and be covered by COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and IRRC. Rights protection data for firms not covered by IRRC are collected from
SEC filings in Edgar and/or the Fiche-Q files. Of the original 421 carve-out firms, 144 firms were dropped either because they
are unlisted or listed on exchanges other than AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE. 105 firms were dropped due to non-coverage by CRSP,
COMPUSTAT, IRRC, SEC filings, and Fiche-Q files. And an additional 61 firms were dropped due to missing data points. The
final sample count is 101 firms consisting of regulated firms (2-digit SIC codes 60 and 49) and unregulated/industrial firms.
Panel B presents the sample distribution by year of transaction announcement and Panel C shows sample distribution by 2-digit
industry SIC.

Panel A: Construction of the Sample

# of firms

Total no. of firms:
Firms not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ:
Firms not covered by COMPUSTAT / CRSP:
Firms with missing data:

421
(144)
(105)
(61)

Final Sample Count:

111

Panel B: Distribution by Year

# of firms

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

8
6
4
3
4
3
7
13
5
6
10
5
7
5
9
7
4
3
2

Panel C: Distribution by SIC

Two-Digit SIC

# of firms

Mining, Oil & Gas
Manufacturing
Transport, Comm., Utilities
Wholesale/Retail
Financials
Services (other)

10
20-30
40
50
60
70-80

5
25
4
7
58
12

*Source: Security Data Company (SDC)
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for subsidiary firms in Panel A and parent firms in Panel B. Some means are unusually low
(high) due to the influence of outliers, this problem is mitigated in the regression analysis by using industry-adjusted numbers and
by winsorizing the data at 1% and 99%. Nevertheless, results obtained with unadjusted data are qualitatively similar.

Panel A: Subsidiary Firms:
Variable

Mean

(Std. Dev)

Median

Min

Max

Market Value of Equity a ($M)

985

212

197

3.4

58,514

Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)

0.41

0.18

0.52

0.12

1.04

Book-to-Market

0.39

0.22

0.31

0.21

0.79

Tobin‟s Q

1.44

1.07

1.48

1.18

1.88

Return on Assets

0.09

0.11

0.12

-0.03

0.16

Return on Equity

0.21

0.18

0.23

-0.06

0.28

GIM-Index (# of provisions)

8.2

2.69

8.4

5

16

Entrenchment Index (# of provisions)

3.9

1.02

3.8

1

6

Variable

Mean

(Std. Dev)

Median

Min

Max

Market Value of Equity b ($M)

2, 742

582

728

4.2

82,644

Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)

0.59

0.20

0.58

0.16

1.07

Book-to-Market

0.73

0.13

0.58

0.47

0.88

Tobin‟s Q

1.56

1.28

1.34

1.01

1.72

ROA (EBIT/TA)

0.07

0.12

0.09

-0.02

0.13

ROE (EBIT/EQUITY)

0.14

0.69

0.16

-0.08

0.24

GIM-Index (# of provisions)

10.1

2.07

9.2

5

16

Entrenchment Index (# of provisions)

4.9

1.18

4.1

1

6

Panel B: Parent Firms:

Source: Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT
CRSP, IRRC, Edgar, Fiche Q files

a The number of subsidiary shares outstanding after the announcement times price per share at end of first day of
trading
b The number of parent shares outstanding after the announcement times price per share at end of first day of trading
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Table 3: Governance Provisions
Table 3 provides the major governance categories and lists of related provisions that are used to construct the GIM-index and the
Entrenchment Index. Detailed explanations of the categories and related provisions are available in the appendix of Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003).

Category

Related Provisions

Delay:

Blank Check
Classified Board
Special Meeting
Written Consent

Protection:

Compensation Plans
Contracts
Golden Parachutes
Indemnification
Liability
Severance

Voting:

Bylaws
Charter
Cumulative Voting
Secret Ballot
Supermajority
Unequal Voting

Other:

Anti-greenmail
Directors‟ duties
Fair Price
Pension Parachutes
Poison Pills
Silver Parachutes

State:

Anti-greenmail Law
Business Combination Law
Cash-out Law
Directors‟ Duties Laws
Fair Price Law
Control Share Acquisition Law

Source: Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).
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Table 4: Variable Definitions and Sources
Table 4 provides definitions of the empirical variables and their related sources. Subscripts that appear on variables
presented elsewhere relate to number of time lags.

Variable

Definition

Source

Adj_Q

Adjusted Tobin‟s Q – market value of equity
divided by book value of assets

Tobin et al. (1977)

Adj_ROA

Adjusted return-on-assets – firm i‟s return
on assets minus median industry return
on assets

Compustat

Adj_ROE

Adjusted return-on-equity – firm i‟s return
on equity minus median industry return
on equity

Compustat

BME

Book-to-market value ratio

Compustat

B_EXTRN

Proportion of independent board
members on board

IRRC, Edgar, Fiche Q
files

B_SIZE

Total number of board members

IRRC, Edgar, Fiche Q
files

CTRL

Parent majority control in subsidiary

SDC

EBIT Ratio

EBIT-to-total Assets ratio

Compustat

ENT-Index

Entrenchment Index

Bebchuk et al (2005)

FIN

Binary variable: „1‟ if financial firm
or „0‟ otherwise

GIM-Index

Corporate Governance Index

Gompers et al (2003)

HML

High book-to-market minus low
book-to-market

Fama- French (1993)

LEV

Leverage: debt-to-total assets

Compustat

L_MVE

Log of firm‟s market value

Compustat

L_TA

Log of firm‟s total assets

Compustat

PBV

Price-to-book value

Compustat

ROA

Return-on-assets (EBIT/TA)

Compustat

ROE

Return-on-equity (EBIT/Common Equity)

Compustat

SIC

Standard Industry classification code

Compustat

SMB

the difference in the returns of small
stocks and big stocks.

Fama- French (1993)
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SIC Codes
(6000 -6999)

Table 5: Correlation Matrix
Table 5 provides pairwise correlations between the variables. For adjusted Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA next period
values (t+1), are also presented to account for the delayed impact of shareholder-rights protection proxies (GIMindex, Entrenchment_ index).
N=111

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Adj_Q

1.00

2. Adj_Qt+1

0.96***

1.00

3. ROE

0.21*

0.26**

1.00

4. ROEt+1

0.33*

0.42***

0.67*

1.00

5. ROA

-0.01*

0.28*

0.03

0.61*

1.00

6. ROAt+1

0.07

0.01*

0.09*

0.01**

0.44

1.00

7. GIM_Index

0.04

-0.04**

-0.37

-0.29*

0.55

0.21

1.00

8. ENT_Index

-0.04*

-0.49**

0.10

-0.27*

0.32

-0.01

0.78**

1.00

9. L_TA

-0.11*

-0.47*

-0.38

-0.29

-0.03*

-0.07

0.21*

0.44**

1.00

10. LEV

-0.32*

-0.10*

-0.25

-0.02*

-0.04

-0.13

0.33*

0.12

-0.78*

1.00

11. EBIT

0.88*

0.81**

0.92

0.97*

0.78

0.74

0.46**

0.63*

-0.52*

0.41*
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7

8

9

10

11

1.00

Table 6a: Excess Return Factor Regressions (Calendar-time) – Parent Firms
Table 6a provides results from calendar-time factor regressions for the excess returns on equally-weighted and value-weighted
sample portfolios. The portfolios are comprised of firms that initiated carve-out transactions during the sample period. Panel A
presents estimated coefficients for a 36-month period for equally-weighted and value-weighted sample portfolios and Panel B
presents estimated coefficients for the 60-month period for equally weighted and value weighted sample portfolios. I use the
Fama-French three-factor model and obtain the factor returns for MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French‟s website. The
values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Panel A: 36-month Period
Equal-Weighted Returns

Value-Weighted Returns

α

-0.28***
(-3.412)

-0.47***
(-2.702)

MKT

1.38
(1.614)

1.09**
(2.033)

SMB

0.71***
(5.240)

0.52*
(2.142)

HML

-0.13***
(-9.120)

-0.07***
(-3.201)

Adj-R2

0.78

0.92

Panel B:

60-month Period
Equal-Weighted Returns

Value-Weighted Returns

α

0.39
(1.01)

-0.77**
(2.12)

MKT

1.20*
(1.874)

1.04**
(2.362)

SMB

0.48***
(2.514)

0.72
(1.08)

HML

0.08**
(2.019)

-0.15***
(-4.09)

Adj-R2

0.87

0.90

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 6b: Excess Return Factor Regressions (Calendar-time) – Subsidiary Firms
Table 6b provides results from calendar-time factor regressions for the excess returns of equally weighted and value-weighted
sample portfolios for subsidiary firms. The portfolios are comprised of subsidiary firms that were carved out and returns are
observed from the first day of trading following the announcement. Panel A presents estimated coefficients for a 36-month period
for equally- weighted and value-weighted sample portfolios and Panel B presents estimated coefficients for the 60-month period
for equally weighted and value weighted sample portfolios. I use the Fama-French three-factor model and obtain the factor
returns for MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French‟s website. The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Panel A: 36-month Period
Equal-Weighted Returns

Value-Weighted Returns

α

-0.17**
(-4.560)

-0.23*
(-1.902)

MKT

0.87
(1.614)

1.22**
(2.154)

SMB

0.73***
(6.040)

0.34***
(3.142)

HML

-0.09***
(-6.331)

-0.13**
(-2.401)

Adj-R2

0.88

0.83

Panel B:

60-month Period
Equal-Weighted Returns

Value-Weighted Returns

α

-0.03*
(1.817)

-0.07**
(2.438)

MKT

1.03**
(2.874)

0.54**
(2.311)

SMB

0.09***
(2.771)

0.66*
(1.68)

HML

0.17**
(2.201)

-0.32***
(-3.271)

Adj-R2

0.79

0.92

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 7: Fixed-Effects Model
Table 7 provides coefficient estimates from the fixed effects model. Industry-adjusted ROAt, industry-adjusted ROE, and
industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q are regressed on governance indices (Panel A: GIM_Index; and Panel B: Entrenchment index). I

include a dummy variable for financial firms (FIN) and the degree of relatedness between the subsidiary and the
parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and leverage (LEV). The values in parenthesis are tstatistics and variable definitions are presented in Table 4.

Dependent Variable
ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

Panel A

ROAt

α

-1.21***
(-8.04)

0.01
(0.63)

-0.19***
(-4.27)

GIM_indext-1

-0.17***
(2.35)

-1.08***
(3.78)

0.09
(1.27)

L_TA

-0.18***
(3.88)

0.33
(0.91)

-1.04***
(2.77)

LEV

-0.01***
(14.2)

- 0.43***
(2.34)

0.02
(1.21)

EBIT

0.11
(0.74)

0.73**
(1.89)

0.04
(1.14)

SIC
FIN

0.21***

1.01**

0. 09**

(2.48)

(1.88)

(1.77)

0.12
(0.29)

0.33**
(1.68)

0.27
(1.02)

Panel B

ROAt

Dependent Variable
ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

α

-0.97**
(1.88)

0.42
(0.79)

-0.43***
(-2.56)

ENT_indext-1

0.08
(0.04)

-1.42***
(-3.44)

-0.18***
(-2.76)

L_TA

-0.23***
(2.41)

0.22
(0.87)

-1.08***
(2.44)

LEV

-0.13***
(2.44)

0.03
(1.03)

-0.22**
(1.72)

EBIT

0.48
(0.29)

1.09**
(1.73)

0.02
(1.11)

SIC
FIN

0.17***

0.98**

0.16**

(2.68)

(1.74)

(1.81)

0.31
(0.48)

0.52**
(1.72)

0.11
(1.03)

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 8: Hausman Endogeneity Tests
Table 8 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on GIM_Index (Panel A) with the three firm performance
dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q) using GIM_Indext-2 as the instrument. I test the significance of the coefficient
on the GIM_Index residuals. As exogenous variables, I include an indicator variables for financial firms (FIN) and
relatedness between the subsidiary and the parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and
leverage (LEV).

Dependent Variable
ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

Panel A

ROAt

α

-1.32*
(-1.34)

-0.97**
(-1.76)

1.02
(0.57)

GIM_indext-1

-0.03**
(-1.67)

-0.11*
(-1.62)

0.23**
(1.82)

GIM_Residuals

-0.04**
(-1.74)

0.01***
(2.04)

-0. 37**
(-1.94)

L_TA

-0.22*
(-1.54)

-0.03**
(-1.81)

-2.19***
(-3.41)

LEV

-1.07*
(-1.58)

-0.83**
(-1.68)

-0.07
(-1.02)

EBIT

0.11*
(1.41)

0.82***
(2.48)

0.53
(1.03)

SIC

0.07

0.29

0.02*

(0.43)

(1.03)

(1.55)

FIN

1.19
(1.12)

0.93*
(1.63)

0.78*
(1.34)

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
Wald (2)

0.14
63.96
78.12

0.07
18.44
24.06

0.11
33.08
42.43

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
(Instrument:
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GIM_Indext-2)

Table 8: Hausman Endogeneity Tests…cont
Table 8 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on ENT_Index (Panel B) with the three firm performance
dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q) using GIM_Indext-2 as the instrument. I test the significance of the coefficient
on the ENT_Index residuals. As exogenous variables, I include an indicator variables for financial firms (FIN) and
relatedness between the subsidiary and the parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and
leverage (LEV).

Dependent Variable
Panel B

ROAt

ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

α

0.82
(0.76)

-0.04*
(1.31)

-0.78*
(-1.44)

ENT_indext-1

-0.02
(-0.74)

-0.32
(-0.94)

0.05*
(1.34)

ENT_Residuals

-0.08***
(-3.22)

-0.13**
(-1.87)

-0.09*
(-1.44)

L_TA

-0.01*
(-1.48)

-0.23*
(-1.27)

1.03
(0.57)

LEV

-0.43
(-0.58)

-0.05**
(-2.17)

-0.07
(1.02)

EBIT

0.77*
(1.38)

0.83
(0.78)

1.03*
(1.53)

SIC

0.77*

1.02**

0.94*

(1.31)

(1.73)

(1.28)

FIN

0.68
(1.22)

0.94*
(1.55)

0.89*
(1.38)

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
Wald (2)

0.16
44.37
68.04

0.08
33.23
72.05

0.14
22.67
46.16

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
(Instrument:

ENT_Indext-2)
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Table 9: IV Regressions
Table 9 provides coefficient estimates from IV regressions of industry adjusted ROA on governance indices (Panel A:
GIM_Index; and Panel B: Entrenchment index) using GIM_indext-2 and ENT_indext-2 as instruments, respectively. I include a

dummy variable for financial firms (FIN) and the degree of relatedness between the subsidiary and the parent (SIC),
controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and leverage (LEV). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics and variable
definitions are presented in Table 4.

Dependent Variable
ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

Panel A

ROAt

α

1.17***
(3.14)

-0.44
(1.03)

-1.68***
(-9.28)

GIM_indext-1

-0.57***
(-2.66)

-0.24**
(-1.80)

-0.71**
(-2.24)

L_TA

-0.08***
(-2.48)

-0.02
(-0.07)

1.03**
(1.78)

LEV

-0.43
(-0.58)

-0.05**
(-2.17)

0.07
(1.02)

EBIT

1.24**
(1.77)

0.83***
(2.48)

0.76**
(1.83)

SIC

0.11***

0.03**

0.40**

(3.19)

(1.88)

(1.97)

FIN

0.28
(0.22)

0.34**
(1.68)

0.09
(1.07)

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
P-Values

0.38
10.53
[0.0018]

0.15
7.00
[0.0003]

0.27
3.83
[0.0520]

Dependent Variable
Panel B

ROAt

ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

α

1.02**
(2.16)

-0.76
(0.97)

-1.12***
(-3.04)

ENT_indext-1

-0.83**
(-1.97)

-0.67***
(-2.47)

0.02**
(1.73)

L_TA

-0.41**
(-2.01)

-0.38
(-1.02)

0.93**
(1.81)

LEV

-0.22
(-0.58)

-0.05**
(-2.17)

0.07
(1.02)

EBIT

0.89**
(2.03)

0.47***
(2.88)

0.51
(0.79)

SIC

1.04***

0.21**

0.57**

(3.37)

(1.91)

(2.16)

FIN

0.07
(1.12)

0.81**
(1.97)

0.34
(0.83)

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
P-Values

0.23
10.28
[0.0005]

0.12
9.70
[0.0005]

0.28
14.04
[0.0020]

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
Instruments:

Panel A: Constant, GIM_Indext-2
Panel B: Constant, ENT_Indext-2
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Table 10: GMM Estimates
Table 10 provides coefficient estimates from GMM regressions of industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobins_Q on governance
indices (Panel A: GIM_Index; and Panel B: Entrenchment index) using GIM_indext-2 and ENT_indext-2 as instruments,
respectively. I include a dummy variable for financial firms (FIN) and the degree of relatedness between the
subsidiary and the parent (SIC), controlling for firm size (L_TA), profitability (EBIT), and leverage (LEV).
Dependent Variable
Panel A

ROAt

ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

α

0.69**
(1.81)

0.07***
(2.33)

-1.12**
(-1.91)

GIM_indext-1

-0.43***
(-2.74)

-0.22***
(-2.67)

0.08**
(1.98)

L_TA

-0.14***
(-2.67)

-0.03
(-1.02)

-1.05**
(-1.74)

LEV

-0.42
(-1.21)

-0.07***
(-2.37)

- 0.12**
(-1.82)

EBIT

1.18**
(1.79)

0.87**
(1.86)

0.74
(1.02)

SIC

0.11*
(1.32)

0.46**
(1.81)

0.05**
(2.04)

FIN

0.04
(1.08)

0.32**
(1.77)

0.08
(1.17)

R-Square
Adj_R2
Durbin-Watson
J-Statistic

-14.00
-12.34
4.78
6.31E-06

-18.34
-18.41
3.79
2.84E-03
Dependent Variable

-16.37
-11.54
4.07
3.46E-03

Panel B
ROAt

ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

α

1.04**
(1.77)

0.12**
(1.98)

1.15
(0.91)

ENT_indext-1

-0.72***
(-2.48)

-0.22**
(-2.27)

-0.08**
(-1.84)

L_TA

-0.01**
(-1.73)

-0.09
(-0.84)

-0.75**
(-1.81)

LEV

-0.47
(-1.12)

-0.08***
(-2.41)

- 0.01**
(-1.98)

EBIT

0.48**
(1.79)

0.53**
(1.86)

0.74**
(2.12)

SIC

0.09
(1.04)

0.13**
(1.69)

0.02**
(2.04)

FIN

0.11**
(1.67)

0.52*
(1.07)

0.71
(1.26)

R-Square
Adj_R2
Durbin-Watson
J-Statistic

-12.02
-10.82
5.06
4.32E-04

-10.12
-14.28
4.03
3.21E-02

-12.05
-9.34
2.84
6.93E-.2

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
Instruments:
Panel A: Constant, GIM_Indext-2
Panel B: Constant, ENT_Indext-2
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Table 11a: IV and GMM Regressions for sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000)
Table 11a provides coefficient estimates from IV and GMM regressions for a sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000). I regress industry-adjusted ROA, ROE, and
Tobins_Q on GIM_Indext-1 using GIM_indext-2 as an instrument. I include an indicator variable (SIC) for industry relatedness between the subsidiary and the
parent (SIC). I control for firm size (L_TA), Price-to-book value (PBV), and firm profitability (EBIT).
IV
GMM
Model

1
ROAt

2
ROEt

3
Tobin‟s Qt

1
ROAt

2
ROEt

3
Tobin‟s_Qt

Constant

0.03
(0.57)

0.24***
(2.58)

-1.06
(-1.04)

-1.27
(-0.11)

0.05
(1.08)

-1.04**
(-1.66)

GIM-incdext-1

-0.98**
(-1.87)

-0.91***
(-2.77)

-0.24**
(-2.08)

-0.03*
(-1.41)

-0.62**
(-1.83)

0.08**
(1.79)

L_TA

-0.32**
(-1.71)

-1.01**
(2.29)

0.03
(0.07)

-0.74
(-0.42)

-0.11**
(-2.17)

-4.10**
(-1.78)

PBV

1.17**
(1.68)

2.22***
(2.69)

-

0.83**
(1.78)

0.62**
(2.03)

-

EBIT

0.04**
(2.08)

1.86**
(1.75)

0.81
(1.07)

0.14**
(2.02)

0.08
(0.17)

0.41**
(1.88)

Adj.R2
F-statistic
Model p-value

0.31
42.18***
[0.0000]

0.12
18.22**
[0.0001]

0.24
34.37***
[0.0000]

0.18
22.10**
[0.0000]

0.22
28.54**
[0.0001]

0.12
16.64**
[0.0000]

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 11b: IV and GMM Regressions for sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000)
Table 11b provides coefficient estimates from IV and GMM regressions for a sub-set of financial firms (SIC 6000). I regress industry-adjusted ROA, ROE, and
Tobins_Q on ENT_Indext-1 using ENT_indext-2 as an instrument. I include an indicator variable (SIC) for industry relatedness between the subsidiary and the
parent (SIC). I control for firm size (L_TA), Price-to-book value (PBV), and firm profitability (EBIT).
IV
GMM
Model

1
ROAt

2
ROEt

3
Tobin‟s_ Qt

1
ROAt

2
ROEt

3
Tobin‟s_Qt

Constant

0.74
(1.02)

0.63**
(1.92)

1.44**
(2.04)

-1.54
(-0.09)

0.11*
(1.29)

-1.67*
(-1.42)

ENT-incdext-1

-0.53*
(-1.67)

-0.08***
(-3.68)

-0.37***
(-2.44)

-0.43**
(-1.67)

-0.22**
(-1.91)

0.13*
(1.42)

L_TA

-0.04***
(-2.71)

-0.78**
(1.99)

-0.03
(-0.47)

-0.72
(-0.56)

-0.41*
(-1.33)

-3.87**
(-1.68)

PBV

0.97**
(1.73)

1.09***
(3.01)

-

0.32**
(1.69)

0.34**
(2.03)

-

EBIT

0.28*
(1.69)

1.01*
(1.71)

0.82
(1.33)

0.07**
(2.11)

0.17
(0.53)

0.57**
(1.93)

Adj.R2
F-statistic
Model p-value

0.18
28.17
[0.0000]

0.26
34.37***
[0.0001]

0.16
22.10**
[0.0000]

0.12
8.54**
[0.0000]

0.10
16.64**
[0.0001]

0.21
9.57**
[0.0000]

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 12: Granger Causality Tests
Table 12 presents results from bi-variate granger causality tests between shareholder-rights protection [GIM-index and ENTindex] and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA along with their 1-period lag.

F-Statistic

Probability

GIM-index does not granger cause ROA

8.420

[0.0000]

ROA does not granger cause GIM-index

1.203

[0.5480]

ENT-index does not granger cause ROA

12.621

[0.0000]

ROA does not granger cause ENT-index

0.044

[0.2860]

GIM-index does not granger cause ROE

4.568

[0.0005]

ROE does not granger cause GIM-index

0.941

[0.3680]

ENT-index does not granger cause ROE

26.010

[0.0000]

ROE does not granger cause ENT-index

1.045

[0.6200]

GIM-index does not granger cause Adj_Q

1.325

[0.0500]

Adj_Q does not granger cause GIM-index

0.572

[0.2020]

ENT-index does not granger cause Adj_Q

2.920

[0.0600]

Adj_Q does not granger cause ENT-index

0.083

[0.7200]

Model 1-(ROA)

Model 2-(ROE)

Model 3-(Adj_Q)
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Chapter 3
Board Structure and Firm Performance: The Case of Equity Carve-outs

Abstract

I investigate the effect of board structure on firm performance using a sample of carve-out firms
for the period 1983-2004. The board as an internal governance mechanism is intended to align the
interests of shareholders and those of management. An extensive literature attempting to evaluate how
effectively boards perform this role exists; however, the evidence is mixed and largely inconclusive. In
this essay I re-examine the effect of board structure on firm performance by implementing IV and GMM
to ameliorate the empirical problems that plague past studies. I also exploit the experimental setting
presented by the structural break in a firm‟s governance system through restructuring to mitigate the
persistence of governance structures across time. Full sample results show that board size is negatively
related to firm performance, board independence is positively associated with firm performance, and CEO
duality is negatively related to firm performance. On the other hand, results from a sub-sample consisting
of only financial firms board size is shown to be positively related to firm performance. In the case of
board independence and CEO duality, results for financial firms are qualitatively similar to those for nonfinancial firms – indicating a positive relation between firm performance and the two variables. Although
Granger causality tests suggest reverse causality between board size and firm performance, it is not clear
what explains the distinction between financial and non-financial firms in the case of board size.

JEL Classifications: G34, G38
Keywords: Corporate Boards; External Directors; Board Size; Board-insiders; Board Independence.
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1.

Introduction

Corporate boards constitute one of the most important internal control mechanisms of the
modern firm and have justifiably attracted significant interest from business researchers for a
long time. The board as an internal control mechanism is tasked with overseeing, hiring, firing,
and rewarding managers with the objective of aligning managers‟ interests with those of
shareholders through its key committees – audit, compensation, and governance and
nominations. Given the prominent role that boards play they have attracted significant attention,
particularly, from empirical researchers. Some of the big questions that empirical research has
attempted to answer include: (1) What factors affect the composition of boards; (2) Whether and
how board characteristics such as the proportion of external-to-insider directors and board size
affect firm performance; and thirdly (3) How effective corporate boards are in accomplishing
their intended role as an interest alignment mechanism. As important as boards seem to be,
though, Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) note a conspicuous dearth of formal theory on corporate
boards. In the absence of formal theory on corporate boards, interpreting the extensive empirical
findings is bound to be cloudy and subjective. This may partly explain the largely conflicting
extant evidence.

Limited formal theory notwithstanding, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) posit two
alternative causes for the largely mixed evidence and present some interesting policy
implications of their findings. First, they argue that empirical studies on corporate boards, like
other governance studies are seriously hampered by the endogeneity or reverse-causality
problem. It is still not clear whether good boards lead to better firm performance or whether past
performance in fact influences the future composition of boards. Second, they posit that
interpretation of the empirical results and related policy implications may vary depending on
whether the empirical results are interpreted from an equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium
perspective. For instance, they suggest that if the negative relation between board size and firm
performance is perceived from an out-of-equilibrium perspective, it may imply causation and the
encouragement of small boards. On the other hand, the equilibrium interpretation of these results
may point to a spurious relation between board size and firm performance, and the implication
that the two variables are driven by some other factor.
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In addition to board size, board independence has attracted similar attention from
scholars. It is very critical that boards as monitors of management not only be impartial but also
be perceived as such. Consequently, the presence of outside/unaffiliated board members on the
board and the CEO not doubling as the chairman of the board are perceived as indicators of the
degree of independence between the board and management. Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that
independent directors have an incentive to act as effective monitors in order to preserve their
reputations. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), on the other hand, posit that a board‟s independence
depends on the relative bargaining powers of the CEO and the board. More recently, as a result
of corporate scandals, board independence has taken on a regulatory dimension. Sarbanes-Oxley
and new securities exchange requirements now mandate that a majority of board members be
independent as well as all directors on key committees. These developments seem to implicitly
suggest that the presence of outside directors on a board ensures its effectiveness. From a
shareholder wealth perspective, a more interesting question to ask then becomes: Does an
independent board necessarily improve firm performance? As alluded to earlier, extant evidence
does not conclusively answer this question. Some evidence suggests a positive relation between
firm performance and board independence, other evidence posits a negative relation, and yet
other studies find no relation.

The majority of these earlier studies implement OLS regressions by projecting some
measure of firm performance, say, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), or Tobin‟s Q
on a given proxy for board size and independence (composition and leadership). Given the
potential endogeneity of board characteristics and firm performance, results obtained from
simple linear approaches are potentially likely to be misleading. I argue that the econometric
issues that generally afflict governance studies coupled with the limited formal theory to inform
empirical research on board structure and firm performance have to a degree constrained the
current state of inquiry on boards, thus impeding our full understanding of whether the form that
boards take has any influence on performance or vice versa.

The main objective of this essay is to re-examine the relation between firm performance
and board structure using methodological approaches that control for the major econometric
problems that plagued earlier studies. I argue that the largely mixed evidence on the effects of
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board structure on firm performance can partly be attributable to inadequate methodological
approaches used in these studies. To control for the potential endogeneity, I use panel data and
start with pooled regressions. I then implement the instrumental variables method (IV), the
generalized method of moments (GMM), and lastly I run granger causality tests between board
structure and firm performance to ascertain the direction of causation. I successively increase
the complexity of the models with a view to discerning the effect on my coefficients. The idea
here is that if any statistically significant changes in the coefficients can be observed, then it is
plausible that the choice of econometric models in earlier studies may partly explain the largely
mixed evidence. I then attempt to reconcile my results with existing evidence.

Second, I exploit the experimental setting presented by equity carve-outs to analyze the
effects of the restructuring „shock‟ on board structure. Then following the announcement, I
investigate to what extent board structure influences the performance of the carved-out
subsidiaries. My prior is that if shareholder wealth maximization is the goal of management, then
one would expect management of the parent company, with the approval of the board, to
structure the subsidiary‟s board in ways most likely to maximize shareholder value. I investigate
whether the parent firm‟s board structure has similarities with that of the newly created
subsidiary. And if so, to what extent these similarities may influence the subsidiary‟s
performance following the announcement.

I find that board size is negatively related to firm performance for non-financial firms,
consistent with the findings by Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Mak
and Yuanto (2003), Coleman and Biekpe (2005), and Charu Raheja (2005). Board independence
is positively associated with firm performance in support of the evidence presented by Charu
Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000). Consistent with
Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995) I find that
CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance. Results from a sub-sample consisting of
only financial firms (SIC 6000), show that board size is positively related to firm performance.
The findings for financial firms support the evidence presented by Adams and Mehran (2005)
and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming). A plausible explanation for the positive relation between
board size and firm performance for financial firms is that banks being large holding companies,
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the scope of operations is so complex that it requires larger boards provide a wider pool of
expertise to run them. What accounts for the positive association between board size and firm
performance though, is not so clear. One possibility, Adams and Mehran argue, is that board size
may be endogenously determined following merger activity when the board of directors from the
target firm is absorbed by the acquirer. In support of this view Granger causality test results
indicate reverse causality between board size and firm performance.

The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section 2, I review extant theory on board
structure and firm performance, present the empirical evidence, and develop testable hypotheses.
I present sample selection criteria, the data, and describe the variables in section 3. Section 4
discusses the empirical tests and results. Robustness test results are presented in section 5 and
section 6 concludes.

2.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

In this section, I review extant theory on board structure and discuss related predictions,
then I present the empirical evidence, and lastly, I motivate and develop testable hypotheses.
Although the relation between board structure and firm performance has defied conclusive
evidence, more recently, Charu Raheja (2005) posits that… “Optimal board design maximizes
the probability that the majority of board members will vote against inferior projects and replace
them with higher value projects. He goes on to say that “board size and independence affect the
incentives of board members and play a crucial role in board effectiveness”…thus directly
linking the performance of the firm to the effectiveness of the board, through the board‟s
approval of value increasing projects and rejection of bad projects. However, this assertion still
leaves open the question of what constitutes an „optimal‟ board. A number of theories have been
advanced to explain the structure of corporate boards, namely: the scope of operations
hypothesis; the monitoring hypothesis; and the negotiation hypothesis. I review each of these
theories, present related empirical evidence, and develop testable hypotheses to ascertain the
relation between firm performance and board structure.

61

2.1

Theory on Board Structure

2.1.1 The Scope of Operations Hypothesis
Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that as a firm‟s operations expand, its production processes
become increasingly complex and its organization more hierarchical. The board which is charged
with the stewardship of the firm and overseeing its senior managers, invariably also grows in size
as its responsibilities increase. Coles, Daniel, Naveen (2006) make the same argument, positing a
positive association between board size and the complexity of operations, but predicate the
increase in complexity on the introduction of new products and expansion into new geographical
markets. Crutchley, Garner, and Marshall (2004) and Lehn, Patro, Zhao (2004), on the other
hand, argue that given the complexity of operations and wider span of control larger firms are
likely to suffer from significantly more agency problems, consequently requiring more
independent (outside) board members to mitigate these problems. The main predictions from the
scope of operations hypothesis are that: (1) board size is positively related to the scope and
complexity of the firm‟s operations; (2) the proportion of independent (outside) directors on the
board is positively related to the scope and complexity of the firm‟s operations.

Yermack (1996) and Denis and Sarin (1999) present evidence that board size is positively
related to firm size. Anderson, Bates, and Lemmon (2000) show that diversified firms have
relatively more independent directors to monitor their extensive and varied operations. Boone,
Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) using firm size, age, and number of segments as proxies for
firm complexity, also present evidence in support of the scope of operations hypothesis, for both
board size and board independence.

2.1.2 The Monitoring Hypothesis

The notion that the effectiveness of the monitoring role played by boards diminishes as
the board gets larger is modeled by Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2006) as a trade-off
between the managers‟ consumption of private benefits and directors‟ monitoring costs.
Hackman (1990) makes the same „free-rider‟ and „cost-benefit‟ argument. He argues that large
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boards create incentive problems similar to a free-rider problem, which makes it difficult for
individual board members to actively participate in their supervisory roles. Moreover, as the
board grows in size the costs of group-decision making such as communication and coordination
costs rise, while at the same time reputation benefits in the eyes of the individual board member
diminish. The idea here is that optimal board size will be that number at which the verification
and monitoring costs of individual board members begin to rise. The overall predictions under
the monitoring hypothesis are that (1) Board size and independence are positively related to
managers‟ private benefits, and (2) board size and independence are negatively related to
directors‟ costs of monitoring. Lehn, Patro, Zhao (2004) show that firms with greater growth
opportunities have smaller boards and fewer outside directors. Similarly, Coles, et al. (2006)
present evidence that a firm‟s R&D expenditures are negatively related to the number of
independent (outside) directors.

Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) present recent

evidence of a positive relation between board size and managers‟ private benefits using industry
concentration and the presence of take-over defenses as proxies for managerial private benefits.
However, they show no relation between board independence and managers‟ private benefits and
directors‟ costs of monitoring.

2.1.3 The Negotiation Hypothesis

One of the reasons advanced for the existence of boards is that of an equilibrium solution
to the severe agency problems that exist between managers and shareholders. Independent
(outside) directors are often viewed as playing the role of monitors within the overall governance
framework. Proponents of the negotiation hypothesis take the view that board composition is an
evolutionary process that is largely shaped by the bargaining game between the CEO and the
independent directors on the board. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) posit that in this negotiation,
the CEO prefers a less independent board whereas the outside directors wish to maintain their
independence. The CEO‟s main bargaining chip is her ability. The authors make the case that if
the CEO demonstrates that she possesses a set of special abilities and therefore is not easily
replaceable, the board‟s independence will likely decline. Conversely, when the CEO presides
over poor performance her reputation and bargaining power with the board suffers likewise, and
she is more likely to be replaced. More recently, Baker and Gompers (2003) argue that the longer
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a CEO has been tenured and the better skilled she appears relative to potential replacements, the
stronger will be her bargaining power and the less independent will be the board. Kieschnick and
Moussawi (2004) reaffirm the negative relation between board independence and CEO influence
and argue that board independence will grow with institutional investor influence. Boone, Field,
Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) using CEO‟s stock ownership and job tenure as proxies for CEO
influence find a negative relation between board independence and these two variables.

2.2

Board Structure and Firm Performance

Most empirical studies that investigate the relation between board structure and firm
performance tend to appeal to agency theory. The rationale is that senior managers to whom
decision-making authority is delegated by the share owners of a corporation are self-interested
and may pursue actions that do not necessarily align with those of the owners. Hence, the board
of directors, being one of the important internal control mechanisms, is looked upon as a
mechanism to align managers‟ and shareholders‟ interests through close monitoring.
Consequently, when boards perform their role effectively, it is argued that actions that managers
take will be geared towards fulfilling their cardinal duty of maximizing shareholder wealth. On
the other hand, proponent‟s of the stewardship role of corporate boards argue that directors play
an advisory role to senior managers and engendering unity at the top and avoiding unnecessary
power struggles may in fact be a good thing in terms of shepherding and deploying the firm‟s
resources. The two polar views notwithstanding, some important questions that deserve attention
when evaluating the impact of board structure on firm performance are: (1) What constitutes an
effective board, and (2) How are the characteristics of an effective board related to firm
performance? An extensive literature exists although it is still largely mixed.

2.2.1 Board Size

In the case of board size, there are studies that posit a positive relation between firm
performance and board size; there are those that show a negative association, and others that
support the null hypothesis that board size has no effect on firm performance. Mak and Yuanto
(2003) and Coleman and Biekpe (2005) present international evidence of a negative relation
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between firm performance and board size and for Singapore and Malaysia, respectively.
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) also find a negative relation
between board size and the market valuation of US firms. Charu Raheja (2005) argues that
optimal boards maximize the probability that inferior projects will be rejected by the board and
replaced with higher value projects, partly attributing the effectiveness of boards to small size.
On the other hand, several management researchers, in particular Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and
Ellstrad (1999) argue that large boards provide a wider pool of expertise that senior management
can tap into thus predicting a positive relation between board size and firm performance. The
null hypothesis between firm performance and board size is supported by Bhagat and Black
(2002), Provost, et al., (2002), and Adams and Mehran (2002) who find no statistically
significant relation between board composition and firm performance.

In this study, I

hypothesize that small boards are more effective and will have a more significant impact on firm
performance:

H1:

Long-term carve-out performance is negatively associated with board size.

2.2.2 Board Independence

Part of Charu Raheja (2005) argument that optimal boards maximize the probability that
inferior projects will be rejected by the board and replaced with higher value projects, is
predicated on the notion that independent boards are more effective. This supports the notion that
a positive association exists between firm performance and board independence. Chung, Wright,
and Kedia (2003) study the relation between a firm‟s R&D expenditures and firm value and
present evidence of a positive relation for those firms with more independent boards. Brewer III,
et al., (2000) shows that banking firms with independent boards command higher premium in
takeovers than those with less independent boards. On the other hand, Anderson, et al., (1998)
show that the ratio of independent directors is negatively related to the price-to-sales ratio for
mono-product line firms. Yermack (1996) using the simultaneous equations approach, also
documents evidence of a negative relation between the firm‟s Tobin‟s Q and an independent
board. The effect however, disappears in a fixed effects setup. Lastly, Bhagat and Black (2002),
Provost, et al., (2002), and Adams and Mehran (2002) find no statistically significant relation
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between board independence and firm performance. In view of the largely mixed evidence, I reinvestigate the relation between firm performance and board independence. I hypothesize that
independent boards are more effective monitors and hence will have a positive effect on firm
performance:

H2:

Long-term carve-out performance is positively associated with the proportion of
independent (outside) directors on the board.

2.2.3 CEO Duality

Related to board independence is the notion of board leadership. Separation of the role of
CEO and board chairman has pre-occupied board scholars and regulators particularly following
recent corporate scandals. Agency theory suggests that having the CEO also play the role of
board chairman compromises the independence of the board and an ineffective board is likely to
cause poor performance [Fama and Jensen (1983)]. Based on the monitoring hypothesis, it would
seem obvious that the CEO who is supposed to be monitored by the board should not be the chair
of the same board. Moreover, the negotiation hypothesis which posits that board structure is the
result of bargaining between the CEO and the board, suggests that having the CEO act as
chairman of the board bestows enormous bargaining advantage for the CEO over the board,
invariably compromising its independence. Consistent with these views, Rechner and Dalton
(1991) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) show evidence that firms which separate CEO and board
chairman roles consistently outperform those with dual CEO/Chairman positions. On the other
hand, proponents of the stewardship hypothesis suggest that the CEO is likely to be more
informed about what is happening within the firm and therefore better placed to chair the board
and act as the conduit for the exchange of critical information between the insiders and the
outside directors on the board. This arrangement, they argue, minimizes the cost of information
transfer and potential miscommunication between the board and management [Donaldson and
Davis (1991)]. On the other hand, Baliga et al., (1996) and Dalton et al., (1998) find no
significant association between CEO duality and firm performance. Given this dichotomous view
on CEO duality, I include an indicator variable, (CEOt-1), coded „1‟ if the CEO is also the
chairman of the board or „0‟ otherwise, and test the following hypothesis:
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H3:

Long-term carve-out performance is negatively associated with CEO Duality.

2.2.4 Board Structure and Performance: Financial Firms

Adams and Mehran (2005) examine the relation between board structure and firm
performance for US banking institutions and find that, contrary to the evidence for non-financial
firms positing a negative (positive) relation between board size (board independence) and firm
performance, board size is positively related to firm performance and no statistically significant
association between board independence and firm performance. They argue that banks being
large holding companies, the scope of operations hypothesis explains why they are likely to have
larger boards. What accounts for the positive association between board size and firm
performance though, is not so clear. One possibility, they argue, is that board size may be
endogenously determined following merger activity when the board of directors from the target
firm is absorbed by the acquirer. This argument is plausible, considering that their sample period,
1959-1999, was a period characterized by significant M&A activity in the banking industry.
Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming) studies board size and firm performance for US banks and
Savings & Loans, for the period 1995-2002. Consistent with Adams and Mehran (2005), he finds
a positive relation between board size and firm performance and no relation between board
independence and firm performance.

To ascertain whether the relation between board structure and firm performance for
financial firms differs from that documented for non-financial firms, I include a dummy variable
(FIN), for financial firms in all full sample regressions. I also run separate IV and GMM
regressions for financial firms.

3.

Sample Selection and Data

3.1

Sample Selection
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The sample is compiled from the Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) US IPO data and
cross checked with Lexis-Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, the Wall Street Journal Index and the
Directory of Corporate Affiliations. The initial sample comprises 421 firms (regulated and
unregulated) that announced carve-out transactions during the time period 1983 - 2004. For
inclusion in the sample, a firm must be traded on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and be
covered by CRSP and Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT. Supplemental governance data is
obtained from Q-files, Lexis-Nexis, Compact Disclosure CD-ROMs, The Corporate Library
(TCL), and corporate proxy statements. For each year that a firm is in the sample, I gather
complete data on the composition of the board, directors‟ relationships with the firm/senior
management, and number of directors on the board. Firms that constitute the final sample are
then observed for the entire sample period or until a given firm is re-acquired or summarily sold
off. I use Weisbach (1998) methodology to classify directors as affiliated or non-affiliated.
Directors who are current employees of the firm, retired, or their immediate families are
classified as affiliated directors or insiders. Those whose only association with the firm is
membership on the board are classified as unaffiliated or outside directors.

After the initial screening and elimination of firms that do not trade on
AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE, have missing data points, or are not covered by CRSP and
COMPUSTAT 164 firms constitute the final sample (81 financials and 83 industrials). To
control for the regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of financial firms (SIC 6000), I
include an indicator variable coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial or „0‟ otherwise, in all
regressions. For robustness, I also run separate regressions on financial firms (SIC 6000).

Table 13 presents the size and distribution of the sample. Panel A shows the initial
sample size and break- down of the number of firms screened out and the reasons for their
exclusion. Of the original sample of 421 firms, 144 firms are dropped because they are not listed
on AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE.

Additionally, 105 firms are not covered by CRSP and/or

COMPUSTAT and 8 firms had missing data on the structure of their boards. Panel B shows the
distribution of carve-out announcements by year. Firms that meet all requirements for inclusion,
range from 5 for the years 1989, 1991, 2003, and 2004 to 14 for 2000. Panel C presents the
distribution of announcements by industry (2-digit SIC). Financials (SIC 60), had the highest
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number of transactions with 81 announcements, manufacturing (SIC 20-30) had 34, there were
17 announcements for other services (SIC 70-80), 14 for wholesale/retail (SIC 50), 9 for
transportation, communications, and utilities (SIC 40), and 8 for mining, oil, and gas (SIC 10).

3.2

Descriptive Statistics
Table 14 presents sample descriptive statistics. Board size has a mean (median) of 10.74

(10.19) board members with a standard deviation of 2.31. The maximum (minimum) number of
directors on the board is 18 (4). The proportion of independent directors to total directors on the
board has a mean (median) of 73% (78%) with a standard deviation of 22%. The maximum
(minimum) proportion of independent directors is 94% (31%). CEO/Chairman duality has a
mean (median) of 0.26 (1.00) and a standard deviation of 0.52. The maximum (minimum)
number for CEO/Chairman duality is 1.00 (0.00). Total market value of equity ranges from a
minimum of $3.4 to a maximum of $58,514 with a mean (median) of $1,002 ($207) and a
standard deviation of $244. Leverage which is measured as total long-term debt divided by total
assets ranges from a minimum of 0.12 to a maximum of 1.06 with a mean (median) of 0.43
(0.54) and a standard deviation of 0.20. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.21 to a
maximum of 0.79 with a mean (median) of 0.41 (0.39) and a standard deviation of 0.24. Tobin‟s
Q which is measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets,
ranges from 1.18 to 1.92 with a mean (median) of 1.48 (1.57) and a standard deviation of 1.12.
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets
(EBIT/TA) and the minimum (maximum) for the sample is -0.03 (0.16) with a mean (median) of
0.17 (0.21) and a standard deviation of 0.13. Return on equity is measured as net earnings
divided by total owners equity (Net Income/Common Stock) and ranges from a minimum of 0.06 to a maximum of 0.28 with a mean (median) of 0.17 (0.21) and a standard deviation of 0.24.

3.3

Description of Variables

3.3.1 Dependent Variables (ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q)
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Table 15, presents descriptions of dependent and independent variables and how they are
constructed. The dependent variable is firm performance. Three variables including Tobin‟s Q
(Adj_Q), return on assets (Adj_ROA), and return on equity (Adj_ROE) are used to proxy firm
performance. Tobin‟s Q, is measured as book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus
the market value of equity divided by the book value of its assets. Each firm‟s Tobin‟s Q is then
adjusted by subtracting the industry median. To ascertain the significance of the potential right
skew in the distribution of firm value, I use log values of Tobin‟s Q as a robustness test. Return
on assets (ROA) for each firm is calculated as the ratio of the firm‟s earnings before interest and
tax (EBIT) to the book value of assets. Return on equity (ROE) measured as a firm‟s earnings
before interest and tax divided by the firms total equity. Both variables are then adjusted by
subtracting the industry medians for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE),
respectively.

3.3.2 Explanatory Variables

Board size is measured as the total number of directors on the board. An indicator
variable coded „1‟ if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board or „0‟ otherwise. Board
independence is the ratio of outside (unaffiliated) directors to the total number of directors on the
board. Outside (unaffiliated) directors are defined as those non-executive board members who
have no material relationship (either as partner, shareholder, or officer) with the company
beyond their directorship. The IFC definition goes even farther and suggests that an independent
director should be independent in character and judgment. It specifically states that, “…an
independent director is one who is not, and has not been employed by the company or any of its
related parties at any time during the past five years; is not, and has not been affiliated with a
company that acts as an advisor or consultant to the company or its related parties, nor is not and
has not himself acted in such capacity at any time during the past five years; is not, and has not
been affiliated with any significant customer or supplier of the company or its related parties…”
among others. For robustness, I also use the change in board independence (Outside directors
minus inside directors), in place of the proportion of outsiders.
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3.3.5 Control Variables

Control variables include book-to-market value (BME), log of market value of equity
(L_MVE), and log of total assets (L_TA) used as control variables for firm size. Leverage
(LEV), computed as total long-term debt divided by the firm‟s total assets, and Capital ratio are
used to proxy for the indebtedness of non-financial and financial firms, respectively. For full
sample regressions combining financial and non-financial firms, I include an indicator variable
FIN for financials, to control for the regulatory and balance sheet differences. The sample
distribution data presented in Table 13, Panel C depicts some degree of industry concentration
particularly in manufacturing, services, and wholesale/retail. For robustness, I include an
indicator variable for industry, SIC, based on the 2-digit SIC code.

Table 16 presents the correlation matrix between the main variables. Results show that
the pairwise correlation between contemporaneous firm performance proxies and the main
explanatory variables is much weaker than that between performance proxies and lagged
explanatory variables. Pairwise correlations between industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q and ROE with
lagged board size (B_SIZE) are negative and significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Pairwise correlation between ROA and lagged B_SIZE is positive and insignificant. Correlations
between Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA and board independence are all positive and statistically
significant at 5% level for Tobin‟s Q and ROE, and 10% for ROA. Pairwise correlations between
performance measures and CEO Duality are all negative and statistically significant at the 10%
level. For further analysis, I run granger-causality tests between the three performance measures
and board structure proxies to determine the direction of causation.

4. Methodology

Following the discussion on the econometrics of governance studies, I argue that simple
OLS estimation methods are unlikely to yield unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates. I use
panel data which allows for more robust and dynamic modeling of firm heterogeneity. First, I
start with annual univariate regressions and then successively increase the complexity of the
models by implementing a fixed effects model, then the instrumental variables method (IV), and
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lastly, the generalized method of moments (GMM). As a robustness check, I also run granger
causality tests to determine the direction of causation between board structure and firm
performance. To test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, I project an industry-adjusted performance
measure [ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q] on each of the proxies for board structure [B_SIZE,
B_INDEP, and CEO]. I include as control variables the log of total assets (L_TA), firm leverage
(LEV), and firm profitability (EBIT). To capture industry effects, I use a binary variable (FIN),
coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial (SIC 6000) or „0‟ otherwise. For the IV and GMM models, I
use 2 lags of board structure variables as instruments. I estimate the following model:
Adj_ROAit = α + ß1B_SIZEi,t-1 + ß2B_INDEP i,t-1 + ß3CEO,i,t-1 + ß4LEV i,t-1 + ß5L_TAi,t-1 + ß6FINi, t + εit (1)

One of the econometric problems discussed earlier is reverse causality. In the case of
board structure and firm performance, it is not clear whether effective boards result in better firm
performance in the future or whether in fact good performance causes firms to establish effective
boards. I implement granger causality tests (Granger 1969) to test whether changes in board
structure are followed by systematic changes in firm performance or vice versa. Granger
causality tests have the advantage of not requiring the use of instrumental variables. I test the
following models for each of the board structure proxies and measures of firm performance:
Adj_ROAt = α0 + α1ROAt-1 + α2ROAt-2 + β1B_SIZEt-1 + β2B_SIZEt-2 + εt

(2)

B_SIZEt = φ0 + φ 1B_SIZEt-1 + φ 2B_SIZEt-2 + β3ROAt-1 + β4ROAt-2 + νt

(3)

In equation (2), the null hypothesis is that: board size (B_SIZE) does not granger cause firm
performance (ROA). Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that board size granger causes
firm performance. In equation (3), the null hypothesis is that: firm performance does not
granger cause board size. Rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that firm performance
granger causes board size. The F-statistic/Wald-statistic is used to test the following condition,
for all equations:

β1 = β2 = 0

5. Empirical Results
5.1 OLS Regressions
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Table 17 presents test results from annual OLS regressions. Model 1 uses industryadjusted ROA as the dependent variable, Model 2 uses industry-adjusted ROE, and Model 3 uses
industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q, controlling for firm profitability (EBIT), leverage (LEV), firm size
(L_TA), and whether the firm is financial or non-financial (FIN). The coefficients on board size
(B_SIZEt-1) are mostly negative and range from -0.87 to 0.19 with levels of significance
ranging from 0.01 in year 1998, to 0.05 in 1988, 1990, and 2004, and 0.10 in 1984, 1985, 1989,
1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2004. The coefficients on board independence (B_INDEP) are
mostly positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the years 1983, 1991, 1992, 1998,
2002, and 2003, and significant at the 0.10 level for the years 1984, 1986, 1989, 1997, and 2000.
The coefficients on CEO duality (CEO) are mostly negative and range from -1.42 to 0.91 with
levels of significance ranging from 0.05 in 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995, 1999, and 2004, and 0.10 in
1992. Model 2 uses adjusted return on equity (ROE) as a measure of firm performance. The
coefficients on board size (B_SIZE) are mostly negative and range from -0.54 to 0.22 with levels
of significance ranging from 0.05 for years 1988, 1992, and 1996, to 0.10 in 1983, 1984, 1987,
1989, 1991, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004. The coefficients on board independence
(B_INDEP) are mostly positive ranging from -0.11 to 0.94 and statistically significant at the
0.05 level for the years 1989, 1997, 1998, and significant at the 0.10 level for the years 1985,
1987, 1990, 1993, 2002, and 2004. The coefficients on CEO duality (CEO) are mostly negative
and range from -1.20 to 0.85 with levels of significance ranging from 0.05 in 1985, 1991, 1994,
2001, and 2003, and 0.10 in 1997. Model 3 uses adjusted return on equity (ROE) as a measure of
firm performance. The coefficients on board size (B_SIZE) are mostly negative and range from
-0.34 to 0.48 with levels of significance ranging from 0.05 for year 2003, to 0.10 for years 1986,
1988, 1991, 1993, and 1998. The coefficients on board independence (B_INDEP) are mostly
positive ranging from -0.11 to 0.87 and statistically significant at the 0.10 level for the years
1985, 1988, 1992, 1998, and 2003. The coefficients on CEO duality (CEO) are mostly negative
and range from -1.18 to 0.37 with a 0.10 significance level for years 1983, 1988, 1996, and 2000.

In general, though inconclusive, OLS multivariate results show a positive association
between firm performance and board independence, a negative relation between CEO-duality
and firm performance, and a negative relation between firm performance and board size. These
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preliminary results support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, and are consistent with the results
presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al.,
(2000). The results negate the findings by Bhagat and Black (2002) and Provost, et al., (2002),
who document no relation between firm performance and board composition, and those of
Yermack (1996) who shows a negative relation between firm performance and board
independence.

5.2 Fixed Effects Model

I test the appropriateness of the fixed effects and a random effects model using a
Hausman endogeneity test. Results show an F-statistic (P_value) of 12.43 (0.0000) suggesting
that the fixed-effects coefficient estimates are more consistent. Hence, I implement a fixed
effects model. Table 18, Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as
the dependent variable. Board size (B_SIZE) has the opposite sign from that predicted by
hypothesis H1 and the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on board
independence (B_INDEP) has a positive sign as predicted by H2 but is also statistically
insignificant. Consistent with hypothesis H3, the coefficient on CEO duality is negative and
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The indicator variable for financial firms is also
statistically significant suggesting that association between firm performance, as measured by
ROA, may be different for financials that non-financial firms. Overall, results from the fixed
effects model, using ROA as the measure for firm performance, do not support hypotheses H1
and H2 but are consistent with hypothesis H3, which predicts a negative relation between firm
performance and CEO-duality. The results on CEO duality are consistent with Fama and Jensen
(1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995). Model 2 uses return on
equity (ROE) as a measure for firm performance. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZE) is
-1.08 and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient on board independence
(B_INDEP) is negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient on CEO duality is negative
and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The pooled regression results using ROE as a
measure of firm performance support hypothesis H1 and H3. Results are also consistent with the
evidence presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto
(2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996). The indicator variable for
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financial firms is positive and statistically significant suggesting that the relation between firm
performance and board structure may differ from that of non-financial firms. Model 3 uses
Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as a measure of firm performance. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZE) is
-0.13 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient on board independence
(B_INDEP) is 0.28 and statistically insignificant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient on CEO duality
is negative, -0.21, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Results support hypotheses.
Overall, the fixed effects results support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 which posit a
negative relation between firm performance and board size; positive relation between firm
performance and board independence, and a negative relation between CEO duality and firm
performance, respectively.

5.3 Hausman Endogeneity Test

Table 19 presents results coefficient estimates when B_SIZEt-2, B_INDEPt-2 and CEOt-2
are used as instruments. The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_SIZE Residuals is -0.34(-1.41) with an
F-statistic (Wald-2) of 7.44 (24.06) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_SIZE Residuals
using ROE as the dependent variable is -0.06(-1.41) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 8.62
(32.16). The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_SIZE Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent
variable is -0.11(-0.73) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 2.03 (4.18). The coefficients on the
residuals for ROA and ROE are statistically significant at the 0.05. The coefficients on the
residuals for Tobin‟s Q are statistically insignificant. The null hypothesis that the coefficient on
the B_SIZE Residuals is zero is rejected for the first two models (ROA and ROE). This implies
the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of using the OLS method. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on B_INDEP Residuals is 0.21(1.59) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of
6.32(16.38) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on B_INDEP Residuals using ROE as the
dependent variable is 0.43(2.77) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 26.72 (42.06). The coefficient
(t-statistic) on B_INDEP Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is 0.57(1.66) with
an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 9.72 (27.03). The coefficients on the residuals for all the dependent
variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The null hypothesis that the coefficient on
the B_INDEP Residuals is zero is rejected, which suggests the presence of endogeneity and
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hence the inappropriateness of using the OLS method. The coefficient (t-statistic) on
OWN_CON Residuals is -2.63(-1.88) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 8.62 (32.16) for ROA. The
coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is -0.09(3.41) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 18.12 (22.01). The coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON
Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is -0.28(-1.37) with an F-statistic (Wald-2)
of 8.02 (24.92). The null hypothesis that the coefficient on the OWN_CON residuals is zero is
rejected for all models, suggesting the presence of endogeneity. In the presence of endogeneity,
the OLS coefficient estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent.

5.4

Instrumental Variables Method (IV)
Table 20 presents results from IV regressions. The instruments for board structure

variables are the 2 lags of B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and CEO. Model 1 presents estimated coefficients
using return on assets (ROA) as a measure of performance. All the coefficients on board
structure proxies B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1, and CEOt-1 are statistically significant at 0.10, 0.10,
and 0.05 levels, respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the
predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.

Consistent with extant evidence board size is

negatively associated with firm performance, while board independence is positively related to
performance, and CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance. The indicator variable
for financial firms is statistically insignificant. These results are also consistent with the evidence
presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al.,
(2000) in the case of board independence, and Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto
(2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996) in the case of board size,
and Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995), in the
case of CEO duality. Model 2 presents test results using ROE as the performance measure.
Board size and CEO duality have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at 0.01 and
0.10, respectively. Board independence has the opposite sign from that predicted by hypothesis
H2 and is statistically insignificant. The results for board size and CEO duality are consistent
with the evidence presented by Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg,
Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996), in the case of board size. In the case of CEO
duality, they are consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and
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Westphal and Zajac (1995). Model 3 presents estimated coefficients using Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as
the performance measure. All coefficients on board structure proxies B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1,
and CEOt-1 are statistically significant at 0.05, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The signs on
the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. Board size
is shown to be negatively associated with firm performance, while board independence is
positively related to performance, and CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance.
The indicator variable for financial firms is statistically insignificant. Results are consistent with
the evidence presented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer
III, et al., (2000) in the case of board independence, and Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and
Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996) in the case of board
size, and Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995),
in the case of CEO duality.

5.5

Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
Table 21 presents GMM test results. As instruments, I use 2 lags of board structure

variables: B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and CEO Duality. Model 1 presents results using ROA as the
performance measure. All coefficients on B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1, and CEOt-1 are statistically
significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also
consistent with the predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. Board size is negatively associated
with firm performance, while board independence is positively related to performance, and CEO
duality is negatively related to firm performance. The indicator variable for financial firms is
statistically insignificant. These results are also consistent with the evidence presented by Charu
Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000) in the case of
board independence, and Coleman and Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg,
Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack (1996) in the case of board size, and Fama and Jensen
(1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac (1995), in the case of CEO duality.
Model 2 presents results using ROE as the performance measure. Again, all three coefficients on
B_SIZEt-1, B_INDEPt-1, and CEOt-1 are statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses
H1, H2, and H3. Model 3 uses Tobin‟s Q as the performance measure and still all three
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instruments for board structure are statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively. The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses
H1, H2, and H3. Model 2 presents results using ROE as the performance measure. All coefficients
on board structure proxies are statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
The signs on the coefficients are also consistent with the predictions of hypotheses H1, H2, and
H3. Board size is shown to be negatively associated with firm performance, while board
independence is positively related to performance, and CEO duality is negatively related to firm
performance. The indicator variable for financial firms is statistically insignificant. These results
are consistent with the evidence documented by Charu Raheja (2005), Chung, Wright, and Kedia
(2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000) in the case of board independence, and Coleman and
Biekpe (2005), Mak and Yuanto (2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Yermack
(1996) in the case of board size, and Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and
Westphal and Zajac (1995), in the case of CEO duality. All three models are also shown to be
significant. All three models are statistically significant with J-statistics of 4.37E-03 for ROA,
6.72E-03 for ROE, and 2.48E-03 for Tobin‟s Q.

Overall, the signs and significance of the coefficients on board structure proxies suggest
that firm performance is negatively associated with board size, positively related with board
independence, and negatively related with CEO duality.

5.4

Empirical Results - Subset of Financial Firms (SIC 6000)

Full sample results indicate a statistically significant coefficient on the indicator variable,
FIN, for financial firms (SIC 6000). Consistent with Adams and Mehran (2005) and Mohamed
Belkhir (forthcoming), this suggests that the association between board structure and firm
performance for financial firms may be distinct from that for non-financial firms. To ascertain
what the differences are and whether the differences are statistically significant, I run separate IV
and GMM regressions for financial firms. Table 22 presents the empirical results. For the
instrumental variables approach (IV), Model 1 uses return on assets (ROA) as the performance
measure. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) has the opposite sign as that predicted by
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hypothesis H1 and it is statistically insignificant.

The coefficient on board independence

(B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by hypothesis H2, and statistically significant at the 0.10
level. CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance and statistically significant at the
0.10 level, consistent with hypothesis H3. Model 2 uses return on equity (ROE) as the
performance measure. The coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) is negative, contrary to
hypothesis H1 and it is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The coefficient on board
independence (B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by hypothesis H2, and statistically significant
at the 0.10 level. CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance but statistically
insignificant.

Model 3 uses Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as the performance measure. Contrary to

hypotheses H1 and H2, the coefficients on board size (B_SIZEt-1) and board independence
(B_INDEPt-1) are both negative, and statistically insignificant. CEO duality is negatively related
to firm performance and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, consistent with hypothesis H3.
For GMM, I use return on assets (ROA) as the performance measure in Model 1. The
coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) is negative as predicted by hypothesis H1 but statistically
insignificant. The coefficient on board independence (B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by
hypothesis H2, and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. CEO duality is negatively related to
firm performance and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, consistent with hypothesis H3.
Model 2 uses return on equity (ROE) as the performance measure. The coefficient on board size
(B_SIZEt-1) is negative, as predicted by hypothesis H1 but statistically insignificant.

The

coefficient on board independence (B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by hypothesis H2, but
statistically insignificant. CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance and statistically
significant at the 0.10 level. Model 3 uses Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q) as the performance measure. The
coefficient on board size (B_SIZEt-1) is negative as predicted by hypothesis H1 but statistically
insignificant. The coefficient on board independence (B_INDEPt-1) is positive as predicted by
hypothesis H2, and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Contrary to hypothesis H3, CEO
duality is positively related to firm performance but statistically insignificant.

Overall, results for the relation between board size and firm performance for financial
firms seem to contradict hypothesis H1, which posits a negative relation between board size and
firm performance. This evidence, however, is consistent with the findings by Adams and Mehran
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(2005) and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming) which posit a positive association between board
size and firm performance for banking institutions. Results for board independence (B_INDEPt1)

and CEO duality for financial firms are consistent with hypotheses H2 and H3. Board

independence is positively related to firm performance and CEO duality is negatively related to
firm performance.

5.5

Granger Causality Tests
Table 23 presents empirical results from bi-variate granger causality tests. Model 1 tests

causality between board structure variables [board size, board independence, CEO duality] and
return on assets (ROA). The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that board size (B_SIZE) does
not granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 5.183 with a p-value of 0.0001. The F-statistic for
the test that ROA does not Granger cause board size (B_SIZE), is 7.011 with a p-value of
0.0000. Thus the reverse causality between ROA and board size cannot be rejected. The Fstatistic for the null hypothesis test that board independence (B_INDEP) does not Granger cause
return on assets (ROA), is 6.801 with a p-value of 0.0050. The F-statistic for the test that ROA
does not Granger cause board independence (B_INDEP), is 1.021 with a p-value of 0.4210. The
results suggest that ROA does not Granger cause board independence but board independence
Granger causes ROA. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that CEO duality (CEOt-1) does
not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 5.118 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for
the test that ROA does not Granger cause CEO duality (CEOt-1) is 0.975 with a p-value of
0.2732. The results suggest that ROA does not Granger cause CEO duality but CEO duality
Granger causes ROA.

Model 2 presents test results for bi-variate causality between board structure and return
on equity (ROE). The null hypothesis test that board size (B_SIZE) does not granger cause return
on equity (ROE), has an F-statistic of 3.840 and a p-value of 0.0050. The F-statistic for the test
that ROE does not Granger cause board size (B_SIZE), is 12.001 with a p-value of 0.0000.
Results suggest that we cannot reject reverse causality between ROE and board size. The Fstatistic for the null hypothesis test that board independence (B_INDEP) does not Granger cause
return on equity (ROE), is 4.648 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that ROE
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does not Granger cause board independence (B_INDEP) is 1.008 with a p-value of 0.2839. The
results suggest that ROE does not Granger cause board independence but board independence
Granger causes ROE. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that CEO duality (CEO) does
not Granger cause return on equity (ROE), is 8.246 with a p-value of 0.0001. The F-statistic for
the test that ROE does not Granger cause CEO duality (CEO) is 0.320 with a p-value of 0.3392.
The results suggest that ROE does not Granger cause CEO duality but CEO duality Granger
causes ROE.
Model 2 presents test results between board structure and Tobin‟s Q (Adj_Q). The null
hypothesis test that board size (B_SIZE) does not granger cause Tobin‟s Q has an F-statistic of
1.121and a p-value of 0.0520. The F-statistic for the test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger cause
board size (B_SIZE), is 4.056 with a p-value of 0.0002. Results suggest that board size does not
Granger cause Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q Granger causes board size. The F-statistic for the null
hypothesis test that board independence (B_INDEP) does not Granger cause Tobin‟s Q is 5.820
with a p-value of 0.0005. The F-statistic for the test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger cause board
independence (B_INDEP) is 0.872 with a p-value of 0.6040. Results suggest that Tobin‟s Q
does not Granger cause board independence but board independence Granger causes Tobin‟s Q.
The F-statistic for the null hypothesis that CEO duality (CEO) does not Granger cause Tobin‟s Q
is 7.004 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that Tobin‟s Q does not Granger
cause CEO duality (CEO) is 0.048 with a p-value of 0.5722. These results suggest that Tobin‟s
Q does not Granger cause CEO duality but CEO duality Granger causes Tobin‟s Q.

Overall, Granger causality tests suggest the presence of reverse causality between board
size and firm performance, which may partly explain the mixed evidence reported. In the case of
board independence and CEO duality, results show that both of these variables Granger cause
firm performance but the reverse is rejected. It is important, though, to note that these results do
not necessarily imply a causal relation between board independence or CEO duality and firm
performance but rather precedence of information content i.e. past changes in the two board
structure proxies can explain the latter.
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6. Robustness

I test the robustness of these results to the use of alternative thresholds for defining
independent boards. All results with thresholds above 50%, outside directors yield qualitatively
similar results. I also test the robustness of my results to the use of alternative measures of firm
performance/value. I use investment intensity (INV), measured as R&D expenditures divided by
total assets and the ratio of capital expenditures-to-total assets. In both cases, results are
qualitatively similar to those reported using Tobin‟s Q. To ascertain whether there are any
statistically significant differences between firms with higher Q values than those with lower Q
values, I divide the sample into three sub-samples. The three sub-samples consist of firms that
fall into the top 40%, firms in the lower 40%, and the rest in the middle 20%. I run the tests on
the top 40% and the bottom 40%. Results obtained in both cases are qualitatively similar to those
reported for the full sample. Lastly, I winsorize the sample data at 1% and 5% to mitigate the
potential influence of outliers. In both cases the results obtained using winsorized data are
qualitatively similar to those obtained for the full sample.

7.

Conclusion
In this essay I investigate the relation between board structure and firm performance.

Consistent with prior findings by Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Mak
and Yuanto (2003), Coleman and Biekpe (2005), and Charu Raheja (2005) I find a negative
relation between board size and firm performance for non-financial firms. Contrary to this
finding, board size for a sub-sample of financial firms is shown to be positively associated with
firm performance. The findings between board size and performance for financial firms support
the evidence presented by Adams and Mehran (2005) and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming). I
also find that board independence is positively related to firm performance for both financial and
non-financial firms. These results are consistent with the findings by Charu Raheja (2005),
Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003), and Brewer III, et al., (2000). In support of the evidence
presented by Fama and Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), and Westphal and Zajac
(1995) I find that CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance. Results from a subsample consisting of only financial firms (SIC 6000), show that board size is positively related to
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firm performance. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance. Results
from winsorized and non-winsorized data are also qualitatively similar.

The findings for financial firms support the evidence presented by Adams and Mehran
(2005) and Mohamed Belkhir (forthcoming). A plausible explanation for the positive relation
between board size and firm performance for financial firms is that banks being large holding
companies, the scope of operations is so complex that it requires larger boards provide a wider
pool of expertise to run them. What accounts for the positive association between board size and
firm performance though, is not so clear. One possibility, Adams and Mehran argue, is that board
size may be endogenously determined following merger activity when the board of directors
from the target firm is absorbed by the acquirer. In support of this view Granger causality test
results indicate reverse causality between board size and firm performance. Industry
concentration does not seem to significantly influence the results, either.

In general, the results suggest that board size is largely driven by the scope of operations
hypothesis and hence attempts at regulating „optimal‟ board sizes may be misplaced. On the
other hand, the positive association between board independence, CEO duality, and firm
performance seems to be robust to industry classification and to various measures of
performance suggesting that these variables contribute significantly to board effectiveness which
ultimately translates into superior performance.
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Table 13: Sample Selection & Distribution
Table 13 presents sample distribution and size. Panel A provides a count of the firms comprising the final sample and the
number and reasons for those screened out. For a firm to qualify for inclusion it must be listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ
exchanges and be covered by COMPUSTAT, CRSP. Of the original 421 carve-out firms, 144 firms were dropped either because
they are unlisted or listed on exchanges other than AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE. 105 firms were dropped due to non-coverage by
CRSP, COMPUSTAT, SEC filings, and Fiche-Q files. And an additional 8 firms were dropped due to missing data points. The
final sample count is 164 firms consisting of 81 financial firms (SIC 6000) and 83 industrial firms. Panel B presents the sample
distribution by year of announcement and Panel C shows the industry distribution by 2-digit SIC.

Panel A: Construction of the Sample

# of firms

Total number of firms:
Firms not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ:
Firms not covered by COMPUSTAT / CRSP:
Firms with missing data:

421
(144)
(105)
(8)

Final Sample Count:

164

Panel B: Distribution by Year

# of firms

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

10
9
7
5
6
5
9
16
7
8
13
8
9
8
14
12
8
5
5

Panel C: Distribution by SIC

Two-Digit SIC

# of firms

Mining, Oil & Gas
Manufacturing
Transport, Comm., Utilities
Wholesale/Retail
Financials
Services (other)

10
20-30
40
50
60
70-80

8
34
9
14
82
17

*Source: Security Data Company (SDC)
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics
Table 14 provides the sample descriptive statistics. Some performance means are unusually low (high) due to the influence of
outliers, this problem is mitigated in the regression analysis by using industry-adjusted numbers and by winsorizing the data at
99% and 1%. Results obtained from industry-adjusted and unadjusted data are qualitatively similar.
Variable

Mean

(Std. Dev)

Median

Min

Max

Board Size

10.74

2.31

10.19

4.00

18.00

Independent Directors (%)

0.73

0.22

0.78

0.31

0.94

CEO

0.26

0.52

1.00

0.00

1.00

Book-to-Market

0.41

0.24

0.39

0.21

0.79

Tobin‟s Q

1.48

1.12

1.57

1.18

1.92

Market Value of Equity ($M)

1,002

244

207

3.4

58,514

Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)

0.43

0.20

0.54

0.12

1.06

Return on Assets

0.08

0.13

0.11

-0.03

0.15

Return on Equity

0.17

0.24

0.21

-0.06

0.28

Source: Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT
CRSP, IRRC, Edgar, Fiche- Q files
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Table 15: Variable Descriptions
Table 15 provides descriptions of the variables used and related sources. Subscripts that appear on variables presented elsewhere relate to number of
time lags.

Variable

Description

Source

Adj_Q

Adjusted Tobin‟s Q – market value of equity
divided by book value of assets

Tobin et al. (1977)

Adj_ROA

Adjusted return-on-assets – firm i‟s return
on assets minus median industry return
on assets

Compustat

Adj_ROE

Adjusted return-on-equity – firm i‟s return
on equity minus median industry return
on equity

Compustat

BME

Book-to-market value ratio

Compustat

B_INDEP

Proportion of independent board
members on board

Edgar, Fiche Q
Files

B_SIZE

Total number of board members

Edgar, Fiche Q
Files

EBIT Ratio

EBIT-to-total Assets ratio

Compustat

Capital Ratio

Tier 1 leverage ratio for financial firms

10-K Reports

CEO

Indicator variable: „1‟ = CEO/chairman
„0‟ = otherwise

Edgar, Fiche Q
Files

FIN

Indicator variable: „1‟ = financial firm
„0‟= otherwise

SIC Codes
(6000 -6999)

LEV

Leverage: debt-to-total assets

Compustat

L_MVE

Log of firm‟s market value

Compustat

L_TA

Log of firm‟s total assets

Compustat

PBV

Price-to-book value

Compustat

ROA

Return-on-assets (EBIT/TA)

Compustat

ROE

Return-on-equity (EBIT/Common Equity)

Compustat

SIC

Standard Industry classification code

Compustat
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Table 16: Correlation Matrix
Table 16 presents pairwise correlations between the main variables. For performance variables (adjusted Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA),
the following period values (t+1), are included to capture the potential delayed impact of board structure (B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and
CEO) on firm performance.
N=164

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1. Adj_Q

1.00

2. Adj_Qt+1

0.93**

1.00

3. Adj_ROE

0.31*

0.28*

1.00

4. Adj_ROEt+1

0.38**

0.43***

0.78**

1.00

5. Adj_ROA

0.04*

0.23*

0.11

0.64*

1.00

6. Adj_ROAt+1

0.07

0.17*

0.12*

0.04*

0.47

1.00

7. B_SIZE

0.06

-0.02**

-0.33

-0.25*

0.73

0.31

1.00

8. B_INDEP

0.02*

0.47**

0.22

0.28**

0.33

0.07*

0.56*

1.00

9. CEO

-0.09*

-0.18**

-0.03*

-0.12*

-0.16*

-0.54*

0.71*

-0.62*

1.00

10. L_TA

-0.14*

-0.52*

-0.41

-0.27

-0.13*

-0.11

0.27*

0.51*

0.28

1.00

11. LEV

-0.38*

-0.13*

-0.22

-0.10*

-0.08

-0.14

0.29*

0.08

0.11

-0.66*

1.00

12. EBIT Ratio

0.81*

0.74*

0.91

0.93*

0.81

0.72

0.51*

0.68*

-0.24

-0.44*

0.38*
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11

1.00

12

Table 17: OLS Regressions
Table 17 presents estimated coefficients on board size (B_SIZEt-1) and board independence (B_INDEPt-1) from annual OLS regressions using ROA (model 1), ROE (model 2), and
Tobin‟s Q (model 3) as measures of firm performance. In Model 1, ROA is regressed on B_SIZE and B_INDEP, controlling for CEO-Duality, log of total assets (L_TA), Leverage (LEV),
and firm profitability (EBIT). In Model 2, ROE is regressed on B_SIZE and B_INDEP, controlling for CEO-Duality, log of total assets (L_TA), Leverage (LEV), and firm profitability
(EBIT). And in Model 3, Tobin‟s Q is regressed on B_SIZE and B_INDEP, controlling for CEO-Duality, log of total assets (L_TA), Leverage (LEV), and firm profitability (EBIT).
Reported results are median regressions by year from 1983 to 2004.
Model 1: Adj_ROA

Model 3: Adj_Tobin’s Q

Model 2: Adj_ROE

Year

B_SIZE

B_INDEP

CEO

B_SIZE

B_INDEP

CEO

B_SIZE

B_INDEP

CEO

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

-0.13
-0.08*
-0.51*
-0.17
0.38
-0.11**
-0.32*
-0.73**
-0.87
-0.33*
-0.81*
-0.24
0.19
0.15
-0.42*
-0.02***
-0.07*
0.06
- 0.12*
-0.08
0.17
-0.28**

0.89**
0.71*
-0.42
1.03*
0.07
1.21
1.08*
0.58
0.92**
0.67**
-0.02
1.25
0.87*
1.01
0.78*
0.49**
0.47
1.119*
0.61
0.78**
1.14**
-0.07

-1.04*
-0.37
0.02
-0.71*
-0.84
0.04
-1.11*
0.23
-0.19
-0.44**
0.17
0.52
-0.87*
-0.38
0.56
0.04
-0.83*
0.01
0.27
-1.42*
0.91
0.03

-0.18*
-0.23*
0.02
-0.37
0.13*
-0.54**
0.08*
0.12
-0.14*
-0.27**
0.22
-0.09
0.63*
-0.44**
-0.29*
0.10
0.08*
-0.05*
0.14
-0.55*
0.07
-0.47*

0.64
1.01
0.48*
-0.02
0.47*
0.53
0.94**
0.37*
0.87
0.67
0.09*
0.28
0.78
0.61
1.02**
0.74**
-0.11
0.39
0.74
0.44*
0.29
0.33*

-0.42
-0.09
-1.01*
-0.22
0.10
-1.24
0.85
-0.81
-0.33*
0.52
-0.91
-1.20*
-0.78
0.34
-0.49**
0.81
-0.72
-1.03
-0.55*
0.04
-0.11*
0.02

0.02
0.13
-0.12
-0.34*
0.77
-0.27*
0.44
-0.19
-0.07*
0.02
0.11
-0.08*
0.21
-0.03
0.48
-0.23*
0.08
0.15
-0.33
0.04
-0.22**
0.16

-0.11
0.43
0.26*
0.08
0.19
1.03*
0.87
0.59
0.11
0.07*
0.98
0.47
0.04
0.71
0.34
0.27*
-0.02
0.06
0.23
0.19
0.21*
0.09

-0.02*
-1.03
-0.42
0.11
0.07
-0.22*
-1.18
0.37
0.08
-0.49
-0.55
0.36
0.25
-0.40*
-1.07
-0.03
0.21
-0.09*
-0.77
0.02
-0.11
-0.47

-0.28**
0.44
-2.88

0.81**
0.64
1.99

-0.67*
0.77
2.47

-0.42*
0.58
-1.75

0.74***
0.87
3.02

0.62*
0.82
1.67

-0.38*
0.49
-1.68

0.56
0.67
1.07

-0.44
0.48
1.53

Time Series mean
Time series σ:
T-statistic

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 18: Fixed Effects Model
Table 18 presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects model. Using industry-adjusted ROAt, industry-adjusted ROE, and industry-adjusted
Tobin‟s Q to proxy for firm performance. Explanatory variables include board size (B_SIZEt-1) and board independence (B_INDEPt-1) . I include

an indicator variable, CEO, coded „1‟ if the CEO also holds the chairmanship of the board or „0‟ otherwise. I control for financial
firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Dependent Variable
ROAt

ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

α

0.71***
(8.04)

2.01
(0.73)

0.05**
(2.92)

B_SIZEt-1

0.17
(1.36)

-1.08***
(3.78)

- 0.13***
(-11.27)

B_INDEPt-1

0.08
(1.05)

-1.42
(-1.44)

CEO t-1

-0.34**

0.03*

-0. 21***

(-2.48)

(1.92)

(-5.77)

L_TA

-0.49*
(1.86)

-0.33
(-0.98)

-1.04***
(7.77)

LEV

-0.01***
(-14.2)

0.43*
(1.88)

0.08***
(9.21)

FIN

0.44*
(1.83)

0.39*
(1.71)

0.20
(1.02)

0.28**
(2.31)

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 19: Hausman Endogeneity Tests
Table 19 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and CEO. Dependent variables are ROA, ROE, and
Tobin‟s Q. I use 2 lags of board size, board composition, and CEO duality as instruments (B_SIZEt-2, B_INDEPt-2, and CEOt-2) and test the
significance of the coefficients on the residuals.

ROA

ROE

Tobin’s Q

Variable

Coefficient (t-statistic)

B_SIZE

-1.11(-1.35)

B_SIZE Residuals

-0.34 (-1.41)

B_INDEP

1.63 (1.77)

B_INDEP Residuals

0.21 (1.59)

CEO

-2.07(-1.49)

CEO

-2.63 (-1.81)

Variable

Coefficient (t-statistic)

B_SIZE

-0.98(-1.04)

B_SIZE Residuals

-0.06 (-2.87)

B_INDEP

2.11 (4.38)

B_INDEP Residuals

0.43 (2.77)

CEO

-1.14 (-2.69)

CEO

-0.09 (-3.41)

Variable

Coefficient (t-statistic)

B_SIZE

-0.03(-0.57)

B_SIZE Residuals

-0.11(-0.73)

B_INDEP

2.44 (1.80)

B_INDEP Residuals

0.57 (1.66)

CEO

-0.34(-1.55)

CEO

-0.28 (-1.37)
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FStatistic

Wald

7.44

24.06

6.32

16.38

8.62

32.16

FStatistic

Wald
(2)

6.88

12.14

26.72

42.06

18.12

22.01

FStatistic

Wald
(2)

2.03

4.18

9.72

27.03

8.02

24.92

(2)

Table 20: IV Estimates
Table 20 provides coefficient estimates from IV regressions of industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q on board size (B_SIZE) and board
independence (B_INDEP) using their corresponding 2 lags as instruments. I include an indicator variable, CEO, coded „1‟ if the CEO also
holds the chairmanship of the board or „0‟ otherwise. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values
in parenthesis are t-statistics.

Dependent Variable
ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

Panel A

ROAt

α

3.71*
(1.84)

1.09
(0.73)

2.05**
(2.33)

B_SIZEt-1

-1.11*
(-1.73)

-2.04***
(-9.78)

-0.81**
(-2.21)

B_INDEPt-1

0.08*
(1.92)

-0.04
(-0.38)

0.24**
(2.02)

CEO t-1

-1.17**

-0.03*

-0. 13*

(-2.03)

(-1.91)

(-1.77)

L_TA

-2.09*
(1.75)

-1.33**
(-1.98)

-1.04
(-0.77)

LEV

-0.51***
(-11.32)

0.78*
(1.82)

0.08***
(3.21)

FIN

0.44
(1.04)

0.05*
(1.84)

0.20
(0.96)

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
P-Values

0.28
11.17
[0.0000]

0.18
9.22
[0.0004]

0.31
8.17
[0.0052]

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 21: GMM Estimates
Table 21 presents GMM coefficient estimates of industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q on board size (B_SIZE) and board
independence (B_INDEP) using their corresponding 2 lags as instruments. I include an indicator variable, CEO, coded „1‟ if the CEO
also holds the chairmanship of the board or „0‟ otherwise. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA).
The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Dependent Variable
Panel A

ROAt

ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

α

0.33
(1.44)

2.89
(1.03)

1.11**
(2.02)

B_SIZEt-1

-0.74*
(-1.85)

-1.19*
(-1.73)

-1.20***
(-3.44)

B_INDEPt-1

1.13**
(1.98)

0.28**
(2.38)

0.51*
(1.84)

CEO t-1

-2.44*

-1.69*

-0. 79**

(-1.70)

(-1.68)

(-2.33)

L_TA

-0.78
(1.54)

-1.02
(-1.39)

-1.04
(-0.77)

LEV

-1.23*
(-1.74)

-0.97
(-1.14)

0.11**
(2.28)

FIN

0.12*
(1.77)

1.79
(1.01)

0.04*
(1.86)

R2
Adjusted R2
Durbin-Watson
J-Statistic

0.21
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.11
0.18
7.92
9.22
6.83
4.37E-04
6.72E-03
2.48E-03
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 22: IV and GMM Regressions - Financial Firms (SIC 6000)
Table 22 provides estimated coefficients for a subset of financial firms from IV and GMM regressions on the B_SIZE and B_INDEP using their corresponding 2 lags as
instruments. I control for CEO-Duality, firm size (L_TA), capital ratio, and Price-to-book value (PBV). Dependent variables are industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and
Tobin‟s Q for models 1, 2, 3 respectively.
IV
GMM
Model
1
2
3
1
2
3
ROAt
ROEt
Tobin‟s Qt
ROAt
ROEt
Tobin‟s_Qt


-2.24
(-1.57)

1.01**
(1.97)

0.98
(1.35)

0.38*
(1.68)

0.92*
(1.88)

-2.01*
(-1.70)

B_SIZEt-1

0.22
(-1.03)

0.49*
(1.74)

0.06
(1.19)

-0.78
(-1.63

-0.01
(-1.77)

-0.08
(1.03)

B_INDEPt-1

1.14*
(1.82)

0.59*
(1.66)

-0.08
(-1.02)

1.08*
(1.78)

0.32
(1.58)

0.17*
(1.89)

CEO t-1

-1.31*
(1.81)

-0.92
(-1.46)

-0.89**
(-1.98)

-0.02**
(2.32)

-1.15*
(-1.67)

0.01
(1.04)

L_TA

-0.32
(-1.23

1.01**
(2.27)

0.46**
(2.07)

-0.68
(-0.42)

1.12*
(1.57)

-0.27
(-1.18)

Capital Ratio

0.03**
(2.11)

0.43*
(1.85)

0.06
(0.97)

0.54*
(1.80)

0.07*
(1.69)

1.01
(1.37)

PBV

1.02*
(1.65)

1.09*
(1.79)

-

0.88*
(1.81)

0.52**
(2.27)

-

Adj.R2
F-statistic
Model p-value

0.12
16.24**
[0.0000]

0.24
6.58**
[0.0001]

0.16
44.38*
[0.0000]

0.18
8.64*
[0.0000]

0.28
13.52**
[0.0001]

0.08
24.34**
[0.0000]

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 23: Granger Causality Tests
Table 23 presents results from bi-variate granger causality tests between board structure [B_SIZE, B_INDEP, and
CEO] and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA along with their 1-period
lag.

Model 1-(ROA)

Model 2-(ROE)

Model 3-(Adj_Q)

F-Statistic

Probability

B_SIZE does not granger causes ROA

5.183

[0.0001]

ROA does not granger causes B_SIZE

7.011

[0.0000]

B_INDEP does not granger causes ROA

6.801

[0.0050]

ROA does not granger causes B_INDEP

1.021

[0.4210]

CEO does not granger causes ROA

5.118

[0.0000]

ROA does not granger causes CEO

0.975

[0.2732]

B_SIZE does not granger causes ROE

3.840

[0.0050]

ROE does not granger causes B_SIZE

12.001

[0.0000]

B_INDEP does not granger causes ROE

4.648

[0.0000]

ROE does not granger causes B_INDEP

1.008

[0.2839]

CEO does not granger causes ROE

8.246

[0.0001]

ROE does not granger causes CEO

0.320

[0.3392]

B_SIZE does not granger causes Adj_Q

1.121

[0.5200]

Adj_Q does not granger causes B_SIZE

4.056

[0.0020]

B_INDEP does not granger causes Adj_Q

5.820

[0.0005]

Adj_Q does not granger causes B_INDEP

0.872

[0.6040]

CEO does not granger causes Adj_Q

7.004

[0.0000]

Adj_Q does not granger causes CEO

0.048

[0.5722]

97

Chapter 4
An Empirical Analysis of Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in
Equity Carve-outs

Abstract

This essay examines the relation between ownership structure and the performance of a sample of
firms that initiated equity carve-outs during the period 1983-2004. The evidence presented in previous
studies on ownership structure and firm performance is largely mixed and inconclusive. Various
econometric issues such as the endogeneity problem, variable measurement, unobserved heterogeneity,
and the serial persistence of ownership structures that plague empirical studies on governance have been
partly to blame. I mitigate the afore-mentioned problems by exploiting the structural break in the
ownership structure of firms following equity carve-out announcements and implementing alternative
estimation methods, in particular the IV, GMM, and Granger causality tests. I find that contrary to extant
evidence that posits a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low levels of
ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is rejected in the case of
equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider ownership in the subsidiary seems to
exacerbate the entrenchment effects which overwhelm the incentive alignment benefits at low levels of
insider ownership documented in other studies. Consistent with extant literature, I present evidence in
support of the positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The
presence of outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly
dominant parent firm. And lastly, results show that the level of ownership concentration, in particular
ownership by the parent firm, seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes
in firm performance.

JEL Classifications: G32, G34
Keywords: ownership structure; insider-ownership; managerial-ownership, blockholders.
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1.

Introduction

The idea of divorcing corporate ownership from corporate control and its implications for
firm value and performance has preoccupied financial economists since the seminal paper on the
subject by Berle and Means (1932), suggesting an inverse relation between diffuse ownership
and firm performance. Morck et al., (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Holderness et
al., (1999), present evidence suggesting an inverse relation between diffuse ownership and firm
performance. On the other hand, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Himmelberg et al., (1999), and
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no relation between ownership and firm value. Interestingly,
Cho (1998), using the system of equations approach finds that firm value as proxied by Tobin‟s
Q affects corporate ownership and not vice versa.

As is the case with most governance studies, a number of empirical issues arise when
attempting to relate corporate ownership to firm performance. First, corporate ownership is
measured in several different ways such as ownership by the board; insider ownership; CEO
ownership; block-holder ownership; and institutional ownership. This disparity in definition and
measurement is likely to complicate any attempts to reconcile the results presented in various
studies. Secondly, several studies such as Demsetz (1983), Jensen and Warner (1988), Seyhun
(1998), and Himmelberg et al. (1999) show that corporate ownership and firm performance are
endogenous. This endogeneity problem if not empirically tested and controlled for, invariably
confounds the findings. Third, it is plausible that the so called unobserved heterogeneity problem
explains the differences observed in firm performance if systematic cross-sectional differences
amongst firms, such as size, affect ownership and performance. Lastly, the disparity in empirical
proxies used for firm performance, such return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin‟s
Q, and Market-to-book ratio most likely also account for some of the inconsistency in the
empirical studies that attempt to relate corporate ownership to firm performance. Moreover, the
persistence of governance structures, including ownership, across time that is alluded to by a
number of researchers, such as Bhagat and Black (2001), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991),
Yermack (1996), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Madura and Nixon (2002), would
tend to weaken the explanatory power of many econometric models intended to ascertain the
relation between ownership and firm performance.
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To my knowledge, Sukesh Patro (2005), is the first study that takes an evolutionary
approach to examining ownership structure and firm performance. He exploits the structural
break in the ownership structure of spun-off firms during the period 1981-2000, to investigate
what changes occur in the ownership structure, the determinants of those ownership changes, and
the impact of these changes on firm performance. He finds that on average block ownership of
spun-offs increases by approximately 7% and a significant proportion of that change,
approximately 60%, occurs during the first year. He also finds that the ownership structure in
these firms reaches a steady-state, on average, in 3 years from the date of announcement. In
terms of the determinants of structural changes in ownership, he posits that parent-unit
relatedness, firm size, and market-to-book ratio are significantly related to changes in ownership
changes. Consistent with extant literature he concludes that, in general, ownership structures
exhibit serial correlation but when circumstances warrant, ownership can significantly change to
a new equilibrium.

In this essay, I exploit the structural break in the ownership structure of equity carve-outs
to re-examine the relation between ownership and firm performance. Patro‟s findings cannot
necessarily be generalized to equity carve-outs due to the fundamental differences in their
ownership structures. In the case of equity carve-outs, parent firms retain a significant ownership
stake in the subsidiary, unlike spin-offs. This set-up essentially makes the parent firm a dominant
blockholder in the subsidiary. I hypothesize that the monitoring benefits argument that is made
for block-holdership in the presence of diffuse ownership may be compromised when the
blockholder is also the parent. Considering that parent firms in equity carve-outs tend to be
distressed while the subsidiaries have better growth opportunities, it may not be a stretch to argue
that the interests of the minority shareholders in the carve-out subsidiary although they may
compromised. I argue that these structural differences between carve-outs and spin-offs are
likely to induce ownership changes that are dissimilar from those observed by Patro (2005).
Focusing on equity carve-outs in this study is likely to generate new insight on the relation
between ownership and firm performance, in particular the role played by a majority blockholder when that blockholder is the parent firm.
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The objectives of this study are threefold. First, with a view to reconciling extant
literature, I attempt to mitigate the econometric problems that confound previous studies to reexamine the relation between corporate ownership and firm performance, the monitoring role
that blockholders are deemed to play in the stewardship of the modern firm, and whether
corporate ownership reverts to some optimal level over time. In particular, I implement the
instrumental variables approach, generalized method of moments, and run Granger causality
tests to control for the potential endogeneity of ownership and firm performance. Second, there is
wide disparity in the definition and measurement of corporate ownership. Given the existing
mixed evidence, it is arguable that test results are not necessarily invariant to the definition and
measurement of corporate ownership. Various studies have defined ownership as managerial
ownership, CEO ownership, officer and director ownership, insider ownership, closely held
shares, or institutional ownership. The results from these disparate studies are equally varied. For
robustness in this essay, I implement alternative measures of ownership to ascertain what impact
if any, different ownership proxies have on the empirical results obtained. Third, to ascertain if
measures of performance partly explain the mixed findings, I use both accounting and market
based proxies for firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and
Tobin‟s Q]. I then attempt to reconcile the results from all four models with the extant evidence.

This study makes a number of contributions to extant literature. First, contrary to extant
evidence that posits a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low
levels of ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is
rejected in the case of equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider
ownership in the subsidiary seem to exacerbate the entrenchment effects and overwhelm the
incentive alignment effects at very low levels of insider ownership. I present evidence in support
of the positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The
presence of outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly
dominant parent firm. And lastly, I show that in the case of equity carve-outs, the level of
ownership concentration seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative)
changes in firm performance. These findings seem to suggest that dominant parent firms, at least
in the case of equity carve-outs, exacerbate rather than mitigate the agency problem. As a matter
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of governance policy in equity carve-outs, alternative control mechanisms may be necessary to
moderate the behavior of dominant parent firms.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review related theoretical and
empirical literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Sample selection, data, and descriptive
statistics are presented in section 4. Methodology is discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents the
empirical results. I discuss robustness test results in section 6. And section 7 concludes.

2.

Literature Review

2.1

Theories of Ownership

An extensive literature linking corporate ownership and firm performance has evolved
along two main dimensions. The first strand attempts to link the type of ownership to the
performance of the firm. Major studies present evidence on insider ownership (officers &
directors), managerial ownership, CEO ownership, institutional ownership, and corporations.
The second strand links ownership concentration to performance. Concentration of ownership
has been proxied by blockholder ownership - defined as a 5% share ownership in a corporation
or greater and the Herfindahl Index of ownership concentration measured as the sum of squared
ownership shares. Both research strands base their empirical investigations on four salient
hypotheses: (i) the incentive alignment hypothesis; (ii) the entrenchment effects hypothesis; (iii)
Reverse causality – insider rewards and investments, (iv) the non-monotonous hypothesis; and
lastly (v) the economics of natural selection.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) advance the incentive alignment argument which is rooted in
agency theory. They argue that managers are self-interested agents who, if left alone and in the
presence of asymmetric information [Hart and Holmstrom (1987)], will pursue their own
interests to the detriment of the shareholders of the firm. The incentive alignment hypothesis
posits that granting managers an equity ownership stake in the firm is likely to improve firm
performance due the alignment of the monetary incentives between principals [shareholders] and
the agent [manager]. The main predictions under the incentive alignment hypothesis are twofold.
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First, one would expect to observe a positive relation between managerial share ownership and
firm performance. Second, the higher the information asymmetry problem by a given firm the
higher managerial ownership is likely to be.

Although, the incentive alignment hypothesis asserts that managerial share ownership in
the firm mitigates principal-agent conflicts, the entrenchment hypothesis posits that beyond a
certain threshold, increased managerial ownership may in fact be sub-optimal. Beyond this
optimal threshold, the entrenchment effects overwhelm the incentive effects when powerful
managers extract private benefits in the form of perquisite consumption, pet projects, and
engaging in empire building to the detriment of the shareholder, contrary to the incentive
alignment hypothesis [(Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)]. The prediction here is that at low
levels of managerial ownership [5%], the incentive alignment effects dominate the entrenchment
argument however, at higher levels of managerial ownership [30% or higher], the relation
reverses and the entrenchment prediction prevails.

Contrary to the above hypotheses, the reverse causality hypothesis assumes that the
direction of causality flows from ownership structure to firm performance. This hypothesis posits
that firm performance may in fact be causing the changes in ownership that are observed. The
idea is that when managers perform well firms reward them by granting them equity ownership
[Kole (1996)]. One should therefore observe a positive relation between firm performance and
managerial ownership. On the other hand, Cho (1998) asserts that managers may prefer stock
compensation when they expect their firm to over perform in the future. So, managerial share
ownership is likely to be positively related to the firm‟s market value. Lastly, the insider
investment argument predicates observed changes in managerial ownership on managers‟
expectations of their firm‟s future performance. Managers‟ share holdings are predicted to
increase when they have favorable expectations and to decrease when they expect poor future
performance [Loderer and Martin (1997)].

And finally is the economics of natural selection hypothesis which posits that ownership
is an endogenously determined governance structure [Demsetz [1983], Demsetz and Lehn [1985]
and Kole and Lehn [1997]. Predicated on the notion that financial performance determines
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ownership, poorly performing firms will have inefficient ownership structures and soon or later
will cease to exist. The prediction here is that in the long-run ownership in surviving firms
should converge to the optimal structure.

In the next section I discuss the empirical evidence on the association between corporate
ownership and firm performance. The evidence has evolved along two major research strands.
The first strand examines the effect of ownership concentration on performance and the second
focuses on how the type of ownership impacts firm performance.

2.2

Empirical Evidence

Extant empirical evidence on ownership and firm performance falls into two strands,
namely: the concentration of ownership and type of ownership. In the case of the former, why
some investors are motivated to concentrate a significant portion of their wealth in a single firm
seems to contradict the tenets of modern portfolio theory. Various theories have been presented
to explain this investment choice. First, the shared benefits argument is advanced to explain
ownership concentration as a means to resolving the principal-agency problem. Large block
ownership bestows to the owner monitoring and decision-making rights in form of directorships
or company officer positions in which they can influence company decisions arguably for the
benefit of all shareholders. Second, is the private benefits hypothesis. Blockholders can use their
voting powers to access corporate resources for their own private benefit.
A number of empirical studies relating ownership to firm performance use „block
ownership‟ - defined as large shareholders who own at least 5% of the company‟s shares, to
measure corporate ownership. Recent evidence on the relation between block ownership and
firm performance is presented by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Anderson and Reeb (2003),
Holderness (2003) and Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2005). Consistent with earlier evidence
presented by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) for US firms, that no statistically significant relation
exists between ownership and firm performance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) using a system
of simultaneous equations, model ownership endogenously in their study and distinguish
between managerial ownership and other outside blockholders. They use the proportion of the
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five largest blockholders as the proxy for ownership. They assert that ownership is endogenously
determined but find no evidence that ownership affects firm performance (measured as Tobin‟s
Q). Anderson and Reeb (2003) also find no relation between ownership and firm performance
using a single regression approach and using Tobin‟s Q as a measure for firm performance.
Holderness (2003) surveys the literature on blockholders and firm performance and concludes
that ownership concentration has little, if any impact on firm performance. He makes two
important observations: (i) that insider and outsider blockholders have disparate private
benefit/shared benefit incentives; and that corporation blockholders present a set of governance
issues not found with individual blockholders. Since in the case of carve-outs the most
significant blockholder is a corporation, this essay attempts to determine the set of firm
governance issues that corporation blockholders present and the impact, if any, that these issues
may have on firm performance. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) investigate the relation of
blockholder ownership and firm performance using samples of US, UK, and Continental
European firms. They find no relation between ownership and firm performance for the US and
UK firms but find a statistically significant negative relation between ownership and firm
performance for Continental European firms.

On the other hand, an extensive literature presents evidence relating firm performance to
the type of corporate ownership. Important studies on ownership and firm performance use
managerial ownership, insider ownership, officers & director ownership, CEO ownership, and
corporation ownership as types of ownership, among others. McConnell and Servaes (1990)
investigate insider and blockholder ownership. They report a positive relation between insider
ownership and firm performance but find no statistically significant relation between blockholder
ownership and firm performance. Loderer and Martin (1997) use a simultaneous equations
approach to examine insider ownership and firm performance. They find that insider ownership
does not predict Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q has a negative relation with insider ownership. Cho
(1998) also uses a system of equations approach to investigate managerial ownership and firm
performance. He finds no causation from ownership to Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q affects
ownership structure. Himmelberg et al., (1999) implement a fixed effects model and the
instrumental variables approach using officers‟ and directors‟ ownership. They control for fixed
firm effects and find no statistically significant relation between officer and directors‟ ownership
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and Tobin‟s Q. Moreover, when they control for the endogeneity, they find a quadratic relation
between ownership and firm performance. Holderness et al., (1999) confirm the endogeneity of
managerial ownership and they document a positive relation between firm performance and
managerial ownership in the 0-5% ownership range.

Various studies examine the relation between institutional owners and firm performance.
Institutional investors are in general expected to influence on firm performance because
corporate monitoring is costly and given the significant investment stakes they are likely to hold,
it is reasonable to assume that they have the incentive and the wherewithal to monitor managers,
[Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1980)]. However, the empirical evidence
presented is largely mixed. It is not clear what makes some institutional owners better monitors
and others less so. Bushee (1998) attempts to characterize institutional investors based on their
investment horizon outlook on the firms in which they buy ownership sakes and their trading
styles. He delineates three groups: Institutional owners that frequently trade and diversify their
portfolios are termed „transient‟. They are less likely to be effective corporate monitors. The
second group comprises institutional owners who hold large and stable stakes in the firms they
invest in. Because of the large stakes and long-term investment view, these institutional investors
are assumed to be better monitors. Earlier studies that document a positive relation between
institutional ownership and firm performance include McConnell and Servaes (1990), Nesbitt
(1994), Smith (1996), and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) who document a positive relation
between institutional investor ownership and firm performance. More recent evidence of a
positive relation between institutional stock ownership and firm performance is presented by
Hartzell and Starks (2003), Almazan et al., (2005), Borokhovich et al., (2006) and Cornett et al.,
(2007). On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and
Miller (1999), and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no significant relation. Thus, the impact of
institutional investor stock ownership on firm performance is still unclear.

Lastly, there seems to be a dearth of research on the effects of concentrated ownership
when the blockholder is another corporation. Holderness (2001) observes that “Blockholders that
are corporations present a set of issues not found with individual owners…”. To my knowledge
no study specifically examines the effect that blockholders that are corporations have on firm
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performance. This study using a sample of carve-out firms makes an additional contribution to
extant literature by investigating the potential effects that a dominant blockholder that is also a
corporation may have on the performance of another firm.

3.

Hypotheses Development

In this section I develop three testable hypotheses to determine, first, whether ownership
structure in equity carve-outs moderates their long-term performance. Second, to examine
whether the concave relation documented in the case of insider ownership is supported in the
case of equity carve-outs. And third, to test whether evidence of ownership reversion to some
optimal level over time that is documented in various studies is supported in the case of equity
carve-outs. Descriptive statistics show that the majority of the parent firms in the sample
maintain a majority stake in the subsidiary in excess of 70%. The data also suggest that parent
ownership levels in the subsidiary change very slowly over time. Approximately 35% of the
subsidiaries are re-acquired, 20% of the parents‟ ownership stake increases following the
announcement, and in the rest of the cases the parents‟ ownership stake decreases gradually or
the subsidiaries are summarily spun-off.

Various studies on insider ownership are surveyed in Murphy (1999), Core et al., (2001),
and Holderness (2001). The evidence suggests that firm performance improves at lower levels of
insider ownership but declines at higher levels of insider ownership. Other studies that control
for the endogeneity problem, discussed earlier, find no relation between ownership and firm
performance. These findings seem to support the incentive alignment hypothesis at lower levels
of ownership but are more consistent with the entrenchment effect at higher levels. I test the
following hypothesis.

H1:

Performance in subsidiary firms is inversely related to the level of insider
ownership.

Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003), among others present evidence that the presence
of an outside blockholder has a moderating effect on the actions of management and ultimately
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on firm performance. A blockholder is defined as any shareholder who holds at least a 5% stake
in the firm. The idea is that ownership of a 5% or greater interest in the firm is sufficient
incentive to monitor and influence managerial decision-making. I argue that in the case of equity
carve-outs, where you have a dominant corporate blockholder (parent firm), the moderating
effect of an outside blockholder is likely to be even more beneficial. I test the following
hypothesis.

H2:

Long-term performance of subsidiary firms is positively related to the presence of
outside blockholders or institutional shareholders.

Whether or not firms target an optimal level of insider ownership still remains an
empirical question. Zhou (2001) asserts that insider ownership changes so slowly and in some
cases not at all. Core and Lacker (2001) suggest that adjusting ownership structure involves costs
and when these costs are substantial there will be a tendency for ownership structures to depart
from the optimal target. Patro (2005) observes that ownership is fairly stable but when
circumstances warrant it does significantly change. He concludes that changes in ownership are
endogenous to firm characteristics. Frye and Smith (2003), on the other hand, present evidence
of faster changes in ownership in a sample of IPO firms. They report average increases in block
ownership of 8% during the 4 years following the IPO. The insider investment argument predicts
that insider ownership will change based on insider expectations about future firm performance
[Loderer and Martin (1997)]. In the case of carve-outs, the dominant parent is likely to increase
its stake in the subsidiary when it has favorable expectations about future performance and
reduce it when the future looks bleak. I hypothesize that positive (negative) changes in the
parent‟s ownership in the subsidiary precede improved (weaker) subsidiary performance.

H3:

Positive (negative) changes in a parent’s ownership stake in the subsidiary
precede improved (weaker) subsidiary performance.

4.

Sample Selection and Data

4.1

Sample Selection
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The initial sample is compiled from the Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) US IPO data.
Ownership data is compiled from Thompson Financial, Compact Disclosure, and proxy
statements. I cross check with Lexis-Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, the Wall Street Journal Index
and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. For those firms with data preceding 1987, I obtain
data from the microfilm collection of proxy statements. The initial sample comprises 421 firms
(regulated and unregulated) that announced carve-out transactions during the time period 1983 2004. For inclusion in the sample, a firm must be traded on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and
be covered by CRSP and Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT. Supplemental governance data is
obtained from Q-files, Lexis-Nexis, Compact Disclosure CD-ROMs, The Corporate Library
(TCL), and corporate proxy statements. For each year that a firm is in the sample, I gather
complete data on insider ownership, the percent of parent ownership in the subsidiary, outside
blockholders, and institutional ownership. The final sample is then observed for the entire
sample period or until a given firm is re-acquired or summarily sold off.

The final sample is 170 firms comprising 83 financials and 87 non-financial firms. For
all full sample regressions I control for the regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of
financial firms (SIC 6000) by including an indicator variable coded „1‟ if the firm is financial or
„0‟ otherwise. For robustness, I also run separate regressions for only financial firms (SIC 6000).

Table 21, presents the sample selection and distribution data. Panel A shows the number
of firms dropped from the initial sample and the reasons for their exclusion. Of the original
sample of 421 firms, 144 firms are dropped because they are not listed on
AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE.

Additionally, 105 firms are not covered by CRSP and/or

COMPUSTAT and 2 firms had missing data on ownership. Panel B shows the sample
distribution by year of announcement. Firms that meet all requirements, range from a minimum
of 5 firms for the years 1989, 1991, 2003, and 2004 to a maximum of 14 firms for 2000. Panel C
presents the sample distribution by industry (2-digit SIC). Financials (SIC 60), had the highest
number of transactions with 82 announcements, manufacturing (SIC 20-30) had 37, 19
announcements for other services (SIC 70-80), 14 for wholesale/retail (SIC 50), 9
announcements for transportation, communications, and utilities (SIC 40), and 9 transactions for
mining, oil, and gas (SIC 10).
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4.2

Descriptive Statistics
Table 22 presents sample descriptive statistics. Parent ownership in their subsidiaries has

a mean (median) of 64.9% (71.1%) with a standard deviation of 8.9%. The maximum
(minimum) proportion of parent ownership is 94.3% (8.2%4). Insider ownership, which is
defined as the officers and directors in the subsidiary firm, has a mean (median) of 7% (6%) with
a standard deviation of 2%. The maximum (minimum) insider ownership is 9% (2%). Outside
blockholders are defined as non-executive/non-parent owners who hold at least 5% of the total
outstanding shares of the firm. The mean (median) outside blockholder ownership is 28% (23%)
with a standard deviation of 14%. The maximum (minimum) proportion owned by outside
blockholders is 31% (8%). Ownership concentration is defined as the total proportion of
outstanding shares owned by the officers and directors of the subsidiary firm, the parent firm,
and outside blockholders. The mean (median) of ownership concentration is 81% (92%) and a
standard deviation of 16%. The maximum (minimum) ownership concentration is 100% (14%).
Leverage which is measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets ranges from a
minimum of 12% to a maximum of 106% with a mean (median) of 43% (54%) and a standard
deviation of 20%. Book-to-market ranges from a minimum of 0.21 to a maximum of 0.79 with a
mean (median) of 0.41 (0.39) and a standard deviation of 0.24. Tobin‟s Q which is measured as
the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets, ranges from a minimum of
1.18 to a maximum of 1.92 with a mean (median) of 1.48 (1.57) and a standard deviation of 1.12.
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets
(EBIT/TA) and the minimum (maximum) for the sample is -0.03 (0.15) with a mean (median) of
0.0.08 (0.11) and a standard deviation of 0.13. Return on equity is measured as net earnings
divided by total owners equity (Net Income/Common Stock) and ranges from a minimum of 0.06 to a maximum of 0.28 with a mean (median) of 0.17 (0.21) and a standard deviation of 0.24.

4.3

Description of Variables

4.3.1 Dependent Variables (ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q)
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Table 23, presents descriptions of dependent and independent variables and how they are
constructed. The dependent variable is firm performance. Three variables including Tobin‟s Q
(Adj_Q), return on assets (Adj_ROA), and return on equity (Adj_ROE) are used to measure firm
performance. Tobin‟s Q, is measured as book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus
the market value of equity divided by the book value of its assets. Each firm‟s Tobin‟s Q is then
adjusted by subtracting the industry median. To ascertain the significance of the potential right
skew in the distribution of firm value, I use log values of Tobin‟s Q as a robustness test. Return
on assets (ROA) for each firm is calculated as the ratio of the firm‟s earnings before interest and
tax (EBIT) to the book value of assets. Return on equity (ROE) measured as a firm‟s earnings
before interest and tax divided by the firms total equity. Both variables are then adjusted by
subtracting the industry medians for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE),
respectively.

4.3.2 Explanatory Variables

Parent ownership (PAR_OWN) is defined as the proportion of outstanding shares in the
subsidiary that are owned by the parent firm. Insider ownership (IN_OWN) is defined as the
proportion of shares in the subsidiary firm that are owned by officers and directors. Outside
blockholders (OUT_BLOCK) are defined as non-executive/non-parent owners who hold at least
5% of the total outstanding shares of the subsidiary firm. And Ownership concentration
(OWN_CON) is defined as the combined proportion of outstanding shares owned by the officers
and directors of the subsidiary firm, the parent firm, and outside blockholders.

4.3.5 Control Variables

To control for firm size, I use one of three variables - book-to-market value (BME), log
of market value of equity (L_MVE), and log of total assets (L_TA). Leverage (LEV), computed
as total long-term debt divided by the firm‟s total assets and Capital ratio are used to proxy for
the indebtedness of non-financial and financial firms, respectively. For full sample regressions
that combine financial and non-financial firms, I include an indicator variable „FIN‟ for
financials (SIC 6000), to control for the regulatory and balance sheet idiosyncrasies of financials.
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The sample distribution data presented in Table 1, Panel C depicts some degree of industry
concentration particularly in manufacturing, services, and wholesale/retail. For robustness, I
include an indicator variable for industry, to ascertain whether industry effects have any
statistical significance.

Table 24 presents the correlation matrix between the main variables. Results show that
the pairwise correlation between contemporaneous measures of firm performance and the main
explanatory variables is much weaker than that between performance measures and lagged
explanatory variables. Pairwise correlations between contemporaneous and lagged insider
ownership and industry adjusted Tobin‟s Q are both negative and statistically significant at the
0.10 level. Lagged insider ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
Pairwise correlations between lagged outside blockholder ownership and adjusted Tobin‟s Q,
ROA, and ROE are all positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Pairwise correlations
between both contemporaneous and lagged ownership concentration and industry adjusted
Tobin‟s Q are ROE are all negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The correlation
between lagged ownership and ROA is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level.

5. Methodology

To provide some preliminary evidence on the relation between corporate ownership and
firm performance, I run annual multivariate regressions. Then in light of the econometric issues
that plague previous studies, I successively increase the complexity of the models to mitigate
some of these problems by implementing a fixed effects model, then the instrumental variables
methodology (IV), and lastly, the generalized method of moments (GMM). As a robustness
check, I also run granger causality tests to determine the direction of causation between
ownership and firm performance. To test hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, I project a measure of firm
performance [ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q] on various proxies for ownership [IN_OWN,
(IN_OWN)2, OUT_BLOCK, and (IN_OWN x PAR_OWN)]. I control for firm size using log of
total assets (L_TA), firm leverage (LEV), and firm profitability (EBIT), and whether the firm is
financial or non-financial by including an indicator variable coded as „1‟ if the firm is financial
(SIC 6000) or „0‟ otherwise. I estimate the following model:
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Adj_ROAit = α + ß1IN_OWNi,t-1 + ß2(IN_OWN)2i,t-1 + ß3OUT_BLOCK,i,t-1 + ß4OWN_CONi,t-1 ß5LEV i,t-1 + ß6L_TAi,t-1 +
ß7FINi,t + εit

(1)

To test hypothesis H3, I use ownership concentration (OWN_CON) as one of the explanatory
variables and include a lagged variable of the dependent performance variable as the other
explanatory variable. The coefficient on ß4, captures the effect of changes in ownership
concentration on firm performance can be interpreted as a measure of the impact on performance
resulting from a change in the ownership concentration. I test the following model:
Adj_ROAit = α + ß1OWN_CONi,t-1 + ß4(Adj_ROAit-1) + ß5LEV i,t-1 + ß6L_TAi,t-1 + ß7FINi, t + εit

(2)

For the IV and GMM models, I use 2 and 3 lags of the ownership variables as instruments.
Lastly, I implement granger causality tests (Granger 1969) to ascertain whether changes in
ownership structure are followed by systematic changes in firm performance or vice versa. I test
the following models:
Adj_ROAt = α0 + α1ROAt-1 + α2ROAt-2 + β1IN_OWNt-1 + β2IN_OWNt-2 + εt

(3)

IN_OWNt = φ0 + φ 1IN_OWNt-1 + φ 2IN_OWNt-2 + β1ROAt-1 + β2ROAt-2 + νt

(4)

I test the following null hypothesis in equation 2: Inside ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger
cause firm performance (ROA). Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that inside ownership
Granger causes firm performance. In equation (3), I test the null hypothesis that:

firm

performance does not Granger cause inside ownership. Rejection of the null hypothesis would
imply that firm performance granger causes board size. The F-statistic/Wald-statistic is used to
β 1 = β2 = 0

test the following condition, for all equations:

6. Empirical Results
6.1 Annual OLS Regressions
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Table 28 provides coefficient estimates from annual OLS regressions. Model 1 uses
adjusted ROA as the dependent variable, Model 2 uses adjusted ROE, and Model 3 uses adjusted
Tobin‟s Q, controlling for firm leverage (LEV), firm size (L_TA), and whether the firm is
financial or non-financial (FIN). In the annual regressions, the coefficients on Insider ownership
(IN_OWN) and all three measures of performance [ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q] are mostly
negative at various levels of significance. The initial interpretation may be that for equity carveouts, the threshold at which the entrenchment effects begin to overwhelm the incentive alignment
effects is much lower. For outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK) the coefficient estimates are
mostly positive for all performance measures, with levels of significance ranging from 0.05 to
0.10. The initial explanation may be that outside blockholders help moderate the potential
entrenchment effects from insider owners. And for ownership concentration (OWN_CON),
which is defined as the combined proportion of outstanding shares owned by officers and
directors in the subsidiary firm, the parent firm, and outside blockholders, the coefficient
estimates are mostly negative for all measures of performance. The preliminary interpretation
may be that outside blockholders are not able to counteract the combined entrenchment effects
from both insider owners and the parent firm.

Table 28, Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as the
dependent variable. Explanatory variables include Insider ownership (IN_OWN), the square of
insider ownership (IN_OWN)2, outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), and ownership
concentration (OWN_CON). I control for firm leverage and firm size. To control for the
regulatory and balance-sheet idiosyncrasies of financial firms, I include an indicator variable
„FIN‟ coded „1‟ if the firm is financial or „0‟ otherwise. For all three performance measures
[ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q], insider ownership (IN_OWN) has a negative sign as predicted by
hypothesis H1 and all the coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level. Contrary to
previous studies that show a convex relation between insider ownership and firm performance,
the square of insider ownership (IN_OWN)2, has mixed signs and none of the coefficient
estimates is statistically significant. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H2, coefficient
estimates on outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), have positive signs and are statistically
significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels for all performance measures. Ownership concentration
coefficients are all negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimates on the
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indicator variable, FIN, is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level in the models
using ROA and ROE as the dependent variable. The significance of the coefficient on the
indicator variable for financials may suggest that the association between firm performance, as
measured by ROA and ROE, and ownership may be different for financials.

Overall, OLS results support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. In the case of insider ownership,
the evidence is consistent with Loderer and Martin (1997) who find that insider ownership does
not predict Tobin‟s Q but Tobin‟s Q has a negative relation with insider ownership. I find no
quadratic relation between officers and directors‟ ownership that is reported by Himmelberg et
al., (1999). Contrary to the findings by Holderness et al., (1999) of a positive relation between
insider ownership and firm performance in the 0-5% ownership range, the evidence in this study
does not suggest likewise. The explanation in the case of equity carve-outs may be that the
existing parent ownership may affect firm performance the same way officers‟ and directors‟
ownership in the subsidiary does, hence negating the 0-5% threshold on which the Holderness et
al., findings are predicated. Results for outside blockholders support hypothesis H2. Consistent
with Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003), the evidence suggests that outside blockholders
moderate the entrenchment effects of concentrated insider ownership. The coefficient estimates
on ownership concentration are all negative but statistically insignificant. No conclusions can be
drawn regarding its effect on firm performance or the prediction made in hypothesis H3.
6.2

Fixed Effects Model

Table 29 presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects model. I test the
appropriateness of the fixed effects and a random effects model using a Hausman endogeneity
test. Results show an F-statistic (P_value) of 28.86 (0.0001) suggesting that the fixed-effects
coefficient estimates are more consistent. Hence, I implement a fixed effects model. Table 29,
Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable.
IN_OWN has the opposite sign from that predicted by hypothesis H1 with a coefficient (tstatistic) of -1.38 (-1.69) and is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. The coefficient (t-statistic)
on (IN_OWN)2 is 0.17 (1.36) with an opposite sign to that predicted. The coefficient (t-statistic)
on OUT_BLOCK is 1.24(1.72). It is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and consistent with
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the prediction of hypothesis H2. OWN_CON has a coefficient (t-statistic) of -0.22 (-0.87) and is
statistically insignificant. Overall, the fixed effects results using ROA as the measure for firm
performance do not support hypotheses H1 but are consistent with H2. Model 2 presents
coefficient estimates when ROE is the measure of performance. The coefficient (t-statistic) on
insider ownership is -0.79 (-1.71) suggesting a negative relation between IN_OWN and ROE.
The estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level as predicted in H1. Consistent with the
prediction in hypothesis H2, the coefficient estimate on outside blockholders is positive and
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient estimate on ownership concentration is
negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, as predicted in hypothesis H3. Model 3 uses
industry-adjusted Q as the measure for firm performance. The coefficient estimate (t-statistic) on
insider ownership (IN_OWN) is -0.04 (-1.65) has the opposite sign as that predicted by H1.
Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H2, the coefficient estimate (t-statistic) on outside
blockholders is 0.98 (1.81) and statistically significant at the 0.15 level. Ownership concentration
is shown to be negatively associated with adjusted Q and the estimate is statistically significant
at the 0.10 level as predicted in H3. The coefficient estimates on inside ownership (square of
insider ownership) are negative (positive) for all three measures of firm performance which does
not support the interest alignment hypothesis at lower levels of inside ownership nor the notion
of a convex relation between insider ownership and firm performance.

Overall, the fixed effects results support H2 but do not support hypotheses H1 and H3. The
findings negate the findings summarized by Murphy (1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness
(2001), suggesting improvements in firm performance at low levels of insider ownership and
decreasing performance at higher levels of insider ownership.

6.3

Hausman Endogeneity Test

Table 30 presents coefficient estimates when IN_OWNt-2, OUT_BLOCKBt-2 and
OWN_CONt-2 are used as instruments. The coefficient (t-statistic) on IN_OWN Residuals is
-0.06(-3.08) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 9.68 (44.07) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on
IN_OWN Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is -0.08(-2.87) with an F-statistic
(Wald-2) of 11.03 (28.06). The coefficient (t-statistic) on IN_OWN Residuals using Tobin‟s Q
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as the dependent variable is -0.48(-0.78) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 11.94 (22.63). The
coefficients on the residuals for ROA and ROE are statistically significant at the 0.01. The
coefficients on the residuals for Tobin‟s Q are statistically insignificant. The null hypothesis that
the coefficient on the IN_OWN Residuals is zero is rejected for the first two models (ROA and
ROE). This implies the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of using the
OLS method. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OUT_BLOCK Residuals is 2.11(2.38) with an Fstatistic (Wald-2) of 7.48(14.96) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OUT_BLOCK
Residuals using ROE as the dependent variable is 0.02(1.68) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of
9.24 (18.76). The coefficient (t-statistic) on OUT_BLOCK Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the
dependent variable is 0.04(1.92) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 10.22 (19.07). The coefficients
on the residuals for all the dependent variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05
levels. The null hypothesis that the coefficient on the OUT_BLOCK Residuals is zero is rejected,
which suggests the presence of endogeneity and hence the inappropriateness of using the OLS
method. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals is 0.03(0.74) with an F-statistic
(Wald-2) of 4.64 (17.14) for ROA. The coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals using
ROE as the dependent variable is -0.11(-2.27) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 6.98 (20.04). The
coefficient (t-statistic) on OWN_CON Residuals using Tobin‟s Q as the dependent variable is
-0.55(-2.17) with an F-statistic (Wald-2) of 8.56 (23.08).

The null hypothesis that the

coefficient on the OWN_CON residuals is zero is rejected for ROE and Tobin‟s Q but is
statistically insignificant for ROA. In the presence of endogeneity, OLS coefficient estimates
will be biased and inconsistent.

6.2

Two-Stage Least Squares (IV)
Table 31 presents results from IV regressions. The instruments for corporate ownership

are the 2 lags of the proxies for ownership: Insider ownership (IN_OWN), the square of insider
ownership (IN_OWN)2, outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), and ownership concentration
(OWN_CON). Model 1 presents estimated coefficients using return on assets (ROA) as a
measure of performance. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H1, the coefficient estimate
on insider ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The sign and
statistical significance of the coefficient on OUT_BLOCK suggests a positive relation between
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blockholder ownership and firm performance which is also significant at the 0.05 level,
consistent with hypothesis H2. The coefficient estimate on ownership concentration is negative
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, as predicted in hypothesis H 3. Model 2 presents
coefficient estimates when ROE is the measure of performance. Insider ownership is shown to be
negatively associated with ROE and the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level as
predicted in H1. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis H2, the coefficient estimate on
outside blockholders is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient
estimate on ownership concentration is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, as
predicted in hypothesis H3. Model 3 uses industry-adjusted Q as the measure for firm
performance. The coefficient estimate on insider ownership (IN_OWN) has the opposite sign as
that predicted by H1 but statistically insignificant. Consistent with the prediction in hypothesis
H2, the coefficient estimate on outside blockholders is positive and statistically significant at the
0.10 level. Ownership concentration is shown to be negatively associated with adjusted Q and
the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level as predicted in H3. The coefficient
estimates on the square of insider ownership (IN_OWN)2 are positive for all three measures of
firm performance which does not support the notion of a convex relation between insider
ownership and firm performance.

In sum, the evidence from IV does not support the findings summarized in Murphy
(1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness (2001), suggesting improvements in firm
performance at low levels of insider ownership and decreasing performance at higher levels of
insider ownership. A plausible explanation is that in the case of equity carve-outs, parent
ownership in the subsidiary plays the role of insider ownership as measured in previous studies.
So combining officers‟ and directors‟ ownership in the subsidiary with the existing parent
ownership causes the entrenchment effects of insider ownership to overwhelm the incentive
alignment effects, thus negating the potential benefits of officers‟ and directors‟ ownership in the
0-5% ownership range that is documented in previous studies. On the other hand, IV results for
blockholder ownership support the findings by Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003). The
presence of an outside blockholder seems to have a moderating effect on the actions of insider
owners (subsidiary management) and the parent firm and ultimately on firm performance. The
investment argument predicts that insider ownership will increase (decrease) in anticipation of
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positive (negative) changes in future firm performance [Loderer and Martin (1997)]. The
negative coefficients on lags of insider ownership (IN_OWN) do not seem to support this view.

6.3

Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
Table 32 presents GMM coefficient estimates. The instruments are the 2 lags of the

ownership variables: Insider ownership (IN_OWN), the square of insider ownership
(IN_OWN)2, outside blockholders (OUT_BLOCK), and ownership concentration (OWN_CON).
The signs on the coefficients for all the main explanatory variables are consistent with the H1,
H2, and H3 predictions. Coefficient estimates for insider ownership are statistically significant at
the 0.01 level for ROA and at the 0.10 level for ROE and adjusted Q. The square of insider
ownership is shown to be positive contrary to previous findings. Coefficient estimates for outside
blockholder ownership are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for ROA and at the 0.10 level
for ROE and adjusted Q. Ownership concentration is shown to be negative and statically
significant at the 0.01 for ROA and 0.05 for ROE and adjusted Q. All three models are
statistically significant with J-statistics of 5.487E-03 for ROA, 3.89E-05 for ROE, and 2.57E-04
for Tobin‟s Q.

Overall, in the case of insider ownership, GMM results do not support the findings
summarized in Murphy (1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness (2001). In the presence of
significant parent ownership, entrenchment effects seem to overwhelm the incentive effects even
at modestly low levels of officers‟ and directors‟ ownership in the subsidiary. The evidence for
blockholder ownership supports the findings by Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003). The
presence of an outside blockholder has a moderating effect on insider ownership (subsidiary
management and the parent firm) and ultimately on the subsidiary‟s performance. Consistent
with Loderer and Martin (1997), parent firms seem to increase (decrease) their ownership in the
subsidiary firm in anticipation of strong (weak) future performance.

6.4

Empirical Results - Subset of Financial Firms (SIC 6000)
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Some of the IV and GMM results show statistically significant coefficients on the
indicator variable, FIN, for financial firms (SIC 6000). To ascertain whether the relation between
ownership and firm performance differs for financials, I run separate regressions for a subset of
financial firms. Empirical results are presented in Table 30. In both IV and GMM regressions,
performance measures [ROA, ROE, and adj_Q] are projected onto a set of ownership proxies
[(IN_OWN),

the

square

of

insider

ownership

(IN_OWN)2,

outside

blockholders

(OUT_BLOCK), and ownership concentration (OWN_CON)] with 2 lags, controlling for firm
size, capital ratio, and price-to-book value. The results are qualitatively similar to those for the
full sample. Consistent with the predictions in hypothesis H1, H2 and H3 insider ownership is
negatively associated with firm performance contrary to the findings summarized in Murphy
(1999), Core et al., (2001), and Holderness (2001). The coefficients on blockholder ownership
are positive for all performance measures and statistically significant at the 0.10 level, in support
of the evidence presented by Vishny (1997) and Holderness (2003). Ownership concentration is
negatively related to firm performance with statistically significant coefficients in support of
Loderer and Martin (1997). These results in combination seem to suggest that the impact of
corporate ownership on firm performance is not necessarily driven by industry characteristics but
may be endogenous to the firm.
6.5

Granger Causality Tests
Table 31 presents empirical results from bi-variate granger causality tests. Model 1 tests

Granger causality between insider ownership and various measures of firm performance [return
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and adjusted Tobin‟s Q]. The F-statistic for the null
hypothesis test that insider ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger cause return on assets
(ROA), is 17.21 with a p-value of 0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger
cause insider ownership (IN_OWN), is 4.68 with a p-value of 0.0000. Thus the reverse causality
between ROA and insider ownership cannot be rejected. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis
test that insider ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger cause return on equity (ROE), is 6.88
with a p-value of 0.0050. While the F-statistic for the test that ROE does not Granger cause
insider ownership (IN_OWN), is 1.32 with a p-value of 0.0840. These results seem to suggest
that past values of insider ownership have information precedence about future performance as
measured by ROE but not the other way round. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that
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insider ownership (IN_OWN) does not Granger cause adjusted Tobin‟s Q (adj_Q), is 8.98 with a
p-value of 0.0001. While the F-statistic for the test that adj_Q does not Granger cause insider
ownership (IN_OWN), is 11.04 with a p-value of 0.0000. These results also seem to suggest the
endogeneity of insider ownership and Tobin‟s Q.

Model 2 tests Granger causality between outside blockholder ownership and various
measures of firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and adjusted
Tobin‟s Q]. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that outside blockholder ownership
(OUT_BLOCK) does not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 7.42 with a p-value of
0.0000. The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger cause outside blockholder
ownership (OUT_BLOCK), is 5.33 with a p-value of 0.0000. Thus the reverse causality between
ROA and insider ownership cannot be rejected. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that
outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK) does not Granger cause return on equity (ROE),
is 4.08 with a p-value of 0.0005. While the F-statistic for the test that ROE does not Granger
cause outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK) 0.87 with a p-value of 0.3400. These
results seem to suggest that past firm performance has information precedence about future
outside blockholder ownership and not the other way round. The F-statistic for the null
hypothesis test that outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK) does not Granger cause
adjusted Tobin‟s Q (adj_Q), is 4.47 with a p-value of 0.0001. While the F-statistic for the test
that adj_Q does not Granger cause outside blockholder ownership (OUT_BLOCK), is 6.82 with
a p-value of 0.0000. These results also seem to suggest the endogeneity of outside blockholder
ownership and Tobin‟s Q.

Model 3 tests Granger causality between ownership concentration (OWN_CON) and
various measures of firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and
adjusted Tobin‟s Q]. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that ownership concentration
(OWN_CON) does not Granger cause return on assets (ROA), is 9.72 with a p-value of 0.0052.
The F-statistic for the test that ROA does not Granger cause ownership concentration
(OWN_CON), is 4.38 with a p-value of 0.0000. Thus the reverse causality between ROA and
ownership concentration cannot be rejected. The F-statistic for the null hypothesis test that
ownership concentration (OWN_CON) does not Granger cause return on equity (ROE), is 1.12
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with a p-value of 0.0015. While the F-statistic for the test that ROE does not Granger cause
ownership concentration (OWN_CON), is 9.81 with a p-value of 0.2800. These results seem to
suggest that past values of ownership concentration have information precedence about future
performance as measured by ROE but not the other way round. The F-statistic for the null
hypothesis test that ownership concentration (OWN_CON) does not Granger cause adjusted
Tobin‟s Q (adj_Q), is 6.07 with a p-value of 0.0000. While the F-statistic for the test that adj_Q
does not Granger cause ownership concentration (OWN_CON) is 3.89 with a p-value of 0.0050.
These results suggest that ownership concentration and Tobin‟s Q may be endogenous.

7. Robustness

I test the robustness of these results to alternative measures of firm performance/value. I
use investment intensity (INV), measured as R&D expenditures divided by total assets and the
ratio of capital expenditures-to-total assets. In both cases, results are qualitatively similar to those
reported using Tobin‟s Q. To ascertain whether there are any statistically significant differences
between firms with higher Q values than those with lower Q values, I divide the sample into
three sub-samples. The three sub-samples consist of firms that fall into the top 40%, firms in the
lower 40%, and the rest in the middle 20%. I run the tests on the top 40% and the bottom 40%.
Results obtained in both cases are qualitatively similar to those reported for the full sample. And
lastly, results obtained from winsorized sample data at 1% and 5%, are qualitatively similar to
those obtained for the full sample.

8.

Conclusion
There were three main objectives for this study. First, with a view to reconciling extant

literature, I sought to mitigate the econometric problems that have confounded previous studies
to ascertain which of the largely mixed extant evidence is supported. Second, due to the wide
disparity in the definition and measurement of corporate ownership, one could argue that the
mixed evidence is simply a reflection of differences in variable measurement. For robustness in
this study, I implement alternative measures of ownership to ascertain what impact if any,
different ownership proxies may have on firm performance. And third, to ascertain whether
measures of performance partly explain the mixed findings, I use both accounting and market
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based proxies for firm performance [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and
Tobin‟s Q] to reconcile the empirical with the extant evidence.

I find that contrary to extant evidence, insider ownership contrary to extant evidence that
posits a positive relation between insider ownership and firm performance at low levels of
ownership [0-5%], and a negative relation at higher levels of insider ownership is rejected in the
case of equity carve-outs. A combination of parent ownership and insider ownership in the
subsidiary seem to exacerbate the entrenchment effects and overwhelm the incentive alignment
effects at very low levels of insider ownership. These findings seem to suggest that dominant
parent firms, at least in the case of equity carve-outs, exacerbate rather than mitigate the agency
problem. As a matter of governance policy for equity carve-outs, alternative control mechanisms
may be necessary to moderate the behavior of dominant parent firms. In addition, these results
raise an interesting question. Why in the majority of carve-out transactions do parent firms
retain 70 - 99% majority control in the subsidiary, when in fact empirical evidence shows it to be
sub-optimal? Assuming that the goal of management in the parent firms is value-maximization
that ownership structure indeed reverts to the mean, other things being equal, one would expect
to observe a gradual reversion of parent ownership in the subsidiary towards the 51% level. I
find no evidence to support this argument. Ownership decisions in the case of equity carve-outs
may be driven by other strategic considerations. Second, I present evidence in support of the
positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. The presence of
outside blockholders seems to significantly moderate the negative effects of a highly dominant
parent firm. And lastly, I show that in the case of equity carve-outs, the level of ownership
concentration seems to increase (decrease) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes in firm
performance.
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Table 24: Sample Selection & Distribution
Table 24 presents sample distribution and size. Panel A provides a count of the firms comprising the final sample and the
number and reasons for those screened out. For a firm to be included it must be listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ exchanges
and be covered by COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Of the original 421 carve-out firms, 144 firms were dropped either because they are
unlisted or listed on exchanges other than AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE. An additional 105 firms were dropped due to non-coverage
by CRSP, COMPUSTAT. Two firms were dropped due to missing ownership data. The final sample consists of 170 firms of
which 82 are financial firms (SIC 6000) and 88 are non-financial firms. Panel B presents the sample distribution by year of
announcement and Panel C shows the industry distribution by 2-digit SIC.

Panel A: Construction of the Sample

# of firms

Total number of firms:
Firms not listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ:
Firms not covered by COMPUSTAT / CRSP:
Firms with missing data:

421
(144)
(105)
(2)

Final Sample:

170

Panel B: Distribution by Year

# of firms

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

10
9
7
5
7
8
9
16
7
8
13
8
10
8
14
13
8
5
5

Panel C: Distribution by SIC

Two-Digit SIC

# of firms

Mining, Oil & Gas
Manufacturing
Transport, Comm., Utilities
Wholesale/Retail
Financials
Services (other)

10
20-30
40
50
60
70-80

9
37
9
14
82
19

*Source: Security Data Company (SDC)
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Table 25: Descriptive Statistics
Table 25 presents sample descriptive statistics. Some performance means are unusually low (high) due to the influence of
outliers, this problem is mitigated in the regression analysis by using industry-adjusted numbers and by winsorizing the data at
99% and 1%.
Variable

Mean

(Std. Dev)

Median

Min

Max

Parent Ownership (%)

0.65

0.09

0.71

0.08

0.94

Insider Ownership (%)

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.01

0.03

Outside Blockholder Ownership (%)

0.14

0.05

0.12

0.05

0.18

Ownership Concentration

0.81

0.16

0.92

0.14

1.00

Book-to-Market

0.41

0.24

0.39

0.21

0.79

Tobin‟s Q

1.48

1.12

1.57

1.18

1.92

Market Value of Equity ($M)

1,002

244

207

3.4

58,514

Leverage (LT. Debt/ TA)

0.43

0.20

0.54

0.12

1.06

Return on Assets

0.08

0.13

0.11

-0.03

0.15

Return on Equity

0.17

0.24

0.21

-0.06

0.28

Source: Standard & Poor‟s COMPUSTAT, SDC,
CRSP, Thompson Financial, Proxy Statements.
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Table 26: Variable Descriptions
Table 26 provides descriptions of the variables used and related sources. Subscripts that appear on variables presented elsewhere relate to number of
time lags.

Variable

Description

Source

Adj_Q

Adjusted Tobin‟s Q – market value of equity
divided by book value of assets

Tobin et al. (1977)

Adj_ROA

Adjusted return-on-assets – firm i‟s return
on assets minus median industry return
on assets

Compustat

Adj_ROE

Adjusted return-on-equity – firm i‟s return
on equity minus median industry return
on equity

Compustat

BME

Book-to-market value ratio

Compustat

EBIT

EBIT-to-total Assets ratio

Compustat

CAP

Capital ratio or Tier 1 leverage ratio
for financial firms

10-K Reports

FIN

Indicator variable: „1‟ = financial firm
„0‟= otherwise

SIC Codes
(6000 -6999)

IN_OWN

Proportion of shares owned by officers
& directors, and parent firm

Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats.

(IN_OWN) 2

The square of proportion of shares owned
by officers & directors and parent firm

Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats.

LEV

Leverage: debt-to-total assets

Compustat

L_MVE

Log of firm‟s market value

Compustat

L_TA

Log of firm‟s total assets

Compustat

OUT_BLOCK

Proportion of shares owned by outside blockholders (equal to or greater than 5%)

Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats.

OWN-CON

Proportion of shares owned by all blockholders
(equal to or greater than 5%)

Thompson Financial/ Proxy Stats.

PBV

Price-to-book value

Compustat

ROA

Return-on-assets (EBIT/TA)

Compustat

ROE

Return-on-equity (EBIT/Common Equity)

Compustat

SIC

Standard Industry classification code

Compustat
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Table 27: Correlation Matrix
Table 27 presents pairwise correlations between the main dependent variables (adjusted Tobin‟s Q, ROE, and ROA), and explanatory variables (IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK,
PAR_OWN).
N=170

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Adj_Q

1.00

2. Adj_Qt+1

0.93**

1.00

3. Adj_ROE

0.31*

0.28*

1.00

4. Adj_ROEt+1

0.38**

0.43***

0.78**

1.00

5. Adj_ROA

0.04*

0.23*

0.11

0.64*

1.00

6. Adj_ROAt+1

0.07

0.17*

0.12*

0.04*

0.47

1.00

7. IN_OWN

-0.05*

-0.17*

-0.03

-0.72*

0.28

-0.05

1.00

8. OUT_BLOCK

0.11

0.39*

0.48

0.66*

0.17

0.61*

0.07

1.00

9. OWN_CON

-0.01*

-0.04*

-0.12

-0.02*

-0.53*

-0.78*

0.05

-0.13

1.00

10. L_TA

-0.14*

-0.52*

-0.41

-0.27

-0.13*

-0.11

0.27*

0.51*

0.28

1.00

11. LEV

-0.38*

-0.13*

-0.22

-0.10*

-0.08

-0.14

0.29*

0.08

0.11

-0.66*

1.00

12. EBIT

0.81*

0.74*

0.91*

0.93*

0.81

0.72

0.51*

-0.068*

-0.24

-0.44*

0.38*

129

9

1.00

10

11

12

Table 28: OLS Regressions
Table 28 presents estimated coefficients on ownership proxies [IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK, and OWN_CON]. The dependent variables are ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q in Models 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. I control for firm size (L_TA), Leverage (LEV), and industry (FIN). Reported results are median regressions by year from 1983 to 2004.
Model 1: Adj_ROA

Model 3: Adj_Tobin’s Q

Model 2: Adj_ROE

Year

IN_OWN

OUT_BLOCK

OWN_CON

IN_OWN

OUT_BLOCK

OWN_CON

IN_OWN

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

-1.24
-0.84
-0.07**
-1.02
0.73
-2.14*
-0.92*
-1.05
0.04
0.06*
-0.54*
-0.88
0.02
-1.23*
-0.71*
-0.06
-2.56*
0.04
-0.27*
-0.11
0.57
-0.49*

2.28*
1.46
0.48
1.03
3.38*
1.01
0.78*
1.73*
0.87
2.44*
0.06
1.17
0.36*
0.02
0.63*
2.49
0.77
1.29*
0.81
0.04*
2.54
-1.06

-0.81
0.22
1.23
-1.41*
-0.01
0.98
-0.06*
0.55
0.68*
-0.77
0.53
2.09*
-0.13
0.28
0.07
1.17
-0.05*
0.21
0.89
-0.51*
0.04
0.22

0.06
-1.43**
0.66
-1.24
-0.25
-0.89*
0.02
0.63
-0.57*
-2.08*
0.64
-0.84
-0.40*
0.11
1.08
2.17
-0.31*
-0.78*
0.28
-0.36*
0.04
-0.09

0.02
2.28*
0.12
3.05
0.11*
0.92
1.34*
0.64*
0.03
0.81
1.01*
0.54
0.09
2.01
0.17*
0.76*
0.42
0.06
2.14
0.67*
0.04
2.07*

-0.21
-1.04
-2.47
-4.01*
2.16
-0.08
0.32
-0.62*
-0.04
1.13
-0.22
-1.38
-0.29*
0.01
-2.31*
0.77
-0.15
-0.88
-0.17*
0.36
-0.04
-1.09*

0.14
-0.98*
-2.07
-1.12
0.05
-0.68*
-0.47
-0.51
-0.69
-1.21*
-0.32
-1.78*
0.03
-0.55
-0.44
-0.54
0.01
-0.97*
-0.51
0.68
-0.77*
0.09

3.27
1.01*
0.98
0.57
1.04
0.73
0.12
2.41
0.77*
1.02
0.48
0.03
1.29
0.35*
0.52
1.07
2.07
0.05
0.44
0.72*
1.04
0.38

-2.08
-1.21*
-0.93
0.42
0.68
-1.33
-2.10*
0.56
-0.87
-0.35
-0.67*
-1.12
0.58
-0.28*
-1.44
0.01
0.83
-1.04*
-0.24
0.87
-0.08*
-0.31

-0.67***
0.56
-3.92

1.02***
0.77
6.23

-0.34**
0.77
-2.09

-0.08*
0.46
-1.67

0.68*
0.92
4.04

-0.62*
0.76
-3.08

-0.33
0.58
-1.31

0.74*
0.84
1.81

-0.69*
0.76
1.73

Time Series mean
Time series σ:
T-statistic

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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OUT_BLOCK

OWN_CON

Table 29: Fixed Effects Model
Table 29 presents coefficient estimates from a fixed effects model using industry-adjusted performance measures [ROA, ROE,
and Tobin‟s Q] on ownership proxies [IN_OWN, (IN_OWN)2, OUT_BLOCK, OWN_CON]. I control for financial firms (FIN),
leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.

ROAt

Dependent Variable
ROEt

Tobin’s Qt

Constant

6.23***
(4.33)

11.32***
(6.04)

2.19*
(1.88)

IN_OWNt-1

-1.38*
(-1.69)

-0.79*
(-1.71)

- 0.04*
(-1.65)

(IN_OWNt-1) 2

0.17
(1.36)

-0.04
(-1.17)

0.42
(1.28)

OUT_BLOCKt-1

1.24*
(1.72)

2.37**
(2.02)

0.98*
(1.81)

OWN_CONt-1

-0.22

-0.41

-0. 06

(-0.87)

(-1.07)

(-1.14)

L_TA

-0.22*
(-1.66)

-1.01
(-1.57)

-0.07*
(-1.72)

LEV

-1.32*
(-1.88)

-0.43*
(-1.72)

-0.08**
(-2.04)

FIN

0.21*
(1.68)

0.07*
(1.75)

0.03
(1.04)

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 30: Hausman Endogeneity Tests
Table 30 provides test results from the Hausman test for endogeneity on IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK, and OWN_CON. Dependent
variables are ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q. I use 2 lags of insider ownership, outside blockholders, and ownership concentration as
instruments (IN_OWNt-2, OUT_BLOCKt-2, and OWN_CONt-2) and I test the significance of the coefficients on the residuals.

ROA

ROE

Tobin’s Q

Variable

Coefficient (t-statistic)

IN_OWN

-0.73(-2.44)

IN_OWN Residuals

-0.06 (-3.08)

OUT_BLOCK

4.79 (3.12)

OUT_BLOCK Residuals

2.11 (2.38)

OWN_CON

0.22(1.02)

OWN_CON Residuals

0.03 0.74)

Variable

Coefficient (t-statistic)

IN_OWN

-1.14(-1.97)

IN_OWN Residuals

-0.06 (-2.87)

OUT_BLOCK

0.48 (2.37)

OUT_BLOCK Residuals

0.02 (1.68)

OWN_CON

-0.47 (-1.57)

OWN_CON Residuals

-0.11 (-2.27)

Variable

Coefficient (t-statistic)

IN_OWN

-1.03(-3.14)

IN_OWN Residuals

-0.48(-0.78)

OUT_BLOCK

0.68 (2.39)

OUT_BLOCK Residuals

0.04 (1.92)

OWN_CON

-1.37(-2.09)

OWN_CON Residuals

-0.55 (-2.17)
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FStatistic

Wald

9.68

44.07

7.48

14.96

4.64

17.14

FStatistic

Wald
(2)

11.03

28.06

9.24

18.76

6.98

20.04

FStatistic

Wald
(2)

11.94

22.63

10.22

19.07

8.56

23.08

(2)

Table 31 – Instrumental Variables Regression
Table 31 presents IV coefficient estimates of ownership instruments [IN_OWN , (IN_OWN)2,
OUT_BLOCK,(OWN_CON)] using 2 lags of the original variables as instruments. The dependent variables are
industry- adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size
(L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.

Dependent Variable
ROAt

ROEt

Tobin’s Qt



0.67
(1.03)

2.31*
(1.66)

1.19*
(1.92)

IN_OWNt-2

-3.47**
(-2.15)

-0.94*
(-1.69)

-0.03
(-1.23)

(IN_OWNt-1) 2

1.28*
(1.71)

0.02
(1.44)

0.78*
(1.81)

OUT_BLOCKt-1

0.11**
(2.04)

0.54**
(2.48)

0.07*
(1.93)

(OWN_CON)t-1

-2.39***
(-4.98)

-1.04*
(1.68)

-2.33*
(-1.87)

L_TA

-1.02**
(1.97)

-0.78*
(-1.83)

-0.64
(-1.33)

LEV

-0.07
(-1.41)

-0.42*
(-1.72)

-0.19**
(-2.15)

FIN

0.04
(1.02)

0.23*
(1.74)

0.54
(0.91)

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
P-Values

0.34
8.12
[0.0000]

Panel A

Panel B
ROAt

0.24
3.78
[0.0052]
Dependent Variable
ROEt

0.22
12.03
[0.0002]
Tobin’s Qt

Constant

1.02*
(1.73)

0.98
(1.18)

1.22
(1.03)

IN_OWNt-3

-2.05
(-1.04)

-0.15*
(-1.66)

-0.37*
(-1.72)

(IN_OWNt-3) 2

0.48*
(1.82)

0.59*
(1.69)

0.01
(1.16)

OUT_BLOCKt-3

1.02
(1.18)

0.06*
(1.77)

0.28*
(1.80)

(OWN_CON)t-3

-0.15**
(-3.28)

-0.83
(1.52)

-0.05
(-1.31)

L_TA

-0.97*
(1.67)

-0.33*
(-1.72)

-0.09*
(-1.69)

LEV

-1.13
(-1.08)

-0.88
(-1.51)

-0.64*
(1.75)

FIN

0.21*
(1.68)

0.51*
(1.79)

0.04
(1.53)

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
P-Values

0.34
4.88
[0.0001]

0.27
6.09
[0.0054]

0.18
5.39
[0.0042]

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 32: GMM Estimates
Table 32 presents GMM coefficient estimates of ownership instruments [IN_OWN, (IN_OWN) 2 , OUT_BLOCK, (OWN_CON)].In Panel
A, 2 lags of the original ownership proxies are used as instruments. The dependent variables are industry- adjusted ROA, ROE, and
Tobin‟s Q. I control for financial firms (FIN), leverage (LEV), and firm size (L_TA). The values in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Dependent Variable
Panel A
ROAt
ROEt
Tobin’s Qt
Constant

1.22*
(1.68)

2.79
(1.03)

3.83*
(1.81)

IN_OWNt-1

-4.62***
(-7.28)

-2.31*
(-1.74)

-1.19*
(-1.68)

(IN_OWNt-1) 2

3.87*
(1.74)

1.51
(1.18)

4.66
(1.23)

OUT_BLOCKt-1

1.47***
(3.68)

2.15*
(1.71)

1.03*
(1.66)

(OWN_CON)t-1

-3.78*
(-2.98)

-2.94**
(1.98)

-4.11*
(-2.12)

L_TA

-0.04*
(1.68)

-0.13**
(-2.09)

-0.56
(-1.01)

LEV

-0.11*
(-1.82)

-0.07
(-1.51)

-0.33*
(-1.74)

FIN

1.13*
(1.68)

0.94*
(1.76)

0.33
(1.29)

R2
Adjusted R2
Durbin Watson
J-Statistic

0.12
0.18
6.44
5.48E-03

0.18
0.26
4.78
3.89E-05

0.27
0.31
8.39
2.57E-04

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 33: IV and GMM Estimates - Financial Firms (SIC 6000)
Table 33 presents IV and GMM coefficient estimates for a set of ownership proxies [IN_OWNt-1, (IN_OWNt-1) 2 , OUT_BLOCKt-1, (OWN_CON)t-1] using 2 lags of the
original variables as instruments, for a sub-sample of financial financials. I control for price-to-book value, capital ratios, and log of total assets. Dependent variables are
industry adjusted ROA, ROE, and Tobin‟s Q for models 1, 2, 3 respectively.
IV
GMM
Model
1
2
3
1
2
3
ROAt
ROEt
Tobin‟s Qt
ROAt
ROEt
Tobin‟s_Qt
Constant

-1.37
(-1.01)

1.86*
(1.66)

0.77*
(1.68)

2.23*
(1.72)

0.88
(1.02)

-4.02*
(-1.66)

IN_OWNt-1

-2.16***
(-3.27)

-0.58*
(-1.70)

-1.05*
(-1.90)

-1.82*
(-1.68)

-3.14*
(-1.71)

-0.72*
(-1.82)

(IN_OWNt-1) 2

0.72
(1.44)

0.31*
(1.86)

0.55
(1.11)

2.22*
(1.65)

0.11
(1.07)

0.09
(1.54)

OUT_BLOCKt-1

1.71*
(1.81)

1.73**
(2.04)

2.83
(1.12)

0.81
(0.54)

0.78**
(2.33)

2.03
(1.03)

(OWN_CON)t-1

-1.47
(-2.63)

-0.65
(-1.13)

-0.36*
(-1.72)

-4.11*
(-3.98)

-1.22
(-1.03)

0.47
(1.11)

L_TA

-0.66
(-1.40)

-0.04*
(-1.93)

-0.22*
(-1.74)

-0.03
(-1.35)

0.42*
(1.65)

-0.13
(-1.03)

Capital Ratio

-0.17*
(-1.74)

-0.39*
(-1.65)

-0.24
(-1.57)

-0.37*
(-1.90)

-0.67*
(-1.80)

-0.87**
(-2.13)

PBV

1.41*
(1.81)

0.79*
(1.68)

-

2.52*
(1.69)

0.85**
(2.31)

-

Adj.R2
F-statistic
Model p-value

0.34
8.04
[0.0000]

0.22
3.87
[0.0005]

0.18
6.22
[0.0000]

0.26
3.34
[0.0000]

0.14
4.18
[0.0001]

0.23
7.14
[0.0004]

*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level
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Table 34: Granger Causality Tests
Table 34 presents results from bi-variate granger causality tests between ownership structure [IN_OWN, OUT_BLOCK, and
OWN_CON] and firm performance [Adj_Q, ROE, and ROA].

Model 1-(ROA)

Model 2-(ROE)

F-Statistic

Probability

IN_OWN does not granger cause ROA

17.21

[0.0000]

ROA does not granger cause IN_OWN

4.68

[0.0000]

6.88

[0.0050]

1.32

[0.0840]

OUT_BLOCK does not granger cause
ROA
ROA does not granger cause
OUT_BLOCK
OWN_CON does not granger cause
ROA
ROA does not granger cause
OWN_CON

8.98

[0.0001]

11.04

[0.0000]

IN_OWN does not granger cause ROE

7.42

[0.0000]

ROE does not granger cause IN_OWN

5.33

[0.0000]

4.08

[0.0005]

0.87

[0.3400]

4.47

[0.0001]

6.82

[0.0000]

9.72

[0.0052]

4.38

[0.0000]

1.12

[0.0015]

9.81

[0.2800]

6.07

[0.0000]

3.89

[0.0050]

OUT_BLOCK does not granger cause
ROE
ROE does not granger cause
OUT_BLOCK
OWN_CON does not granger cause
ROE
ROE does not granger cause
OWN_CON
IN_OWN does not granger cause
Adj_Q
Adj_Q does not granger cause
IN_OWN

Model 3-(Adj_Q)

OUT_BLOCK does not granger cause
Adj_Q
Adj_Q does not granger cause
OUT_BLOCK
OWN_CON does not granger cause
Adj_Q
Adj_Q does not granger cause
OWN_CON
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